Putin’s options

Recent information about the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive on the northeastern front leads us to once again review some statements that reality has been refuting.

When Russia invaded Ukraine on several fronts at the end of February, the general opinion is that we were going to witness a short war (days or weeks) that would end with the Ukrainian surrender, the fall of the Zelensky government and its replacement by another related to Moscow. that it would assume enormous territorial losses and the end of access to the Black Sea, which would be controlled by Russia, from the Sea of ​​Azov, through Crimea and southern Ukraine, to Transnistria.

For this reason, many analysts and political leaders (some with “small mouths”) argued that a quick surrender would prevent greater evils – such as the use of energy as a weapon against the West – and would satisfy Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild Great Slavic Russia. under its control, including the explicit subordination of Belarus, forgetting new territorial claims in the perspective of the “recovery” of the post-Soviet space. It was the same as Arthur Neville Chamberlain and Édouard Daladier thought in 1938 when they accepted in Munich that Hitler had the right to “protect” the Sudetenland of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, in the current Czech Republic (then Czechoslovakia).

Fortunately for the cause of freedom, open society, and international law, that prediction of a Russian invasion of Ukraine turned out to be dead wrong. The united response of the West and, above all, the determination of the Ukrainian government to repel the aggression, assuming the very high human and material costs that this entailed, substantially changed the scenario. The sanctions imposed on Russia (in addition to the financial and personal ones, especially those that ban exports of technology and spare parts), the financial aid and, above all, the provision of increasingly sophisticated offensive weapons and military intelligence to the army Ukrainian have dramatically highlighted the deep structural weaknesses of Russia’s military power.

Until recently, however, a different claim was taken for granted. Ukraine demonstrated its ability to resist and stop the Russian advance, although this did not seem enough to initiate a successful counterattack. The corollary was that we were facing a war of attrition, long, and more similar to the trench warfare of the First World War than to the rapid advances and setbacks that characterized the Second.

A bad situation for Russia, but also for Ukraine and for Europe. For this reason, once again, voices were appearing (the same ones that advised surrender) that advocated a ceasefire, leaving things as they were (that is, assuming in practice that unjustified aggression had a reward).

Inflection point?

The reality of the facts has come again to deny that prediction. Ukraine seems ready to fight back and take back occupied territory and Russia seems unable to prevent it. Many analysts speak of a turning point in the war and say that Ukraine may end up winning on the battlefield, including the reversal of the illegal annexation of Crimea. That conclusion seems premature, despite the incredible strategic and tactical shortcomings of the Russian armed forces.

Indeed, Russia has not been able to make use of its claimed great air and naval superiority, neutralizing the former and with serious setbacks for the latter. On the ground, the logistical failures and the use of obsolete weapons, together with a glaring deficit in military intelligence, reflect a reality: Russian military capacity is far below what was supposed. An example is the public emphasis on a counteroffensive in Kherson, on the other side of the Dnieper River, in the south, which has left the front from Kharkov to the Russian border and Donbas unguarded. The Russians have fallen into the trap.

«In the expression of Mao Zedong, the Russian army has shown itself to be a “paper tiger”, typical of a weak economy that objectively prevents it from aspiring to be a great power»

The propaganda boasts about very sophisticated weapons have not been corroborated by reality, beyond prototypes or a few demonstration units. Technological dependence on the West now takes its toll. The –unconfirmed– purchases of weapons from Iran or North Korea clearly show the inability of the Russian arms industry –usually an exporter– to meet its own needs. Without forgetting the corruption, which has undermined the renewal of equipment, nor the low morale of inexperienced and unmotivated troops or the use of Chechen or Wagner mercenaries to make up for the inability of the replacement troops.

In Mao Zedong’s expression, the Russian army has shown itself to be a “paper tiger”, typical of a weak economy that objectively prevents it from aspiring to be a great power. This is how it is being perceived by the West (especially by the United States), which reaffirms the wisdom of military aid and its continuity, with increasingly lethal and sophisticated weapons, including support for training and information on Ukrainian troops by NATO countries. In fact, today there are more Ukrainian soldiers in combat than Russians.

One thing to follow, to check the structural weakness of the Russian army, is whether Moscow can honor its commitments to Armenia, in its war with Azerbaijan, over Nagorno-Karabakh, by providing military assistance on the ground. It seems difficult that it is in a position to do so, since it would further weaken its response capacity on the Ukrainian front. Azerbaijan’s great ally (Turkey) is once again taking advantage of this.

