Europe

Ukraine is looking for its defensive line against Russia

Ukrainian artillerymen prepare a mortar fire near the Dnieper, November 6, 2023.

Faced with the risk of a major Russian offensive in late May or early June, Ukraine is seeking to establish a defensive line similar to the one the Russians built to oppose the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023. It is a herculean task.

On Sunday, April 7, Volodymyr Zelensky again pressured the United States to authorize the expected US military aid of $60 billion, blocked in Congress by supporters of Donald Trump. Without it, the Ukrainian president fears that his country will not be able to withstand a likely large-scale Russian offensive.

It is not only Western support that is worrying in Ukraine. kyiv is also immersed in a race against time to establish defensive lines worthy of the name in anticipation of an intensification of Russian attacks expected “at the end of May, beginning of June,” according to Volodymyr Zelensky declared in an interview with the American network. CBS at the end of March.

Adviivka's lessons

The magnitude of the problem was revealed during the battle of Avdviivka, which ended in mid-February with the fall of the city, north of Donetsk. Following this Ukrainian defeat, kyiv initially tried to reassure the Russians by assuring them that it had sufficient defenses to prevent any Russian attempt to continue its advance. However, “the Russians captured three nearby towns in less than a week,” as noted the New York Times in an article on the Ukrainian defensive effort published on March 2.

In this investigation, the New York newspaper pointed out the “rudimentary” nature of the Ukrainian defensive fortifications. He was not the only one to make this observation: quoted “anonymous Ukrainian military sources” deploring the “lack of preparation of Ukrainian defenses.”

However, “the defensive lines around Adviivka were supposed to be in better condition than elsewhere on the front,” says Huseyn Aliyev, a specialist on the Ukrainian war at the University of Glasgow, Scotland. They were built on fortifications that had already been built in 2014, during fighting between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian forces, in the separatist region of Donetsk.

The Ukrainian government began making a solid defensive line a top priority in November 2023. Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated this in December, and the government then set an ambitious goal: to establish a 2,000-kilometer fortification system, which would have nothing to do with envy the famous Russian defensive line Surovikin.

This is the defense in depth system that Russia managed to build in six months, between October 2022 and March 2023, and spanning more than 800 kilometers. Composed of bunkers, “dragon teeth” -concrete cones placed on the ground to slow the advance of tanks-, minefields and trenches; This structure considerably slowed down the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the spring of 2023.

The Surovikin line: mission impossible?

“kyiv does not want to refer directly to a Russian work and refuses to talk about a Ukrainian-style Surovikin line, but the army is clearly inspired by it,” says Huseyn Aliyev.

“The Ukrainians hope to build their own defense system – with mines, dragon teeth and bunkers – that could slow the advance of tanks and exhaust Russian forces in the next offensive,” agrees Will Kingston-Cox, an expert on the war. from Ukraine to Europinion, a think-tank on security and geopolitics issues in Europe.

Except that “what has been built is not at all comparable to the Surovikin line,” says Glen Grant, an analyst at the Baltic Security Foundation and a specialist in Russian military issues. “It's been done in the same spirit, but the result is much less elaborate and doesn't provide any in-depth defense at the moment,” adds Jeff Hawn, a Russia specialist at the London School of Economics.

There are many obstacles to this Ukrainian-style Surovikin line. Starting with the context: “Russia was able to concentrate on its fortifications for six months without any particular military pressure from the Ukrainians [que estaban preparando su contraofensiva]”says Glen Grant.


Ukrainian artillerymen prepare a mortar fire near the Dnieper, November 6, 2023. © Roman Pilipey, AFP

The Ukrainians, for their part, are forced “to raise their defensive positions about twenty kilometers from the front line to avoid being bombed during construction,” says Huseyn Aliyev. Therefore, “it is more accurate to speak of a line of withdrawal than of a defensive line,” emphasizes Glen Grant.

Efforts to install fortifications are also concentrated “around cities and regions, which can be attacked from various directions [como Zaporizhia o Kupiansk]”explains Jeff Hawn.

The Ukrainians have also been left far behind. “They started talking about it in November, but the work didn't start until January. In other words, they started digging trenches when the ground was most frozen, which was not optimal,” says Huseyn Aliyev.

“It is clear that there was a political mistake. The Ukrainian government should have started building these defenses as soon as the United States began to delay sending money to Ukraine[a partir de octubre de 2023]”says Glen Grant.

To overcome the administrative “Pandora's box”

Russia has also been able to rely on engineering units to accelerate and supervise the construction of the Surovikin line. This is not the case in Ukraine. “There is a clear lack of specialized manpower in the army, which means it has had to turn to private companies to supply equipment and workers,” says Huseyn Aliyev.

As a consequence, the construction of a Ukrainian-style Surovikin line has opened an administrative Pandora's box. “They have to obtain specific authorizations for these types of contracts and also convince the selected companies to send civilian labor to build in areas close to the front line,” summarizes Huseyn Aliyev.

But kyiv has no choice. “At the moment, the Ukrainian army is slowing down the Russian advance mainly thanks to drones. But in the face of artillery fire, soldiers will inevitably need more defensive shelters,” says Glen Grant. “Although Ukraine is behind in its fortification program, it must get on with it, otherwise it will be an admission of defeat,” agrees Will Kingston-Cox.

Even with all the resources at its disposal, kyiv “should not be able to achieve its goal of having 2,000 km of fortifications by the beginning of June,” fears Huseyn Aliyev. This does not mean that Moscow has won beforehand. According to experts interviewed by France 24, the most important thing for kyiv is to have a defensive system capable of resisting until the United States releases the promised aid. At the moment, trenches, bunkers and “dragon's teeth” are the best way to make up for the lack of ammunition on the Ukrainian side.

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