However, the internal conflicts in the region are “children of the Soviet period.” In the former republics of the USSR, young people no longer want to learn Russian. The Central Asians know that they have to find alternatives to Russia, after having exploited it to the full.
Moscow () – In dialogue with the editors of Novaja Gazeta Evropa, political scientist Temur Umarov from the Carnegie Fund took stock of Russia’s relations with its former Soviet “best friends” in Central Asia, after the impact of the war in Ukraine in 2022. On the other hand, last year conflicts that in some cases were up to 30 years old also reemerged in this region, with unexpected violence.
Umarov broadens his gaze not only to Asians but to the entire post-Soviet space, which has become “considerably radicalized and degraded.” The international media have paid much more attention to the tensions that are dragging on in these regions, especially after the riots a year ago in Kazakhstan, shortly before the invasion of Ukraine. Now it seems that “any conflict, internal or between countries, can have fatal outcomes.”
The war has once again become, after Putin’s tragic decisions, “the main instrument of foreign policy”, as it was in the past. The upsurge in confrontations and protests in all these countries seems to be a result of the reasoning “if they do it, we can do it too,” observes the political scientist, because “all authoritarian regimes that are close to each other and share a common past, they tend to exchange tools and modalities of action, but not only Central Asia learns from Russia, it is a process that also moves in the opposite direction”, as evidenced by the various laws on “foreign agents” and constitutional amendments.
The decisive factor is not so much victory or defeat in military operations, but “the admissibility of the use of weapons in politics”, and in the Tajik-Kyrgyz border conflict justifications similar to Russia’s in Ukraine have resonated for defending their compatriots of the “genocide” carried out by the government of the opposing country. Kyrgyzstan has tried to imitate Ukraine, establishing itself as a defender of democracy against Dušanbe’s autocracy, although Bishkek certainly cannot compare with kyiv in respect for liberal values. After all, Umarov admits, “compared to Tajikistan, almost everything looks like democracy.”
One of the many factors at play that the expert points out is the importance of the “youth demographics” of the Central Asian countries in relation to Russia, where the average age is less than 30 years, compared to 47 for Russians. “This generation has no memory of the Soviet Union, and is made up of people very different from those who rule them, who are 65 and older.”
The generational handover of the ruling class has become a priority in the former Soviet countries, even with explicit moves such as the handover from father to son in Turkmenistan and similar initiatives in other countries, including Russia. In these areas “the opposition between the governed and the rulers is increasingly radicalized”, a populist variant that expresses great hostility towards the Russians, whom they consider to be the expression of an old world that must be erased, starting with their language that the young they no longer want to learn.
Even internal and regional conflicts are also “children of the Soviet period”, like the same situation in Ukraine, “when the regime wanted to keep ethnic groups within the various republics separate, so that they did not agree too much with each other.” . In reality, relations between ethnic groups have always existed and miscegenation is inevitable, and today they are simply revealed. An example Umarov cites is the Fergana Valley, once divided between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, “where the population density is higher than elsewhere, and it is a highly developed agricultural area although it lacks water resources.” .
As a Russian proverb says, “The East is a subtle matter”, in the sense of slippery and often incomprehensible. Central Asian countries are by nature hospitable and peaceful, but they are also very pragmatic, such as welcoming Russians fleeing war and their money with open arms. Without being “as dedicated to business as the Chinese, who are increasingly active in the region”, the Central Asians know that they have to find an alternative to Russia after having exploited it to the fullest, because their future now speaks another language.