In a world dominated by a growing technological gap and strategic competition, cooperation in science and technology appears as a key area for the European Union and Latin America to gain autonomy. To do this, they have a network of regional, subregional, bilateral and subnational agreements that is one of the most extensive and complex in the world.
The most recent turmoil in the field of geopolitics seems to confirm that the international system is not necessarily in a phase of deglobalization, but is facing a redesign of the logic behind the global value chains characteristic of the post-Cold War economy. This transformation shows a temporary imbalance of these value chains, which will give rise to a new strategic coupling for the second quarter of the 21st century.
The logic of delocalized production that has characterized the economic order until recent times was the result of globalization promoted, multilaterally, during the last 50 years under forms of liberal regulation that reached their peak after China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. in 2001, an event that accelerated the transfer of the center of the capitalist economy to the east. However, towards the second decade of this century, global value chains began to tighten and some links began to yield under the impact of major world events of a different nature, driving the current stage of partial decoupling: the 2008 financial crisis. ; the H1N1 flu and Covid-19 pandemics; the failure of the Doha Round; the realization of Brexit; the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequent imposition of sanctions on Russia.
However, the main fact that has influenced the current reconfiguration of global value chains is the escalation of the conflict between the United States and China, with its epicenter in science and technology. The loss of higher value-added market shares, as well as the loss of control of strategic technologies for its security and global influence in the face of China, has generated an active response from the US, materialized in initiatives such as the Build Back Better World, the CHIPS and Science Act or the Inflation Reduction Act, with consequences for the science and technology sector.
In this way, faced with the consolidation of two opposing epicenters, the European Union is relatively lagging behind, while Latin America and the Caribbean become the object of dispute over resources and markets.
However, beyond the tensions in productive, commercial and scientific-technological matters, interdependence is a persistent phenomenon that reflects some inexorable dimensions of globalization, evident in the financial sphere or in the management of the ecological crisis, as well as in regarding the management and circulation of information and the production and dissemination of knowledge and technology.
«In the transitions of techno-economic paradigms, the countries that manage to ride the emerging technological waves earlier are the ones that obtain higher incomes and acquire competitive advantages in the long term»
It is therefore worth asking ourselves what will be the tendencies that –in the face of these centripetal and centrifugal dynamics– will guide the rules and principles of the international system in the coming years. Particularly in scientific-technological matters, a recent UNCTAD Report on Technology and Innovation (2023) warns about the ever-widening gap between central and peripheral countries, exposing that, in moments of transition of techno-economic paradigms, The countries that manage to ride the emerging technological waves earlier are the ones that obtain higher incomes and acquire competitive advantages in the long term. In this sense, the green transition represents a new opportunity for developing countries.
The report maintains that the international community must establish global rules for technology transfer that allow the promotion of emerging green industries in peripheral countries. Let us bear in mind that the main deficit of these countries is found in the lack of investment for the development of infrastructure and material capacities. Consequently, the central States are the ones who get the most out of the new technologies, dominating international trade associated with green technologies and increasing their participation in total exports.
On the other hand, another trend associated with the productive dynamics described is the consolidation of a multipolar world configured by interregional association strategies based on the construction of circles of geopolitical trust, which, in economic terms, the United States Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen called it “friend-shoring.”
«A multipolar world is being consolidated where interregional association strategies based on the construction of circles of geopolitical trust prevail»
Given this scenario, Latin America and the Caribbean and the EU are facing growing challenges, but also facing unusual opportunities. One of the less surprising consequences is linked to the fact that, in recent years, foreign policy discussions in both regions have revolved, once again, around the way to acquire greater autonomy. In recent years, concepts such as “relational autonomy” and “active non-alignment” have emerged in Latin America. The latter has been specifically designed for the context of the bid between the US and China and, therefore, seeks to cover discussions around economic, financial and technological issues.
