RUSSIAN WORLD Kirill’s ‘No’ and what remains of the dialogue

The decision not to have the meeting in Kazakhstan was also weighed by the fear that some voices from the Orthodox world of Nur-Sultan could make accusations of “phyletism” against the patriarch. However, Russian culture and tradition are a universal heritage of all Christianity. And when the bombs to rebuild are silenced (something that we hope will happen as soon as possible), the embrace between Francisco and Kirill will be more necessary than ever.

So there will be no second historic meeting between Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. He was postponed several times, in this year of war and “madness”, as the pontiff keeps repeating. The two leaders were due to meet in Nur-Sultan, the capital of the “neutral” country, Kazakhstan, as part of the World Congress of Religions on September 14-15. However, Moscow announced that Kirill will not participate in the ecumenical assembly, contradicting what was initially announced.

The truth is that the meeting could have remained as something merely formal, remaining seated together with the other representatives of the religions, without occupying the entire scene with a face-to-face conversation. And it is precisely this aspect that was inappropriate for the Russian Orthodox, who justified their refusal to participate in the meeting with the argument that a new embrace, after the one with Cuba in 2016, “needs very detailed preparation,” and does not it can be reduced to a handshake and a group photo. The motif brings to mind the patriarchal reticence of the early 2000s, when the dialogue between Moscow and Rome had practically come to a halt.

At that time there was also talk of “preparations to be completed” and “problems to be solved”, referring obsessively to the accusations of Catholic proselytism on the territory of Russia and Greek-Catholic Uniatism on Ukrainian soil. The patriarchate considered this to be an obstacle to relations with the Holy See. The last years of the pontificate of John Paul II, and all those of Benedict XVI, coincided with the restoration of Orthodoxy as the “state religion” under the new Putin regime. In 2002, several missionaries were expelled from Russia, in retaliation for the formal establishment of four Russian Catholic dioceses. The fact marked the freezing of relations for a long time.

The question of proselytism was resolved little by little, after the expulsion of the most active Catholic bishops and priests; only the most prudent and “diplomats” remained in Russia. The activities of the Catholics were subjected to the scrutiny of a mixed Catholic-Orthodox commission, an idea that Kirill had proposed during his tenure as metropolitan “for foreign affairs” in the early 1990s, but which the Vatican had not embraced at all. that moment. In Russia, Catholic structures have remained the same as during the Yeltsin period; moreover, several of them have been closed or reduced their activity to a minimum. Educational and academic works have been almost completely dismantled: in fact, there is only one private Catholic school run by the Jesuits in remote Siberian Tomsk. Especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Catholics remain confined within the walls of parish buildings. At most, they walk a few blocks during the Corpus Christi procession.

The loyal disposition of Russia’s Catholics towards the Orthodox Church and state structures has calmed the situation inside the country, where there are no tensions at the local level. There is even usually an atmosphere of fraternal closeness, if not frank cooperation. Latin parishes are frequented by faithful of Polish, German and Lithuanian origin, but also by many foreigners. They are attended, for example, by Africans and South Americans who live in Russia for study and work (an inheritance from the Soviet era). Also the Armenian Catholics who fled the Caucasus wars of the 1990s (they are that part of the Armenian mountain population that had embraced Catholicism under the protection of the French and Austrians at the time of the genocide in the early 20th century, the so-called “Frankish Armenians”, very active in the life of Russian Catholicism). In thirty years, however, the consciousness of the Russian Catholic community has grown and its faith has matured, leaving in the background the ethnic connotations that justified its historical presence in the country.

There are still cases of Catholics active in the social and political sphere, or in the world of culture and information, but even here without any particular friction with the national-Orthodox majority that supports the Putin system. In recent days, a Catholic municipal deputy from the Moscow suburbs, the liberal Konstantin Jankauskas, was fined for spreading the Pope’s Marian prayer on Facebook Francisco for peace in Ukraine, considered a “discredit of the armed forces”. Simultaneously, a Catholic deputy of the State Duma, Anatolij Vybornyj, – much more influential and who regularly attends mass arriving in all pomp in his official car – exhibited, even in the cathedral, his electoral posters with the Putinian Z and a legend that praises the United Russia party, “become a great magnet that attracts people whose intention is to help the Russian homeland”.

Very different is the situation of the “Uniats”, whom the Moscow Patriarchate sees as its main enemies in the Orthodox “canonical territory”. In the patriarchal eyes, they are the inspirers of the Maidan revolution in kyiv in 2014 and of the Ukrainian “neo-Nazi” ideology, which he considers linked to the collaborationist Stepan Bandera of the Hitler era – despite the fact that he was actually Greek-Catholic . The Holy See has maintained a prudent attitude towards them, making it clear that it does not support the anti-Russian excesses of a Church that, however, is autonomous in its own administration, as is the case with the Eastern Rite Catholic Churches. On the other hand, the Holy Father has shown full solidarity with all the victims in these six months of war, making Greek Catholics feel his closeness on several occasions. First of all, Archbishop Major Sviatoslav Shevchuk, whom the Pope has known since his time in Argentina and who maintains daily contact with the Holy See’s organizations.

Beyond relations with Catholics and with the Pope, the Patriarch’s problem is his isolation, which is increasingly total, even in the Orthodox world, after having completely severed relations with the Patriarch of Constantinople as a result of Ukrainian autocephaly. . And above all, after having scandalized the whole world with his explicit and “metaphysical” support for Putin’s war. Many Orthodox theologians from various parts of the world accuse the Moscow Patriarchate of “philetist” heresy, as religious nationalism is called, which in this case is projected, even acquiring imperial dimensions.

From the autocephalous Church of kyiv, together with many bishops and priests, Metropolitan Epifanyj repeatedly asks the Ecumenical Patriarchate to subject Kirill to a canonical trial in order to deprive him of the patriarchal seat. But it is clear that the head of the Russian Orthodox has no intention of exposing himself in contexts where someone could make accusations and claims against him, something that could well happen in Nur-Sultan. In the end, Kazakh President Tokaev did not hesitate to point out Putin’s own expansionist goalswhich would also like to annex Kazakhstan, in a situation parallel to that of Ukraine, but to the east.

After the Havana meeting, Russian Catholics and Orthodox agreed to resume active collaboration in the humanitarian and cultural spheres, without dwelling on doctrinal and historical diatribes, which are part of the past. Now mistrust and resentment prevail again, but it is to be hoped that the door to dialogue will not close completely: Russian Orthodox culture and tradition are a universal heritage of all of Christendom, and these treasures cannot be left to the mercy of the goals of the powerful. If the Russians too they enlist the Trinity of Rublev in the regiment of fighters against the West and the whole world, this does not mean that the holy icon loses its character as a symbol of faith for all peoples.

And above all, humanitarian cooperation will be the true dimension of relations between Christians of all confessions, and all men of good will, when the bombs and missiles fall – hopefully, as soon as possible – and houses have to be rebuilt, squares and souls. Then a new embrace between Francis and Kirill will be necessary, and no longer in neutral and distant places, but in the heart of the martyred land of kyiv, in the pacified Moscow Kremlin, or blessed under the dome of Saint Peter.

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