In Germany, the Greens have been forced to compromise on many of their core convictions while in government in order to address energy security. To maintain their electoral support, they need to continue to combine pragmatism with climate-focused policies.
The Russian invasion of the Ukraine has had profound political repercussions, especially in Germany, which was heavily dependent on Russian energy. In 2021, Germany imported from Russia the 55% of its total gas, that is, 53,000 million cubic meters (bcm). When this vulnerability was exposed, the newly elected German leadership, the semaphore coalition of Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP), were forced to find new supplies.
This Herculean task required scale and speed to avert an energy security crisis. However, it also demanded compromise, especially from the Greens, who, after 16 years in opposition, were forced to reorganize their priorities to meet the needs of getting Germany out of a crisis. While this unlocked things that were previously politically impossible, it also opened the door to an identity crisis that the party is now forced to grapple with.
The “transition” of the Greens towards energy security
The depth of this crisis is evident when it comes to nuclear power. The anti-nuclear identity has been integral to the German Green Party since its formation in the late 1970s, with Germany’s nuclear exit as its crowning achievement, originally scheduled for 2022. Given the energy emergency, the Greens supported the continuation of the operation of the two remaining German nuclear power plants as emergency reserves. Although they opposed prolonging the operation beyond April 2023, this action showed the Greens struggling to balance pragmatic necessity with the party’s strong aversion to nuclear power.
Prioritizing energy security, the Greens opted for fossil fuels. Last year, more than 20 German coal plants were restarted or had their decommissioning delayed. And just three days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on February 24, Chancellor Scholz announced the establishment of several liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, followed in October 2022 by legislation to speed up the approval of projects. Environmentalists are skirting legal opposition to this, particularly LNG’s use of chlorine. However, the Green Vice Chancellor who is also Minister for the Economy and Climate, Robert Habeck, dismissed these concerns due to the primacy of energy security. In his quest to secure gas for the new terminals, Habeck entered into a 15-year LNG purchase agreement with Qatar.
While these measures help address the immediate energy crisis, the response raises concerns. A report revealed that reopened coal plants produced an additional 15.8 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2022. Their continued operation is increasing German emissions while undermining its self-proclaimed climate leadership internationally. Likewise, a new report from the Ministry of Economy and Climate it envisioned that new LNG facilities could operate at below half capacity by 2030. The plan costs €10 billion and combines 20 billion cubic meters of floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) capacity. English) with 34,000 million cubic meters of onshore capacity to meet the 74,000 million cubic meters of German gas demand in 2030. This objective gives priority to security and is deliberately conservative, even with projections that calculate that Germany could be supplied with 69 .3 bcm through domestic production and imports by pipeline or LNG from Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Norway. Therefore, almost all of Germany’s gas needs can be met without using the new LNG facilities.
However, no margin for disruption is risky, also taking into account gas transiting Germany to Central Europe. The report foresees a margin of 20 bcm to cover the latter. Even so, 34bcm of spare capacity remains, the equivalent of the three onshore facilities. When the 20 bcm of the FSRU supply contracts expire, a difference of 14 bcm would be less conspicuous, but does Germany really expect its gas consumption to remain stable beyond 2030? It seems so, despite the risk that fixed terminals become paralyzed assets. While the current use of FSRUs and construction of a land-based facility may seem sensible during the crisis, the level of overcapacity is incompatible with long-term climate goals. The prioritization of gas is evident in the fact that the first LNG terminals were announced, contracted, supported by legislation and operational within 10 months.
