Russia’s lesser-known intentions in Ukraine

Until the days before the Russian invasion, the European Union I did not believe that Vladimir Putin was about to attack Ukraine. If the EU – an organization whose premise was based on “never again” – was unable to foresee a war, what else could it be missing?

Turns out a lot. Despite all the violence already taking place in Ukraine, the war may actually be just one piece of a much larger puzzle that Russia has been putting together by trial and error in recent years..

In this puzzle, the war in Ukraine it must be analyzed in parallel with the Russian maneuvers in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and East Asia. It must also be viewed in light of the current context: a world in transition destabilized by extreme weather events and geo-economic competition.

It has long been perceived Russia as an actor that contributes little in the fight against climate change. Putin has been oscillating between deny it, downplaying it and arguing that it would even benefit Russia, and casting Moscow as a responsible climate player helping with carbon offset markets in his most recent moves.

«The war may actually be just one piece of a much larger puzzle that Russia has been putting together by trial and error in recent years.»

Putin’s confusing narratives about climate change and Russia’s systemic dependence on hydrocarbons hide a more complex reality about the president’s understanding of the risks and opportunities associated with the climate and digital transitions.

Documents on Russian national security they reveal that Putin understood years ago that climate change and geopolitical disruptions would cause radical changes in energy and commodity markets, forcing Russia to diversify its economy.

Regarding energy, two fundamental aspects defined the Russian outlook. One is that hydrocarbons would continue to be essential for the world economy and that the greatest demand would come from Asia. Therefore, Russia had to direct its efforts towards new markets and partnerships.

The second is that Russia understood European efforts to move towards a renewable energy mix based on strategic raw materials like rare earths. Russia is rich in many of these materials. Not only that: today’s Russia wants to recover the import and export power of the soviet era in terms of strategic materials.

In Putin’s mind, regaining this capability is key to ensuring that Russia is able to tip the global balance of power in its favor. compete with China and undermine the transatlantic relationship.

«Hydrocarbons will continue to be essential for the world economy and the greatest demand will come from Asia. Therefore, Russia had to direct its efforts towards new markets and partnerships.»

In fact, the strategy of economic diversification, strategic raw materials strategynational security and regional strategies they are linked to a specific goal: to improve Russia’s military and defense position and ensure its geo-economic relevance.

Russia’s objective requires three things: to develop its national industrial plantfinding resource-rich countries that it can control or closely cooperate with on its own terms, and building partnerships with countries around the world that possess complementary resources to those Russia can directly control.

Brazil, for example, it falls into the second category, while Kazakhstan and the Arctic fall into the first.

What place does Ukraine occupy in all this?

With a mineral wealth estimated at more than seven billion eurosUkraine reached a strategic partnership on raw materials with the EU in July 2021 to develop and diversify supply chains for strategic materials.

The only other country that the EU had turned to for such a partnership is Canada. This partnership was designed to support the decarbonisation of the EU and to deepen the ties between the EU and Ukraine. Since many of Ukraine’s minerals are located in the eastern part of the country, which is now occupied by Russia, the future of the partnership is unclear.

“Ukraine reached a strategic partnership on raw materials with the EU in July 2021»

What is clear, however, is Russia’s intention to access the resources the EU needs to meet the European Climate Law –a fundamental aspect of the European social pacts in the framework of the European Green Deal. The use of force and the instrumentalization of conflict and war are fundamental to Russia’s strategy.

This pattern is not only observed in Ukraine. The Wagner Group –a mercenary company unofficially linked to the Kremlin whose owner also runs extractive companies such as Lobaye Invest – is now present in African countries with important mineral resources, such as Mozambique, Madagascar, the Central African Republic and Mali.

Even more surprising is that Russia is concluding more defense partnerships that include topographical and hydrological research, such as with Cameroon or Zimbabwe.

What does this all mean?

Putin is using the course of history to design Russia’s role in a climate-altered future. In Ukraine, it is about revising history to justify the occupation and the war. In Africa, it is about exploiting the traumas of history –colonialism and imperialism– to undermine relations between Africa and Europe.

Behind these narratives, Putin wants access to resources and spheres of influence. Among other objectives, his strategic intention is to play with various European dependencies, including future ones. He has understood something that the EU completely missed: the energy transition is a geostrategic issue.

If Europe wants to face the challenges of a world in which actors instrumentalize instability and strategically use supply chains and decarbonization – crucial repositories to reshape the global balance of power, all at a time of climate and ecological collapse –, you must change your vision about transitions. Change must be systemic, but it starts with a few steps.

«Europe must understand that energy security and climate security are the same thing»

First of all, Europe must understand that energy security and climate security are the same thing.

Second, it must urgently regain intelligence analysis capacity and strategic competence. With them, the EU and its Member States must strive to understand the complex and dynamic ways in which security, geopolitics, attacks on open societies and democratic institutions, as well as climate and ecological collapse, are shaping today’s world . If Europe fails in its climate transition, it will fail democratically, industrially, economically, technologically and socially. If external actors try to undermine European transitions, it is a matter of utmost urgency for defense and security actors.

Finally, Europeans must identify how to form qualitative partnerships that go beyond transactional exchanges, and that lead to climate adaptation, climate mitigation and the construction of the interresilience between Europe and its partners. These partnerships are essential to building a climate-safe future and a geopolitical Europe.

The difference between Russia and the EU is that the latter has understood that old geopolitical practices, such as resource hoarding, have no place in the anthropocene. A new strategy is needed to deal with the strategies of the zero-sum game. It is high time that the Green Deal finally endorsed a foreign policy strategy, one that is regenerative and fair.

Article originally published in the Web from Carnegie Europe.