However, it is advisable not to anticipate events or jump to conclusions. The internal pressure in Russia to declare war (forgetting the restrictions derived from a “special military operation”) and mobilize all existing human and material resources is increasing, with the support of both the Communist Party and the pan-Slavic ultra-nationalists. It is not ruled out that, if Putin wants to stay in power, he will end up giving in to his demands, although his implementation requires time and obvious social and image costs. In the meantime, moreover, the Ukrainian advances can be consolidated. In any case, the risk to his continuity in power comes more from that flank than from the Liberals and Democrats, who defend that the operation should not have started and on whom the Kremlin exercises brutal repression.

It is obvious that a declaration of war would suppose a very substantive qualitative change. The non-declaration was intended to prevent the West from being compelled to give an explicit military response on the ground. Something that was complemented by the containment of the Alliance, avoiding placing troops on Ukrainian territory and refusing to declare a no-fly zone. The reason has been clear: to avoid an escalation in the conflict that could make it unpredictable. But the declaration of war would substantially change the panorama.

A possible but not probable nuclear escalation

On the other hand, the temptation to avoid a humiliating defeat, which would seriously endanger Putin himself, brings back into the theater of operations the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, both chemical and tactical nuclear, on the grounds that Russia’s vital interests are seriously threatened. It is true that Putin cannot push the “nuclear button” alone. It is necessary that both the Minister of Defense and the Head of the Russian Joint Chiefs of Staff contribute, with sophisticated secret codes, to its activation, something that, being plausible, we cannot take for granted, given the importance of the decision for the troops themselves and the Russian citizens.

But such an eventuality has many contraindications, such as the fact that Russian territory itself would be affected by radioactivity, it would greatly weaken the implicit support it is receiving from the “Global South” and could provoke a Western response that, without necessarily being nuclear, could be lethal from the outset. conventional point of view. To a large extent, such assertions are also valid for the use of chemical weapons.

In the end, any occupation on a hostile terrain is not resolved with nuclear or chemical attacks, nor without a manifest superiority of the invading troops, which does not exist today. Therefore, a nuclear escalation is possible, but not likely. In fact, the debate on the appropriate nuclear strategy has existed since the former Soviet Union agreed to its production, at the beginning of the Cold War, although today’s parameters are clearly different. The hypothesis of using chemical weapons is somewhat more, but the impact on world public opinion would be devastating for Russia.

The facts are showing that the possession of nuclear weapons deters the possible aggressor (if Ukraine had maintained them, it would hardly have been invaded), but a conventional military capacity based on high-tech equipment, using artificial intelligence, satellite communications, missiles, is also a deterrent. and anti-missile systems equipped with guidance technology, drones, “swarm” defense and attack strategies, etc.

In short, it is about effectively dissuading, making the cost of an aggression unaffordable for the attacker, without the world embarking on a nuclear proliferation race that, in certain cases, can end up in irresponsible hands. It is a good lesson also in the face of a hypothetical Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

Obviously, we don’t know how irresponsible a cornered Putin can turn out to be. But it is doubtful that he will make a decision that would inevitably end in a complete Russian defeat. It is one of the options, although it is not rational. And irrationality unfortunately exists, in politics and in life. Hitler did it.

«The rational option would be to accept the failure of the operation, (…) but it would predictably lead to the dismissal of Putin and his replacement by even more ultra-nationalist politicians. It is dead end street”

More likely is the option of escalating the war by declaring it explicitly, although it is not exempt from considerable internal costs and risks associated with an even more forceful Western response. Russia is not in objective conditions for a war that directly involves the Atlantic Alliance, today clearly superior militarily. Unless we go to Armageddon.

The rational option would be to accept the failure of the operation, withdraw from the occupied territories and try to maintain sovereignty over Ukraine and the existence of separatist republics in Donbas, something that Ukraine does not seem willing to admit today.

Such an option would predictably lead to Putin’s removal from office and his replacement by even more ultra-nationalist politicians.

It is dead end street. After the geopolitical failure (strengthening and expansion of NATO and the transatlantic link, loss of the Baltic and the Black Sea, and consolidation of a Ukrainian and anti-Russian national consciousness), Putin’s position is weaker than ever and his real options are gone. dramatically reducing. The disturbing thing is that the weak may be tempted to die killing. The sooner they disappear from the stage, the better for everyone. Including Russia itself.