“In Strasbourg you already know, the weeks are full schedules like this.” Javier Zarzalejos (Bilbao, 1960) welcomes us in the office he has occupied since 2019 in the European Parliament. “It’s non-stop“, he says, showing a paper with colored markings. Aznar’s right-hand man for decades – he was general secretary of the Presidency and director of the FAES Foundation, a position he still holds – is MEP of the European People’s Party (EPP)the first political force in the current European Parliament, the most fragmented and leaning to the right to date.
This legislature, which began again in the summer under the presidency of Roberta Metsola, has started with the presence of two new ultra parties: the Patriots for Europe group (founded by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán) and that of Europe of Sovereign Nations (led by the German AfD). Also with a central debate on the table: immigration management.
In April, the European Union approved the Migration and Asylum Pact, a legislative package resulting from more than four years of negotiations and tense disputes between member states. “It was approved on the horn of the previous legislature,” underlines Zarzalejos. In July, the MEP was named president of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of Parliament, in charge, precisely, of managing migration and asylum.
The agreement was presented as a “success”, but while waiting for its implementation, several European leaders have decided to go ahead and give one more twist to their national policies. At the forefront of what already seems to be a movement in the process of contagion, the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloniand its migrant repatriation centers in Albania, a non-EU country. A controversial model that has aroused the interest of the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, willing to explore what she has called “innovative solutions”.
EL ESPAÑOL talks about all this with Javier Zarzalejos while a few floors below, in the chamber, there is a debate about possible changes in regulation for the return of third-country citizens without the right to remain in the European Union.
What sense does it make to tighten immigration policies even before the Migration and Asylum Pact, approved less than a year ago, comes into effect?
The migration pact does not seek to tighten policies, but rather to organize the legal framework in which States have to operate operationally. We can talk about more restrictive and broad policies, but there must be legal certainty, a framework for safeguarding the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers, and cooperation mechanisms. That is what the agreement says, which, theoretically, has two years to be put into practice.
He talks about two years of margin, but currently there are already countries that are tightening their policies.
The idea that immigration policy is being tightened at this time is not supported by data, in the sense that there are no more returns. What we are seeing is greater efficiency, more effective containment activity on migratory routes. But, I insist, I do not believe that there is empirical evidence of a tightening; It is more an impression than a reality.
In Germany, Chancellor Scholz has reestablished control at all its borders and deported convicted migrants. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has tried to deport (still unsuccessfully) migrants to a non-EU country and has closed pacts with Tunisia and Libya. If that is not toughening, how do you rate these measures?
I think there are some that are new and others that, in reality, are not so new. For example, the involvement of third parties in the fight against human trafficking and the control of migratory flows is not new. Now it is being done in Tunisia, but the EU has already done it in Türkiye with those displaced by the Syrian conflict. Excessive attention has been focused on Italy and its agreement with Albania, but we should not always fall into mentioning them. Denmark, where there is a social democratic government, is considering doing the same in Kosovo. It is a possibility that some Member States are exploring, although there are legality and human rights issues that have to be reviewed, of course.
Precisely, Italian justice has overturned Meloni’s first attempt to deport migrants to Albania. What do you think?
Well, in Italy what there is is a judicial resolution that says that people cannot be returned to Egypt or Afghanistan, which are not safe countries.
Does the PP contemplate this possibility in Spain?
As far as our country and the Popular Party are concerned, we do not raise it at this time, because our position is different and because the problems associated with migration in Spain have very specific characteristics.
“If we do not give a common European response to migration, there will be national responses that are less supportive and worse to manage”
However, popular Europeans have called for a new return directive to increase the return of migrants who do not have the right to asylum in the EU. What is the objective?
Have a new return policy. At this moment there is a proposal on the table from two legislatures ago that has not advanced one millimeter. It is blocked because there were not enough majorities in previous Parliaments to do so. Now, however, the Commission has announced that in the next 100 days there will be a new proposal whose objective is not to deport more or fewer people, but to have a legal framework so that there is greater effectiveness in return. We cannot live in return rates close to 20% (surely lower) because that means that a central aspect of immigration policy does not work. I insist, the issue is not that European immigration policy be toughened, but rather that the control of migratory flows be more effective, including the return of those who are in European territory and cannot be there. There is no universal, permanent and unconditional right to live in a European state. And coming from a country in conflict cannot by itself guarantee access to asylum.
Where to draw the line as to who should and should not be returned to their country? Each State has its list.
First we have to accept that immigration has to occur within a framework of legality. Then we will draw the conclusions. For example, it is a bad thing to associate immigration with illegality. Especially because the EU has a very significant population rate of immigrant origin. In Spain, the INE says that 20% of the population was not born in national territory. So we cannot speak of a closed Europe, nor of a fortress Europe, nor of an insensitive Europe because, among other things, immigration is a very relevant economic and social asset.