In the EU, the challenge of consolidating a common foreign policy around the idea of strategic autonomy has also regained importance. As the high representative, Josep Borrell, points out, although the concept is long-standing and arose linked to autonomy in matters of defense and security from the US, in recent years it has been extended to cover other areas. Indeed, trade, investment and financing, associated with cooperation in scientific and technological matters, are the areas where the EU finds the most potential to dispute spaces of power with the protagonists of this global situation and, at the same time, allow you to guarantee access to markets and suppliers.
In this sense, the technological field becomes a vital scenario to rethink joint strategies, since it is a central focus of the hegemonic dispute that drags the reorganization of global value chains. After all, the EU itself has been seeking, for years, to equip itself with a Science Diplomacy policy in the face of these challenges, as demonstrated by initiatives such as the European Science Diplomacy Alliance, launched within the framework of Horizon 2020.
Thus, cooperation in science and technology emerges as an area that both the EU and Latin America will seek to strengthen in order to expand their autonomy. For this, they have the current network of agreements at the regional, subregional, bilateral and subnational level between both regions, one of the most extensive and complex in the world.
The EU-CELAC bi-regional strategic alliance in a scientific-technological key
The latest great advances in terms of interregional scientific and technological cooperation were defined in 2015, at the summit of heads of state and government between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). There, the Action Plan was drawn up, which establishes in its first chapter, called “Science, research, innovation and technology”, the guiding objective of developing a Common Knowledge Space through the improvement of cooperation in research and innovation, the development of capacities and infrastructure, technology transfer for sustainable development and bi-regional cooperation in relation to the digital economy. Likewise, the ninth chapter seeks to promote cooperation in higher education through greater exchange and mobility.
These objectives were reinforced in the layout of the 2021-23 Roadmap, where new cooperation opportunities were analyzed, highlighting the energy transition, an area that in Latin America has large flows of European investments, but which are being relegated by the rise of china In addition, the possibilities to deepen cooperation in the decarbonization of the economy (green agenda) and the governance of the oceans (blue agenda) were highlighted.
As a result of this cooperation, today there are important projects in progress such as BELLA II, which seeks to extend a submarine fiber optic cable to encourage Latin American digital transformation, or Copernicus, which opens up new opportunities for collaboration in the field of satellite analysis. The extension of the Horizon Europe Program (2021-27) should also be highlighted through joint actions to promote collaborative projects and the participation of Latin American researchers in programs financed by the EU.
The EU-CELAC summit held on July 17 and 18 of this year focused, among other axes, on food security, energy transition, health self-sufficiency and digital transformation. The fact that these are highly complementary agendas, where Latin America can contribute with qualified human resources, in addition to the natural resources necessary for the transition to green technologies, makes the summit an unpostponable opportunity to strengthen bi-regional ties and rethink the challenge of reinsertion equitable and fair in global value chains in light of the aforementioned reconfigurations.
Thus, with a view to consolidating new interregional value chains, the EU will seek to resignify the idea of strategic autonomy as a guide for foreign action in terms of self-sufficiency and alliance with stable and reliable suppliers. At the same time, for Latin America it means an opportunity to prevail in its “non-aligned” position to negotiate both with the EU and with other actors, and to agree on fair agendas that contribute to its economic, commercial and, above all, scientific development. -technological.
It remains to be seen whether the growing geopolitical tensions will pave or hinder the path for the consolidation of these ties. On the part of the EU, the necessary reforms must be assumed with respect to the current agreements under negotiation, making the general system of preferences more flexible, granting greater margin for the protection of infant industries in Latin America and supporting access to financing for emerging technologies. , both with own funds and international organizations. For Latin America and the Caribbean, a central consequence of the new scenario will be the revaluation of alliances within a framework of calculated opportunity costs, where the strategic rapprochement with the EU represents an opportunity to show a prudent equidistance in the face of growing polarization and the bid for redefinition of the main regulatory aspects of the global economy, as long as this strategic association allows responses to Latin American and Caribbean demands, while allowing the gap with the central countries to be reduced.