When the American friend is gone

Towards the end of his memorable Farewell Address as President of the United States of America, George Washington advised his compatriots to avoid becoming involved in European political “vicissitudes” or in the “combinations and collisions of their friendships or enmities”. Why, Washington wondered, “entangle our peace and prosperity in the difficulties of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or whim.” For just over a century, however, the US seems to have done nothing but become entangled, time and time again, in European ambitions and rivalries. The latest example: the war in Ukraine, an eminently European issue where the key actor –beyond the actual contenders– seems to be, once again, the American superpower.

In the First World War, under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the millions of soldiers that the US sent to the Western Front in the last year of the war ended up tipping the scales in favor of the Allies. In the Second World War, under the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, the US first used the “great arsenal of democracy” through the Lend-Lease program, and then turned all its human and material power into two large theaters of operations separated by more than 10,000 kilometers. During the Cold War, the security umbrella it provided against the Soviet threat, maintained by many different administrations, allowed Europeans to focus on rebuilding themselves economically and politically, enjoying unprecedented decades of peace and prosperity. In the last great European war of the 20th century, that of Yugoslavia, it was the Americans who sponsored the peace talks in Dayton (Ohio) that led to the end of the conflict.

In the war in Ukraine, the US is once again a decisive actor. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, between January and October of this year, the administration led by Joe Biden has committed more than 52 billion euros in military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. among the armament made in america For kyiv are the portable Javelin anti-tank rockets – which have destroyed thousands of Russian armored vehicles – or the Himars, a multi-launch system of high-precision rockets that can reach distances of 70 kilometers, fundamental to the success of the latest Ukrainian offensives. The latest aid package, worth 400 million dollars, includes everything from cold protection equipment to air defense systems and ammunition, such as missiles for the Hawk air defense systems recently supplied by Spain, which will help protect troops and Ukrainian infrastructures from Russian drones and helicopters. In short, the US has not stopped providing weapons and equipment essential to sustain the heroic Ukrainian effort in the different phases of the war.

Thus, today it is we Europeans who cannot avoid getting entangled, albeit vicariously, in American troubles, following the American political vicissitudes with genuine interest and undisguised concern. We have a lot at stake in every election held on the other side of the Atlantic. In the last ones, the midterms of November 8, the Europeans committed to the Ukrainian cause feared that a weakening of the Democrats – they could have lost control of both houses of Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate – would affect the commitment of USA with Ukraine.

It hasn’t been like that. The firmness of the American commitment is, for the moment, assured. The consensus between both parties on the Ukrainian question is clear, despite certain republican whims, such as when, during the campaign, the new speaker of the House of Representatives, Republican Kevin McCarthy, suggested that there would be no “blank check” for kyiv if his party prevailed in the elections. He was soon corrected by Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell, who asserted that “the Biden administration and our allies must do more to provide the tools Ukraine needs to thwart Russian aggression.” In Washington, most of the political class believe that what is at stake is nothing less than the world order built after World War II and propped up by the American victory in the cold war, as well as the status of their country as a hegemonic superpower. . Both Democrats and Republicans consider that any setback in Ukraine would send a message of weakness in the face of Russian revisionism and, mainly, in the face of Chinese expansionism.

“Does it make sense to bear the cost of the war in Ukraine, with all that is at stake, without increasing aid where it really counts: on the ground?”

We Europeans also aided the Ukrainian war effort and, above all, inflicted irreparable damage on the Russian war machine (while bearing a huge financial cost for it). The successive packages of sanctions and the accelerated energy disconnection have undermined the economy and the combat capacity of the Russian armed forces, without a doubt. But in the military field, the European volume is far from the American today. According to the Kiel Institute, the commitments of the countries and institutions of the European Union add up to 29,000 million euros, of which 2,500 million correspond to military aid (compared to 27,600 million for the US). Some cases, such as the German one, are surprising –or not so much– if we take into account that the European economic giant is, today, a military dwarf (something that they are trying to correct with their announced Zeitenwendewhose development, however, will take time to become visible).

Given this scenario, one may ask: does it make sense to assume the cost of the war in Ukraine, with all that is at stake, without increasing aid where it really is decisive: on the ground? Should we leave the course of the war in American (and, to a lesser extent, British) hands?

The seriousness of the challenge forces us Europeans to ask ourselves uncomfortable questions. One of the main ones was made by the high representative, Josep Borrell, in the pages of Foreign policy: “Would we have been able to do it alone?”. If we Europeans had not had, on the other side of the Atlantic, the firm will and enormous resources of our American friend, what would we have done? What would our attitude have been in a different setting of American politics, with another administration less inclined to act? Better not think about it. But you have to think about it.

In Europe, the so far ill-fated Russian invasion brings relief and alarm in almost equal measure. Relief that the EU in particular and the West in general are strong and united; because the US has “returned”, as Biden promised, after the dark years of Donald Trump; because the Russian bear has more cardboard than we thought, and his disdain for International Law and human rights, the inviolability of borders or respect for the territorial integrity of States is costing him dearly, not to mention priceless. But the invasion is also alarming: because behind the Russian cardboard is the largest nuclear arsenal in the world; because the state of European defense is, being generous, still embryonic; because the Trumpian ghosts are still there, and, almost more important, because the US is not going to stop looking at the Indo-Pacific, no matter how pending it is today of the European troubles. The next war will be fought there.

The first president of the US was not an isolationist, nor did he deny the need for strategic alliances in extraordinary periods (like today). But he was clear that Europe had his interests and America had his. And that the first thing was the defense of the US national interest. The questions Washington asked serve us Europeans well today: why make our peace and prosperity dependent on American ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or whim?