The EU enters the new Great Game in Central Asia

The resurgence of border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, coupled with the latest meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand, have recently shed light on a region of the world traditionally neglected by mainstream Western media and yet critical. for the national interests of many European countries. Even in recent months, while all eyes in Europe were on Ukraine, another front in the “geopolitical” game that entangles China, Russia, the United States and Europe (to a lesser extent) was expanding in Central Asia. There, in the area that goes from the Caspian Sea to the Chinese borders, five former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) border one of the most complicated regions in the world, where the influence of Iran and the disorder of the Taliban’s Afghanistan meet the vital interests of Russia. All of these countries have historical ties to Moscow and are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Some of them are also linked to Russia by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military organization that rose from the ashes of the Soviet Union to reconnect the region with the Kremlin, but has since steadily lost limbs and momentum.

In addition to Russia, China is the other great power that is actively involved in this area, mainly – although not exclusively – through its emblematic “One Belt, One Road” (BRI) initiative, which for years has been pouring hundreds of of billions of renminbi in all five economies. Chinese money is financing infrastructure and facilities (not always explicitly related to the BRI itself), thus following a known pattern of economic expansionism that is fueling competition with Moscow. All these factors make the region an incredible observatory not only to follow the change (and business) of power that is taking place between Russia, China and India, but also to study the strategic position of the EU against these three countries. As the choice of Samarkand as the venue for the latest summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization demonstrates, the strongest nations in the area – such as Uzbekistan – are really the scene of the (un)friendly competition(s) ) that extend(s) throughout Eurasia, and as such, significant for the West in general and Europe in particular. By the way, in this very region, the EU and its Member States have been establishing a foothold since the collapse of the Soviet Union, combining human rights activism and oil and gas deals, which is the main local capital. The latest modular strategy for the region was established by the European Council in 2019, to update and expand the previous strategic document dating from 2007. In this framework, the relationship between the EU and the five republics rests on a double pillar. The first is geared towards deeper interregional connectivity, encompassing (but not limited to) energy transport. This association opens the door to possible ambitious projects in the future (for example, in space) and to the inclusion of this area in the EU’s connectivity plan for 2050, called the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). The second pillar of cooperation outlined in the European strategy is rather aimed at establishing a dialogue on human rights, an issue that has long concerned all these countries according to the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the UN. In this area, the EU’s regional approach is consistent with the Commission’s bottom-up guidelines coming from civil society, and with the “Global Europe” programme, which acts as the EU’s main device for promoting human rights abroad.

“The first [pilar de la relación UE-repúblicas de Asia Central] is geared towards deeper interregional connectivity, encompassing, but not limited to, energy transport»

Historically, the region’s importance to the EU has been largely based on natural resources and road transport, but this changed dramatically after February 2022, due to Russia’s war against Ukraine. In the new light that the conflict is shedding on global international relations, the five countries are likely to move up the priority ladder of the Foreign Action Service and many European diplomatic services. Recently, there have been many indications, both facts What wordssuggesting that this change is already taking place.

As for the facts, European diplomacy is changing the size and pace of its regional investment – ​​doubling the efforts promised and made before the conflict – and making unprecedented financial decisions. For example, a news story that attracted media attention in July was the unexpected involvement of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the construction of the huge Rogun hydroelectric power plant, an infrastructure much desired by the government of Tajikistan with the stated goal of making the country energy independent. This investment, supposedly in the billions, was not foreseen by the main investment bank in the EU and, apparently, arrived overnight at the request of the Commission itself. The timing and multi-million dollar scale of the funding are probably unmatched by regional standards; To put that in perspective, the Bank’s global engagement in the five countries between 2014 and 2020 was just $186 million. It is interesting to note that Tajikistan is one of the countries that suffered the most after Western sanctions due to the deep ties that intertwine its banking system with the Russian one. Choosing to keep its financial operations in Moscow is costing Dushanbe, caught between China, which holds more than half of its national debt, and the volatile diplomatic situation that develops as the war progresses. In this situation, the dam would at least limit Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian gas, thus providing more political room for Sadyr Nurgozhoyevich Zhaparov’s government. In addition to direct investments, a second example of European economic pressure on the region occurs in the financial territory. In this case, the main actor is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), an organization owned by a group of European institutional investors and with a long history of aiding development in the Central Asia and Caspian region. The EBRD finances dozens of projects worth billions in the five countries, and its support is essential for the various financial institutions that participate in these programs. The central role of the EBRD highlights the importance of the decisions taken by this organization after the Russian aggression against Ukraine, whose objective is to maintain the EU’s quarantine towards Moscow. Among them is a commitment to freeze all Russian financial assets in its inventory and to isolate Russian banks operating in the joint programs. As far as the region is concerned, an important signal from the bank came in June, when the Kazakh government proposed the nationalization of the Russian bank Sberbank to avoid Western sanctions. On that occasion, the EBRD offered assistance to the Kazakh government to partially cover the costs of this operation. This step could set a precedent for similar decisions in neighboring countries and speed up Central Asia’s financial decoupling from the Moscow system.

These economic events have been followed by words and political gestures. Last April, just a few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, a Kazakh delegation went to Brussels to discuss the sanctions and convey a message of economic rapprochement and political responsibility in the area of ​​human rights. The move was far from obvious, given the worrying unrest in the country in January and the support Vladimir Putin’s government gave to quell the protest. In addition, in June the commitment to advance economic cooperation between the EU and Astana and to promote a more intense political dialogue was discussed during a meeting of the Cooperation Council focused on the constitutional reform that the country has undertaken. Similar negotiations are underway with all the countries in the area. In May, the EU’s special representative for the region began talks on gas and human rights with Turkmenistan’s president Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who, however, is a strong partner of Russia and has recently signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement with Moscow. In July, the EEAS signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Uzbekistan (EPCA), which addresses both economic and political issues. The “geopolitical” confrontation between Brussels and Moscow, which is taking place in a central area of ​​Russian influence, will pose a challenge for the EU, which needs to remain consistent with its values ​​in the area and, therefore, balance international relations, business and human rights. However, this effort is necessary to have a role in the great political game unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February and that any ambitious “Global Europe” should be willing to play.

Article originally published in English in the Web from The International Spectator.