Trouble at the top

When French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Berlin on March 15 for what seemed like an emergency meeting, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz knew he had to serve more than a “fish roll.”

He Fischbrötchenwith which Scholz entertained Macron and his wife Brigitte when they visited Hamburg, Scholz's hometown, in October 2023, and the expression of displeasure with which the French couple consumed the northern German delicacy while Scholz happily chewed was the perfect symbol of a relationship that is not going as well as everyone hopes.

Half a year later, it seems on the verge of breaking completely. The short-notice meeting – which, after two hours alone, was expanded by new Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to form the “Weimar Triangle” summit – offered the two men a chance to reconcile, with Tusk almost in the role of marriage counselor. Despite the good harmony and the effort not to step on each other in public, the brief press conference (in which no questions were allowed) did not serve to clarify things or to signal a change in support for Ukraine. Tusk felt compelled to praise the “atmosphere” that showed “that all those unpleasant rumors of disagreements between European capitals are simply wrong.”

Opposite ends

It is clear, however, that two years after Russian President Vladimir Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Macron and Scholz are divided in their basic reading of what Putin's war means for Europe and their respective countries.

Macron, as he confirmed on the eve of the summit on French television, now sees Putin's neo-imperialism and his desire to wipe Ukraine off the map as an existential threat to Europe, as do Russia's western neighbors, from Lithuania to Romania. “If Russia won, the lives of the French would change,” said Macron in a prime-time interview, doubling down on statements he had already made on February 26 following a high-level meeting in Paris in support of Ukraine. “We would no longer have security in Europe.”

For Macron, this means that it is important not to rule out anything, including the deployment of troops, when responding to Putin's aggression; setting any limit means “opting for defeat,” said the French president.

Scholz's position is diametrically opposite. Although already in December he described the outcome of the war as “fundamental” For Europe and Germany, he has always been in favor of ruling out more aid, at least at first (the German government has reviewed several decisions, including that of sending Leopard tanks). The last ““neins” Germans refer to the Taurus cruise missile, which Scholz ruled out supplying Ukraine for the first time publicly on the morning of February 26, and to any troops, which Scholz emphasized that same afternoon. Deepening the rift with Macron, his team posted a video of Scholz on social media in which the chancellor promised that Germany would not become “part of the war.”

Internal pressures

Keeping such a promise, however, is not really in the hands of Scholz, but of Putin. And intellectual coherence is undoubtedly on the French side. But the German chancellor seems trapped in his own logic – namely that “non-escalation” will keep Russia at bay – while his Social Democratic Party (SPD) hopes that it can announce Scholz as a “chancellor for peace.” ”( “Friedenskanzler”) that kept Germany out of the war will be an electoral success in the European elections in June and beyond.

Currently, the SPD polls around 15%, an embarrassingly low figure for a party that elects Germany's chancellor. The left wing of the SPD, in particular, appears to be putting increasing pressure on Scholz to adopt cautious and defensive stances. Its most powerful figure, parliamentary leader Rolf Mützenich, recently advocated “freezing” the war (a day after Putin made clear on Russian state television for the umpteenth time that he is not interested in any negotiations and that he wants all of Ukraine), much to the dismay also in the government banks.

In France, the political dynamic is the opposite: With Macron's party, Renaissance, trailing far behind the far-right National Rally (RN) in current polls, a more aggressive line toward Russia can help close the gap, attacking RN for its traditional closeness to Putin (while reminding the French public of RN's ideological roots in the part of France that collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II). In a sign of the effectiveness of this stance, RN leader Marine Le Pen, a day before Macron's visit to Berlin, denounced Putin's attack on Ukraine in much harsher terms than before.

“Openly and honestly”

Although these dynamics are pulling Macron and Scholz in different directions, some in Berlin warn against making too much of this division at the top. “The fact that, from time to time, Franco-German differences are aired so publicly is precisely because our relationship is very close; “No other state is in such constant contact with each other,” Anna Lührmann, Secretary of State for Europe, Franco-German relations and climate policy at the German Foreign Ministry, told me.

“The Franco-German relationship is of fundamental importance for Europe; It has solid foundations and there are large areas of agreement. This means that we can talk very openly and honestly with each other,” Lührmann added, somewhat echoing the statements of the French Foreign Minister, Stéphane Séjourné, who, after a damage limitation meeting with his German counterpart , Annalena Baerbock, told the press on March 2 that both countries were in agreement “by 80 percent” (which some observers considered a worryingly low figure, given the circumstances).

For Lührmann, “the policy on Ukraine is a perfect example: On almost all issues, France and Germany are on the same page, their priorities and policies are identical. The disagreement at the end of February concerned the issue of strategic ambiguity: France, with its particular military strategic culture and experience and a president who is also commander in chief, has a different approach than Germany, which, among other things, “It has a ‘parliamentary army,’ which means all deployments require parliamentary approval.”

The president of the Franco-German parliamentary group, Nicole Westig, of the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) party, agrees that relations are generally strong. “Sometimes we can disagree strongly with our French colleagues, for example, on the EU-Mercosur trade agreement [al que, sencillamente, Francia se opone y Alemania está a favor], but the relationship is really close also at the parliamentary level. And the geopolitical situation should make us all focus on what unites us.”

Under pressure

However, it is clear that Russia's war has made it difficult for the EU's two largest nations to get along and move things forward. “The war has not only made the “small differences” between France and Germany more visible, it has magnified them,” Claire Demesmay, a leading expert on Franco-German relations, a professor at the University of Saarbrücken and a former collaborator of the German Council for Foreign Relations. “It also appears to have reinforced the will, in both Paris and Berlin, to keep a firm eye on national interests.”

What's more, Macron and his circle – who first had to deal with a Chancellor Angela Merkel who was unreceptive to moving the EU forward and then with a Chancellor Scholz who also took his time – have become convinced that public snubs only They serve to attract the attention of the German side and make it move positions. The “abruptness” came into play when Macron suspended the annual Franco-German ministerial meeting ahead of the anniversary of the Elysee Treaty between the two countries at the end of 2022, and it is apparently also coming into play now, to shock the Germans in particular into leaving of sleepwalking towards a disaster in Ukraine. “This is counterproductive,” warns Demesmay, “the Franco-German division only favors Putin.”

While the president and the chancellor can still put things right, for the greater good of saving Ukraine and European security, one thing also seems clear: the question of who runs Europe will need a constructive response. For now, it seems that Macron can't and Scholz doesn't want to. And Berlin's unwillingness looks more and more like a national brand: telling not only Russia's war criminals but also Europe's allies and friends everything Germany will not do. This includes the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), especially when it comes to proposing ideas for the future of the EU.

This is perhaps the greatest weight that falls on the relationship. Even seven years after Macron's speech at the Sorbonne, Germany – leaving aside the bombastic language of the coalition agreements – lacks constructive and pioneering proposals to present. Only when Germany's politicians and public opinion finally come back with an idea of ​​Europe and the EU that adapts to difficult times can the growing Franco-German gap begin to narrow again.

Article translated from English from the website Internationale Politik Quarterly.