Turkey after the earthquake

It’s been just over a week since the seismic catastrophe that shook southeastern Turkey and northern Syria. The loss of human life is very numerous. At the time of writing these lines, the number of victims has exceeded 35,000 people. Also, more than 40,000 buildings they have collapsed or become uninhabitable, leaving hundreds of thousands of people without shelter at the very least. The catastrophe will be the greatest of this century.

Though in mourning, Turkey must face some uncomfortable truths. The earthquake was the largest ever recorded in the country and yet its consequences did not have to be so dire. There are many other countries, such as Japan or Taiwan, that live on fault lines and are therefore prone to catastrophes, and that have been able to mitigate these risks through better governance.

Therefore, the first conclusion is that this tragic outcome is directly related to the policies adopted; it is the end product of an inadequate governance framework. Earthquakes will always happen, but governments can take steps to mitigate the destructive power of natural catastrophes. This lesson is even more important considering that Istanbul, the imperial city and commercial and cultural capital of present-day Turkey, may suffer a major earthquake in the next few years.

The opposition has criticized the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government for being ineffective in responding to the disaster. It is true that the response could have been more effective. For example, the disaster relief capacity of the Turkish army (large and well equipped) could have been used in a more timely manner. But ultimately, given the magnitude of the catastrophe and the extent of the geography and population affected, the response was going to be considered inadequate in any case. National capacities pale in comparison to the magnitude of the challenge.

“It is true that the response could have been more effective. (…) But ultimately, the answer was going to be considered inadequate in any case»

In reality, the debate should focus on what ex ante and not in the former post. In other words, the Turkish political system must examine and revise the rules and institutions that have not been effective in mitigating the human cost of this tragedy. I see two big areas of debate.

The first refers to the lack of application of the law. In other words, the lack of resilience that has been so tragically revealed is essentially the result of ineffective enforcement. In fact, Turkey has a strict regulation for the construction industry. It was imposed after the 1999 Marmara earthquake. In return, it suffers from poor implementation. One reason for this state of affairs is the prevailing web of corruption that links contractors to local regulatory institutions, including municipal governments. Unscrupulous contractors seek to maximize their profits by bribing regulators, who then turn a blind eye to construction that fails to meet strict building regulations.

The periodic passage in the Turkish Parliament of amnesty laws for unlicensed and mostly unsafe buildings is another major drag. There have been more than twenty such bills since 1946, when Turkey became a parliamentary democracy. In the past two decades, under the rule of the AK Party, seven such bills have been passed.

This situation creates perverse incentives. It gives contractors the certainty that their substandard buildings will be licensed at election time, increasing the number of unsafe buildings over time. But the Turkish electorate is also to be blamed for supporting the passage of these types of laws, which basically trade security for short-term economic advantages. If the electorate had penalized similar initiatives in the past, governments would not so easily pass amnesty laws.

The second issue has to do with governance at the highest level. The 2017 constitutional change has introduced a presidential system with few checks and balances and a hyper-concentration of power at the top. The system was advertised as an institutional design that allowed for faster decision-making. Be that as it may, the cost of weakening checks and balances, for example by taking power away from the legislature in favor of the executive, has fueled a climate of non-accountability.

The government has rightly been criticized for a lack of transparency in the spending of the relief fund for victims of the 1999 Marmara earthquake. The revenue was meant to be used exclusively to increase the resilience of earthquake-prone provinces. The excessive centralization of power has also visibly hampered disaster relief efforts. The management of the Authority for Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD), the disaster relief agency, was unable to fully harness the capacities of Turkish civil society as it was unable to adopt a much more decentralized decision-making model than it would have quickly empowered local stakeholders and aid workers.

In conclusion, Turkey needs to have a critical internal debate on governance reform and disaster management. This is all the more important when you consider that the next wave could hit Istanbul with possibly even more tragic consequences. This is a deliberation for the Turkish electorate exclusively.

The EU, for its part, could and should help Turkey to meet its financial needs related to disaster recovery, which are growing by the day. In the coming weeks, the Union could play a central role in channeling international aid, acting as a force multiplier.

Article originally published in English in the Web from Carnegie Europe.