The RDF has carried out military operations, apart from regional and multilateral efforts, against insurgents in Benin, Mozambique and the CAR. Rwanda’s actions are atypical for conflict management in sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the continent.
Armed forces from the small state of Rwanda have been deployed in three African states far from Rwanda’s Great Lakes region to fight violent insurgencies. The Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) is currently fighting Islamist groups in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and Benin. To give an idea of the magnitude of Rwanda’s contribution, we could use Liechtenstein, a country with a limited territorial dimension and no access to the sea, as an example, if it hypothetically decided to send its military to protect regimes in Sweden, Montenegro or Ireland.
For several years, the RDF was only deployed as part of multilateral peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN, for example. However, the deployment of Rwandan troops on a purely bilateral basis began in 2020 and marked a significant change from Kigali’s previous modus operandi. In essence, Rwanda is now the one who decides how, when and where to fight in other African countries, all based on bilateral leader-to-leader agreements. In short, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and the RDF appear to be reshaping security provision and conflict management across sub-Saharan Africa: Benin is one example.
For more than a year, this West African state located on the Gulf of Guinea has been the target of attacks by multiple jihadist groups. They threaten one of the most stable and wealthy states in the region, as well as the Ivory Coast and Togo. Several factors contribute to the spread of jihadist activities: First, the pressure exerted by multinational security forces in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Second, the internal conflicts within jihadism between groups loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda and Islamic Jihad, that is, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, respectively. Third, the porous borders between states, much of which is covered by huge national parks like W-Arly Pendjari. Fourth, flammable socioeconomic conditions, such as increasing discrimination against nomadic Fulani communities, exacerbated in turn by climate change. Fifth, neighboring Burkina Faso is increasingly fragile and unable to fight the jihadists as it has suffered two coups in less than a year. These trends, taken together, will increasingly (and negatively) affect both the internal stability of Benin and that of its West African coastal neighbours.
In July 2022, the Chief of Staff of the Beninese Armed Forces (Forces Armées Béninoises), General Fructueux Gbaguidi, paid an official visit to Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. The fact that he visited Kigali instead of Paris is noteworthy. In the past, the region’s leaders turned to France, a former colonial power, before any other African state for security-related matters. This time, however, Benin sent its chief of staff to Rwanda for talks that reportedly focused on the jihadist threat from Benin and how the Rwandan army could help Benin counter it.
Shortly after the Kigali meeting, a bilateral agreement between the two states opened the door for an initial deployment of 350 RDF troops to Benin. This marked another milestone in the provision of security in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. It would not only mark the first RDF mission in West Africa, but also demonstrate Benin’s desire and preference to contact another African state for assistance, rather than a former colonial power or intergovernmental organization such as the Economic Community of West African States or the UN.
Although it is impossible to predict the future, the Rwandan military mission in Benin can build on the RDF’s previous successes against violent insurgents in both CAR and Mozambique. Kagame’s decision to collaborate with Benin’s leadership to address the existential threat is thus one more of the president’s efforts to reshape his country’s tarnished post-genocide image and put into practice the slogan “African solutions.” to African problems. To this end, Kagame has put in place strong defense diplomacy and has tried to make it the centerpiece of Rwanda’s international and African engagement and bolster the country’s reputation.
The multiple extra-regional deployments of the RDF in the CAR, Mozambique and Benin are potentially revolutionary, as they may herald significant changes in conflict management and peacebuilding in post-independence sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that a small, landlocked state with few resources has pursued such a risky foreign policy with its armed forces should not be underestimated. President Kagame’s use of the RDF for what he sees as Rwanda’s political, economic and military interests thus constitutes a fascinating and promising case study of indigenous African military diplomacy and conflict management.
Article originally published in English in the Web from The International Spectator.
