Back on the international stage, the Chinese president has made a point of courting European leaders. This should not be misconstrued as a policy change. It rather suggests that difficult times are ahead.
All eyes were on the Indo-Pacific in November as world leaders gathered in Bali and Bangkok for summits of the G20 Y APEC. This year’s summit season could not come at a better time for China’s leaders. Fresh from the 20th Communist Party Congress, and having secured an unprecedented third term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), these trips to Indonesia and Thailand helped Xi Jinping return victorious to the world stage.
Unafraid of appearing weak now that control of the party leadership has been secured, Xi projected a confident image as he worked to make up for lost time after years of little face-to-face interaction with other world leaders. Often without a mask, he held bilateral meetings with many of the leaders in attendance, including many Europeans. Most of these meetings took place at the Chinese delegation’s hotel, in a subtle diplomatic show of authority.
In an attempt to mend relations with the Western powers—or at least prevent them from getting out of control—the general tone of all these meetings was more constructive than in the past. Xi delivered a much friendlier series of speeches than he has been used to in the past two years. For example, he pointed out that China-Australia relations they should “take care” during his meeting with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. It was the first such meeting between the two countries since relations soured sharply in 2016. (When Canberra proposed an international investigation into the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, Beijing responded with a wave of trade restrictions.) In the absence of points of agreement between the two, Beijing is also showing signs of a certain willingness to re-establish relations with its main competitor. Xi’s meeting with US President Joe Biden was a reopening of communication between both powers.
No signs of policy change
Despite this change in tone, which already began during the visit of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Beijing in early November, it is important not to let Beijing’s charm strategy distract from the main messages conveyed during the 20th Party Congress, held at the end of October. It is in the Congress that political orientations and priorities are outlined, and where the key signals of what we can expect in the coming years in terms of China’s foreign policy are issued.
And the party congress made a few things clear. First, Beijing has a much bleaker view of the international environment than it did five years ago. Triumphalist language about China “standing tall and steady in the East” and enjoying a period of strategic opportunity has given way to an emphasis on the risks and challenges it faces. This includes the intentions of international actors towards China, with Xi’s “working report” warning that external attempts to blackmail and contain China are increasing and may intensify at any time, a veiled reference to the US and its allies.
Second, Beijing has prescribed more “fighting spirit” to respond to these challenges. Although the official objectives and principles of Chinese foreign policy remain unchanged, Xi called for strengthening China’s voice in international affairs and its extraterritorial legal instrument. He also stressed the need to invest more in China’s relations with developing countries, already central to Beijing’s approach to geopolitical competition with the West.
And third, Xi Jinping’s position at the center of political power in China has been further consolidated. He has packed the Politburo and its Standing Committee with loyalists, outlined a political program that revolves around his priorities and amended the party constitution to formalize his position as the party’s core. Ideology, security and stability will be defining themes of Xi’s third term. And party leaders can be expected to take a hard line against any opposition, real or perceived, to China’s rise.
In short, the seduction strategy with which Beijing intends to woo Western powers and prevent them from uniting against China is likely to continue. But it’s probably just small gestures. Ultimately, China’s behavior on the international scene seems destined to stay the course. The geopolitical competition with the US will continue to be the focus of Chinese foreign policy; developing countries will continue to be the main targets of Chinese diplomacy and military pressure on Taiwan will continue.
Xi courts European leaders
European leaders also welcomed Xi’s offensive on the G20 fringes. But it was the member states of the European Union that met with Xi, while representatives of the EU institutions were left out. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, visited Beijing on December 1 to try to remedy this situation. But Brussels is increasingly seen in Beijing as a problematic interlocutor, given its view of China as an increasingly systemic rival and its increasing coordination with the US on China policy.
For this reason, Beijing is turning more and more to the EU member states to defend a return to less tense relations. During his meetings with the Dutch Prime Minister, mark ruttethe French presidentEmmanuel Macronthe president of the Spanish Government, Pedro Sanchezand the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, Xi asked them to encourage the EU to maintain a positive policy towards China and took advantage of some of the points of friction that have arisen in the transatlantic relationship (such as the Inflation Reduction Act or the new US controls on semiconductor exports). ), in a familiar attempt to drive a wedge between Europe and the US. He supplemented this request with calls and commitments for further China-Europe cooperation in a wide range of policy fields, from energy and agriculture to tourism and science.
The latent desire of some European leaders to find ways to reconnect with China and return to cooperation means there is a risk that Xi’s smiles and friendly language could be misinterpreted as a change in policy. But the declarations rejecting the use — or the threat of use — of nuclear weapons, while positive, simply recap China’s longstanding nuclear doctrine. And Xi’s assertion that China does not intend to change the existing international order finds no echo in the CCP language prevailing at the 20th Party Congress. The chances that China and Europe could meet somewhere in the middle on contentious issues like human rights, China’s support for Russia, the rules-based international order or Taiwan remain slim.
Chinese leaders will also have to deal with multiple crises ahead, including a slowdown in the economy and a wave of discontent with their zero-covid policies that will be exacerbated by an increasingly difficult international environment. the protests That have erupted across the country have shown the limits of China’s extensive surveillance and censorship systems, and while they are mostly directed against pandemic control measures, some calls for democracy and free speech have emerged. and even to the resignation of Xi.
The propaganda apparatus is likely to blame foreign forces for instigating the protests, but they show the degree of discontent simmering below the surface in China. Beijing will be able to reassert internal control, but it will have a hard time addressing the underlying issues that cause these problems. This is likely to lead Beijing to focus its attention on internal dynamics, reducing the space for engagement in the international arena. But as instability in China increases, we must be prepared for what lies ahead, in the Indo-Pacific and beyond: a turbulent period of uncertainty and unpredictability.
Article originally published in English in the Web from Internationale Politik Quarterly.
