The declaration of the “Universal Russian People's Council”, which proclaimed Russia's “holy war” as a “defence” against the attack of evil throughout the world, has caused some stir. The Russian term for the “Defender”, Uderživajušijhas been interpreted by many as the katejon biblical, the last bastion against the Antichrist, although perhaps that was not exactly the meaning of the solemn declaration. On the other hand, it was not an ecclesial Council nor did it have the intention of issuing dogmatic declarations, not even limited to the perimeter of the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. He Vserossijskij Soborthe “universal council”, is only a theological-political association founded in 1993 to revitalize patriotism, after the fall of the USSR, on the initiative of the future patriarch, then metropolitan Kirill (Gundjaev), and nourished by numerous and diverse ” ideologues” who for more than 30 years have been prophesying the end of the world if Russia is not allowed to carry out its universal mission.
This session of the Sobor was held on March 27 in the hall located under the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, where the plenary assemblies of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church meet, and was chaired by Patriarch Kirill, supreme leader of the believers “from all the Russias”, giving the impression of a great ecclesial assembly. An official document was approved, the Nakaz (Church Slavonic term to refer to the Ukaz, “decree”, with a note of greater authority, more similar to “sanction”), with the title “The present and future of the Russian world.” The text was written a few months ago and exposes the ideological motivations for the religious justification of the “special military operation” in Ukraine, but today it assumes a much more forceful and current value.
In Russia, much importance is attached to dates and they acquire a sacred meaning: the document had to be approved at the beginning of May, taking advantage of the succession of Workers' Day on May 1, Orthodox Easter on May 5 and the Day of the Victory on May 9, which offered a perfect “calendar trinity” to express the great Russian idea, which the document defines as the “tri-unity” that brings together the peoples (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) and the times (past, present and future). The triad-trinity-triunity is the patriarch's favorite symbolic figure, and recalls the three guiding principles of Tsarist Russia: “autocracy, orthodoxy and popularism”, represented by the sacred icon of the Rublev Trinity that Kirill tore from the Tretyakov Museum to Putin's war glory.
After the solemn coronation of the tsar on March 18 (the date of the annexation of Crimea), Lent had to be passed to reach the definitive exaltation of Easter-Victory. Probably trusting in the new army offensive, reinforced by the post-election mobilizations and the spring thaw that facilitates the advance of the tanks against an increasingly lonely Ukraine, practically abandoned by its uncertain Western allies.
But instead of waiting, the Council was hastily convened, immediately after the tragic attack perpetrated by Central Asian terrorists against the Krokus City Hall on the outskirts of Moscow, which shocked the Russians and disoriented the presumed victors, pushing the startled Putin and Patrushev (his covert stage director and head of the security services) into ranting against the “Ukrainian instigators”, when it is evident that Russia is playing the role of “stumbling block” of political, military and religious plans of East and West. The massacre occurred on March 22 and Sobor It met five days later, as a way to reaffirm the compact unity of the people against all enemies, especially foreign invaders. To the already drafted text, in fact, a long chapter on the “new immigration policy” was added, to defend against Tajik terrorists and any other form of threat against the purity of the universal Russian people.
He Nakaz states that “the massive uncontrolled flow of foreign labor leads to the impoverishment of Russia's native population”, taking up a leitmotiv characteristic of all sovereignisms, from America to Europe, “because it allows immigrants to occupy entire sectors of the homeland's economy.” These “invaders”, even before becoming threatening terrorists, “do not know the Russian language nor do they have a correct view of Russian history and its culture, and therefore are not suitable to integrate into our society.” In the main cities “ethnic ghettos closed in on themselves are formed and developed, organized by criminal gangs that control illegal mechanisms,” and then it seems inevitable that these realities become “fertile ground for all types of extremism and terrorism, and In any case, they become a source of colossal tensions in society. It is necessary to establish new codes to regulate the migration phenomenon that “improve the legislation on Russian citizenship, defending the rights and legitimate interests of our compatriots.” It is especially necessary to “defend Russian families”, perhaps preventing mixed marriages with foreigners, and above all “to defend the civilizing identity of Russia, in its legal, cultural and linguistic unity”, reinforcing controls over social life, “creating the conditions for a massive return of our compatriots living abroad” and allowing entry only to “highly qualified foreigners, loyal to Russia and willing to integrate on a cultural and linguistic level.” Confidence in victory is replaced by panic over one's own disappearance.
And yet the main statement of the text, the concept of Russkij Mir, proclaims that “the borders of the Russian World, as a spiritual and cultural-civilizing phenomenon, are broader than the borders of the State, both of the current Russian Federation and of the great historical Russia.” He even goes so far as to praise “the representatives of the Russian ecumene scattered throughout the world”, explaining that “the Russian World includes all those for whom Russian tradition, the shrines of Russian civilization and the great Russian culture are the values.” most important, those that give meaning to life”. Therefore, it is necessary to protect oneself from “invading” immigrants, but at the same time “the main meaning of the existence of Russia and the Russian World created by it, the spiritual mission they have in common, is to be the universal Defender of the world against to the evil one.” Imperial and borderless ecumenism drives “to render ineffective all attempts to establish universal hegemony in the world by subjecting all humanity to the sole power of evil.”
The millennial mission has been concretized in the “reunion of Russian statehood in the highest forms of political creativity”, uniting the tri-unity of the people in the “sub-ethnics” of the Great Russians, the White Russians and the malorossy, the Ukrainian “Little Russians”, as a model for the aggregation of all other peoples and all men who recognize the need for the Defender. The forces of evil continually try to “divide, weaken and disintegrate” the admirable unity of Russia, and also in the 21st century it is necessary to “restore its spiritual and vital potential.” This includes the return to all “traditional moral values”, starting with the family, the only institution capable of “helping man to know the world around him” and “teaching love, kindness and compassion”, illuminating in this way the educational work of the entire society and eliminating “false values” about nature, sexuality and individual and collective orientation.
Along with the war against the attacks of the Evil One and the custody of true values in the life of the people, the Nakaz points out another objective: overcoming the demographic crisis and resuming active fertility to engender the children of the new Russia. This requires a “transformation of the vital spaces” of the country, a change in the cities and places that must be repopulated. In the future, “massive urban agglomerations” must be reduced with those immense condominiums of tiny apartments, a perverse legacy of the Soviet economy, where the ghettos of Tajiks and Kyrgyz nest, who later destroy the new temples of Russian civilization. It is necessary to “return to the traditional distribution of the population and productive forces throughout the territory”, moving masses of people from the metropolises to “well-organized villages at reasonable distances”, where each family has its own house, the isba winter or dacha summer, as in the oldest Russian fairy tales, the bilynewhich tell the stories of the heroes capable of defending the small principalities of ancient Rus', the bogatyrswho alone, each one as a true Defender, confront the numerous peoples who threaten the Russians from the East and the West.
The fantasies of the patriarch and his “ecumenical” advisors are remarkably reminiscent of the excesses of the protagonists of Dostoevsky's novels, such as Prince Myshkin of The idiot, who is seized by epileptic tremors (like those caused by the Krokus massacre), imagines a new world to be built and shouts “show the Russians the Russian world!”, the first quote of the current ideological myth. Or young Arkady Dolgoruki from The Adolescent, whose last name evokes the mythical founder of Moscow, who jealously keeps in his heart a “great idea” to take revenge for all the wrongs suffered in childhood. The boy does not want to reveal to anyone what this idea really consists of, among other things because he himself does not know it either. It is Russia, the eternal teenager, who wants to save everyone but she never understands herself.
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