The possible scenarios of the conflict, broadly speaking, are reduced to three: abandon Ukraine, humiliate Russia or a long war. Europe, by prioritizing other issues over strategic ones, appears to be sleepwalking into a protracted conflict that temporarily avoids difficult decisions but can have catastrophic consequences.
A reckless, authoritarian and nuclear-armed leader in the Kremlin means there are no good solutions to the Ukraine crisis. Faced with the nuclear risks inherent in this scenario, Western states find themselves caught in a political trilemma: abandon Ukraine, humiliate Russia, or wage war forever; all three options could not only have negative global repercussions, but could lead to the use of nuclear weapons, despite the fact that Russian leaders have recently toned down their nuclear rhetoric.
At present, public debate is dominated by two highly simplified aspects of the trilemma: those who would push kyiv to make concessions claim that caving in to Moscow would reduce nuclear risks, while those who would help Ukraine defeat Russia argue that the risks of a nuclear escalation remain remote. These simplifications not only downplay the risks inherent in each option, but in fact it is the trilemma, with its ugly counterparts, that has led kyiv, Moscow and the West towards an unsatisfactory compromise, the least bad option available, but one that continues to require decisive political action to be achieved. With nothing to suggest such a decision, Europe sleepwalks into a long war.
At the first vertex of the trilemma are the dramatic strategic consequences that Russian success would have. If the West were to leave Ukraine, we would be thrown into a great power war of aggression behind the nuclear shield. In Asia and Europe, US alliances would become strained. Over time, they might even split. Add in China’s ambitions, America’s repeated bouts of isolationism, and a long list of transnational problems, and the current rules-based order would come under severe pressure.
Insecurity would fuel political instability, economic depression, and armed conflict. The role of nuclear deterrence would increase. Proliferation would be harder to stop and enforcement would be weakened. Nuclear crises would be more likely. In the short term, appeasing Russia may indeed be the least scary option for the West. In the medium and long term, it is fraught with uncertainty and could have dramatic consequences.
Between a quick defeat and a long war
At the second vertex are the most serious nuclear risks that would mean a swift and decisive defeat for Putin’s armies, allowing Ukraine to reclaim what is rightfully its own. From the Kremlin’s point of view, these losses might seem impossible to explain to Russian citizens and to square with Putin’s ideological imperialist ambitions.
Losing Crimea would also have serious consequences for Russia’s regional power position. Moscow’s friends in Damascus, New Delhi or Beijing could run, while Western sanctions continue to diminish the country’s economic potential. Putin’s entourage could lose confidence in his leader and a palace coup would not come as a surprise. Faced with events that could lead to his removal, Putin may be willing to use nuclear weapons to make his position and determination clear.
The costs to Russia would be immense, but to him personally, given the potentially fatal alternative of regime change, they might seem acceptable. In contrast to Putin’s current implausible nuclear rhetoric, his threats would suddenly become credible. If they are believed, they are likely to force the West to withdraw, since the stakes do not seem to justify a nuclear confrontation. If misinterpreted, they could lead to actual use, with dramatic consequences for the international system.
“All three options could not only have negative repercussions globally, but could lead to the use of nuclear weapons”
The last vertex of the trilemma is the least attractive: a long war that causes enormous loss of life, costs, and commits the Kremlin and Russian society to victory or bankruptcy. A Great Patriotic War-type effort seems inconceivable today, but so was mobilization a few months ago. Over time, Moscow’s limited initial investment in the war could give way to a bitter struggle to justify the many deaths, the broken economy and the torn society. The Russian people would likely see their future jeopardized and would come to resent their leaders.
On the one hand, the war could turn Russia into a much more militarized and dictatorial society, with Putin’s power expanded and dissent crushed. On the other hand, the revolution would inevitably be in the air, or at least in the minds of the leaders. Putin would see few solutions beyond win or walk. At that point, nuclear coercion against Ukraine and escalation into NATO would be plausible, and both the West and kyiv would be crazy not to seek an alternative solution.
War, the kingdom of uncertainty?
Since the future is notoriously difficult to predict, the trilemma presents risks, not certainties. The world order could survive the weight of aggression under the nuclear umbrella. Until now, US power, as the foundation of the current system, remains dominant, and many continue to appreciate existing international agreements. It is also conceivable that a long war will “only” destabilize and impoverish Europe without precipitating the use of nuclear weapons.
More importantly, Putin could manage to stay in power even after losing Crimea, as former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein did after failing to conquer Kuwait and sacrificing hundreds of thousands of young Iraqi lives. Internally, Putin could suppress challenges to his rule. Abroad, he could rely on nuclear deterrence while he rebuilds his battered military. In this scenario, he might consider the use of nuclear weapons neither worth nor conducive to his objectives. Furthermore, as a man pursuing empire, it is at least possible for Putin to put the fate of his nation before his own and walk away without exercising all of his options. Like the Soviet war in Afghanistan, this conflict may not cross the nuclear threshold either.
Despite these alternative scenarios, the risks of the trilemma are real and pressing in all three vertices at the same time. Consequently, in the coming months, the balances between the vertices of this trilemma will continue to lead Western decision-makers to a half unsatisfactory scenario: support Ukraine with arms and money, but avoid a rapid and dramatic Russian defeat, hoping that this result will be enough for both Moscow and kyiv to agree to a compromise and avoid the long war.
The risk of perpetual war
This is a tough nut to crack. It requires decisive action now: tough sticks and real carrots. In particular, the West would have to provide more and better weapons, allowing kyiv to achieve military results that strengthen its bargaining chip. With any luck, success on the Ukrainian battlefield could help convince Moscow of the futility of further escalation.
More importantly, the West’s action would have to involve a massive commitment to rebuild Ukraine, the much-heralded Marshall Plan 2.0, for the kyiv government to sell the unsatisfactory compromise at home, and for Russia to realize that the West is willing to pay to defend its order.
Yet for the past eight months, this foresight and determination has been in short supply. In Europe in particular, domestic politics, economic concerns and bureaucratic inertia have outweighed strategic considerations. Therefore, sleepwalking into a protracted conflict is a possibility to consider. The internationalist factions will continue to make sure that the West does not abandon Ukraine; supporters of moderation will be sure to avoid a quick Russian defeat.
But without decisive political action, more of the same will lead to the third vertex of the trilemma: the long war. This approach allows you to temporarily avoid difficult decisions and short-term risks. However, a protracted conflict could not only lead to the use of nuclear weapons, but would very likely make Russia an even more volatile neighbor, turn the continent into a perpetual war zone, and diminish Europe’s role in the world. This benefits no one, and yet it is the most likely outcome.
Article originally published in English in the Web from Internationale Politik Quarterly.