Meanwhile, obstacles to renewables remain. German wind projects often present problems, such as taking longer to authorize than to build. This energy crisis created an opportunity to fix this, and Habeck seized it. In 2022 he introduced a law to override German state regulations and pushed for state guarantees for renewable energy projects. However, developers of offshore wind continue to encounter obstacles. Going into 2023, supply and material constraints, poor financial conditions, a 40% increase in manufacturing costs, and a lack of skilled labor and port infrastructure led the industry to call for urgent action. Habeck responded by offering order guarantees to renewable manufacturers and by announcing a series of “wind summits”. While this could be useful, it is by no means as decisive as the gas intervention, the blocking effect of which could become a political drag.
unfortunate optics
The growing divergence between the politics of the Greens and the German climate movement, which until now had huge overlap, was demonstrated in January in Lützerath in North Rhine-Westphalia, where a village was to be demolished to expand the Garzweiler coal mine, owned by the energy company RWE. Activists had occupied the town since 2020 to block the expansion of the project. The expansion had the support of Green leaders, including Robert Habeck and Mona Neubaur, the state’s minister for the economy and climate. They argued that the expansion was necessary for immediate energy security and long-term sustainability. However, those on the ground disagreed. Many activists are members of Los Verdes and, before their forced eviction, the party supported their demonstration, presenting them as concerned young citizens. Then being treated as criminals and using police violence has been a 180-degree turn, creating images that are difficult to digest for many Greens, in which renowned figures such as Greta Thunberg have been implicated.
Despite the optics, the Greens found themselves in a difficult position. The expansion was a compromise between the federal and state governments and RWE. Under that compromise, the demolition of Lützerath would block further extensions and the phasing out of coal in Germany would be brought forward from 2038 to 2030. This deal was also reached in October, when the Greens faced the imminent threat of a possibly cold winter and the town was almost empty. All but one of the inhabitants had reached agreements on compensation and resettlement. So the protest seems to have less to do with preserving Lützerath and more to do with blocking coal expansion.
However, the filibuster stance also has its merits. Numerous studies and scientific opinions have analyzed whether we really need more coal. Some have stressed that the expansion is not necessary to meet coal demand forecasts or energy security needs. Others argue that it would move Germany away from its 1.5 degree Celsius commitment or that phasing out by 2030 will not reduce emissions because coal would become unprofitable long before 2038. Government officials did not address these concerns and the agreement was rushed through with little outside consultation. The reactions resulted in an open letter signed by more than 500 scientists calling for the expansion to be halted.
Controversial politics and pragmatism
Although the eviction has not stopped, trading political values for short-termism can amplify party divisions, especially among the youth. Both Lützerath and the LNG expansion have been criticized by many Green climate activists. Luisa Neubauer, the leader of Fridays for Future in Germany nicknamed the “German Greta,” is a prime example, as she frequently publicly challenges Habeck’s policies. Her frustration is likely to be shared by many young Greens, and her ability to vent this frustration in opposition to the government should not be underestimated.
If the issue persists, it could compromise a good part of the electorate. Young people are politically important to the Greens: in 2021 they got 23% of voters under the age of 25. Their support comes because young people have identified with the Greens’ science-based urgency on climate. Departing from this position will cause problems for the party with this demographic.
However, it is difficult to know how far the discontent extends. As of March 2023, both Green Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Habeck had the second and third highest approval ratings of German politicians, and the recent Berlin state elections demonstrated that the political support of the Greens Greens has held firm even as the SPD faltered. Despite this support, however, the Greens were left out of Berlin’s local government when the SPD opted to form a coalition with the centre-right CDU. Even if they did so by a narrow margin, this case shows that the Greens risk being politically marginalized unless they make significant political concessions, as they did during the March coalition meeting, when they supported the motorway expansion advocated by pro-business Free Democrats (FDP).
“The blow to the popularity of the Greens can also be explained by their pragmatic positions and their firm support for Ukraine, including military aid”
The Greens will have to take this into account. His popularity seems to have taken a hit in recent weeks; in a survey published by the BILD tabloid on April 25, the Greens found themselves in fourth place nationally, behind the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). This can be explained both by popular discontent with Habeck’s new “heat law”, which prohibits the installation of new gas and oil heating systems for the coming year. But it can also be explained, at least in part, by the pragmatic positions of the Greens on other issues related to climate policy, as well as their strong, principled support for Ukraine, including military aid. It is a reminder that their political support is variable and their inclusion in decision-making is not assured.
Looking ahead, the Greens should retain their penchant for finding pragmatic solutions, while striving to keep climate-focused policies at the center of their political horizon.
Article translated from English from the website of International Political Quarterly.