“We cannot talk about a closed and insensitive Europe because immigration is a very relevant economic and social asset”
How can, in your opinion, this “efficiency” in flow control be improved?
Well, using new instruments, such as better management of the interoperability of the database and external borders. Because if we are not capable of good border management, those who want to paralyze the European project will triumph. Look at Germany, a central country in Europe that has reestablished control on all its borders, breaking the Schengen area, because it has an internal security problem. Is that what we want for the European project? If we do not give a European, concerted, transparent and clear response, we will have less supportive national responses, much worse to manage and which may put the internal space of the EU at risk of rupture.
EU data shows that irregular migrant entries have fallen slightly so far this year. Why this urgency to address such a delicate issue and even seek new “solutions” to address it?
First, because there have been events such as the terrorist attack in Solingen by a man who should not have been in European territory. Does this mean a tightening of immigration policy? No. It means a failure of responsibility on the part of the German authorities. What is the response to the failure to effectively address this issue? Well, reestablish border controls unilaterally and indefinitely. Secondly, there have been new phenomena of instrumentalization of immigration, which we suffer in Ceuta and Melilla with Morocco and Poland suffers with the Belarusians. But now, in addition, Moscow is bringing Yemenis to the Finnish border. All this without forgetting that, as in our case, there is enormous pressure in territories like the Canary Islands, despite the fact that entries into the EU have not increased overall.
En el caso de Alemania, usted habla de ineficacia, pero la respuesta coincide con unas elecciones federales en las que ha arrasado la extrema derecha, que precisamente agita el discurso antiinmigración. En 2025, además, habrá elecciones. ¿No cree que detrás de esa respuesta hay cierta motivación electoralista?
Por supuesto eso también es un factor a tener en cuenta. Pero la primera víctima no puede ser el espacio Schengen. No podemos restablecer los controles fronterizos cuando pasa algo porque no tenemos ninguna evidencia de que eso contribuya a rebajar las posibilidades de entrada. Además, está claro que hay un riesgo de seguridad asociado a grandes flujos de migración, pero también hay violencia en el fútbol y nadie dice “vamos a vaciar el Bernabéu o el San Mamés”. Es muy llamativo el doble rasero de la izquierda: porque quien ha hablado de deportaciones masivas ha sido el canciller Scholz. ¡Deportaciones masivas! Literal. Los que se escandalizan cuando alguien habla de control fronterizo se olvidan de que en España tenemos una valla que ha sido reforzada por el Gobierno socialista.
A diferencia del Gobierno socialdemócrata de Scholz, el de Pedro Sánchez se ha desmarcado de la senda de la presidenta de la Comisión Europea en la cuestión migratoria. ¿A qué cree que se debe?
A un cálculo político. Pero vamos a ser serios: lo que tiene que hacer el Gobierno de España, como todos, es presentar un plan exhaustivo de implantación nacional del pacto migratorio, que recordemos que fue aprobado por el Consejo Europeo. Es decir, Sánchez dijo que sí. Y Meloni también. Ambos coincidieron, vaya. Así que basta ya de postureo; vamos a ponernos a trabajar. El Parlamento va a ser muy exigente con los Estados miembros para que el pacto tenga el cumplimiento adecuado. Vamos a ser activos y exigentes en la monitorización de un acuerdo que tardó mucho tiempo y consumió muchas energías.
“Es llamativo el doble rasero de la izquierda: quien habla de deportaciones masivas es Scholz”
¿Y hasta entonces? ¿Podríamos ver más planes como el de Meloni?
Bueno, es que los Estados tienen que controlar las fronteras todos los días; no podemos pensar: “como hay dos años de margen, vamos a esperar”. Lo que ha hecho Meloni es un acuerdo internacional, un convenio con un país soberano como es Albania. Es una iniciativa individual que, personalmente, creo que tendría que concertarse, pero que no está impedida por el Pacto de Migración y Asilo.
¿Cree que externalizar los procesos de asilo y delegar la responsabilidad a terceros casa con los valores europeos?
No sé por qué no va a concordar con los valores europeos. Uno de los temas que plantea el pacto (aunque aún no está desarrollado) es crear una ficción jurídica para que cuando alguien entre en un Estado miembro se considere que no ha entrado en territorio nacional hasta que su situación no sea debidamente evaluada, aclarada y legalizada. Es lo mismo que pasó con Delcy Rodríguez [vicepresidenta del régimen venezolano]who arrived in Barajas, unloaded his suitcases and had interviews with ministers, but it was said that, in reality, he had entered national territory. That same fiction, mutatis mutandisis what is intended. So that? To avoid paying for the work of human trafficking mafias, which is becoming one of the most profitable criminal businesses.
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