Transatlantic cooperation to counter China needs more nuance

On both sides of the Atlantic there is a desire to cooperate on China policy. Europeans and Americans met again on December 1 at a very high level with the Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, and the Secretary General of the European External Action Service, Stefano Sannino, leading the delegations of their usual US-EU dialogue on China. This initiative provides a platform for coordinating China policy and is based on another structure, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC).

China policy cooperation is one of the most complex, difficult, and important areas for the United States and the European Union to work together. The new one National Security Strategy The United States leaves no doubt that although the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shifted many resources to Europe, China is the most important point on the American agenda. Overtaking China is a top priority. The story on the other side of the Atlantic is, however, more subtle.

Although cooperating with the US is the preference for many Atlanticists, the strong fear that a Trump-style president will take over the White House is still very present. That is why there is some caution in the EU about not putting all the eggs in the American basket.

In addition, competition between the EU and the US in terms of trade – the Inflation Reduction Act has been the last example This is an obstacle to greater coordination on the relationship with China.

However, despite the reluctance, there are specific areas in which the EU and the US can collaborate to manage the Chinese impact. This list includes aspects such as countering the influence of China in the immediate neighborhood of the EU or coordinating the control of technology transfers. Transatlantic allies should abandon the disassociation discourse and focus on the essence of cooperation, not forgetting that nuances could also be beneficial after all.

European perspective

The European continent is undergoing very drastic changes. The Russian war of aggression has sparked a rapid energy decoupling, rising cost of living due to rising inflation, declining competitiveness of European industry, millions of Ukrainian refugees in Europe, and renewed investment in defense, all of which at the same time.

In Europe there is currently talk of three dependencies: the US dependency on security and defense, Russia’s dependency on energy and China’s dependency on supply chains in general and critical raw materials in particular. .

As the war has shaken the EU to its foundations, it is trying to rethink all these dependencies while trying to adapt its policies to face a new era of intense geopolitical competition.

When it comes to China, the perception of the EU is very multifaceted. For the EU and its Member States, China is a partner crucial Business, a competitor and a rival at the same time. China is a huge market, especially for industry from key Member States like Germany. It is also the supplier of crucial raw materials and products for the energy transition.

Having said that, China is also the country that has sanctioned members of the European Parliament – ​​in response to the sanctions imposed by the EU in March 2021– for serious violations of human rights. After that, the approval of the EU-China Global Investment Agreement (CAI), which pleased the Americans.

Issues related to the unity of the EU further complicate the picture. When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz organized the first visit just after the re-election of President Xi Jinping, he received a lot of criticism from his union partners. However, many others – including the French leader Emmanuel Macron and the Spanish president, Pedro Sánchez– took advantage the G20 summit in Bali to hold private talks on the sidelines with his Chinese counterpart.

Charles Michel also visited China very recently without the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, which reignited discussions about the interagency rivalry. Emmanuel Macron is planning his solo trip for early 2023. There are many national and institutional priorities in view when China policy is decided. Although the lack of unity is a weakness (exploited by China on every occasion), it is also a source of nuance to improve policy making.

The US should understand that the EU cannot afford to disengage from the Chinese market, especially at a time of great economic stress and as it disengages from Russia. It may not be as drastic as the US when it comes to export restrictions. The United States may not like it, but acknowledging and respecting that reality will open the ground for better cooperation.

It must also be made clear that the EU cannot maintain equidistance between Washington and Beijing. In Europe, policy makers are well aware of the value of the transatlantic alliance, and presumably the same is true in Washington under the leadership of Joe Biden. For this reason, both parties should work to define specific areas in which they can collaborate to manage Chinese influence.

Where should cooperation go?

If the US wants greater alignment with the EU, it must increase the intensity and depth of consultations with Brussels and take into account their interests and concerns. In important actions – such as Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, for example – greater coordination would help build trust. The TTC and the regular dialogues on China would be good platforms for this.

Sharing best practices in rethinking strategic dependencies would be a second step. Although the decoupling does not resonate in Europe, the reduction of strategic dependencies does. Strategic sovereignty is one of the most prominent debates in the EU. While China’s multifaceted perception hasn’t changed, there has been a reality check: When it comes to strategic infrastructures, technology transfers, and semiconductor dependencies in supply chains, a detailed assessment is necessary. There is an immense space for transatlantic cooperation.

A third area of ​​cooperation relates to a major concern for the EU: Chinese investments – including critical infrastructure – in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood. The US has historically supported the enlargement of the EU and its consolidation on the continent. Now would be a good time to do the same and contribute to strategic thinking for a wider Europe. The involvement of the US would be very beneficial when it comes to countering the influence of China. It would also be very much in line with the new Strategic Concept from NATO.

Finally, more and more EU documents talk about countering the Chinese sphere of influence in different regions. all the global gateway – the European Union’s program for smart, clean and secure connections – is intended to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative where necessary. In his State of the Union address, von der Leyen made an open appeal to the US president to cooperate in the fight against China and Russia in other regions. The US administration maintains a excellent working relationship with the European Commission. It should make good use of it when defining specific areas of joint action.

Why nuances are important too

In the coming years, the EU should seek to be autonomous enough to oppose thoughtless and excessively warmongering protectionist policies that it considers undermine a rules-based international order. In this way, it can also play the role of arbitrator if necessary, and be a balancing power that works to reduce tensions between China and the US when necessary.

The relations between these three actors, the US, the EU and China, will also define the future of the world economy. All three have a historical responsibility. It is important to ask yourself what kind of economic model is desired for the future and act accordingly. For globalization to prove resilient and for multilateral institutions to reform and function, diverse interests must be taken into account. The nuances that the EU brings could serve that objective. The EU and the US could only partner if the approaches are carefully calibrated.

President Biden said that “will manage this competition [con China] responsibly.” This is also the responsibility of all transatlantic leaders at this time.

A version of this commentary was originally published in English at CSIS on December 13, 2022.