Not ‘Zeitenwende’ in Paris

It is clear that today there is no shortage of Franco-German disputes. But when it comes to how far to support Ukraine and how to treat Russia, Paris and Berlin are pretty much aligned. Both German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron say they will support Ukraine “as long as it takes” and that it is up to kyiv to decide whether and when to negotiate.

Arms shipments from both countries to Ukraine are significant, but they pale in comparison to the UK and some Central and Eastern European countries, given their size. This is because both countries’ militaries are running out of supplies, but also because Berlin and Paris care more about nuclear threats from Moscow than kyiv winning the war. Hence, they continue to hesitate when delivering “offensive” weapons.

Last but not least, both powers, as part of the ill-fated Minsk Agreements (along with Ukraine and Russia), think they must play a key role in any post-war European security architecture. Both continue to send signals to Russian President Vladimir Putin that they would be willing to re-engage with him if he changes course and ends the war.

“Berlin and Paris care more about nuclear threats from Moscow than about kyiv winning the war. Hence, they continue to hesitate when handing over ‘offensive’ weapons.”

On the other hand, if we look at the attitude of public opinion towards the war, the picture is almost identical on both sides of the Rhine. According to one probe October, two thirds of French and Germans approve of sanctions against Russia. Approximately 60% of French and Germans approve of the delivery of arms, as well as Ukraine’s entry into the European Union. By contrast, 20% of Germans and 16% of French people say they still have a “good opinion” of Russia.

Although there is no Franco-German division on Ukraine policy, the public debate on the issue could not be more different in the two countries.

First foreign policy debate in Germany

Foreign policy has rarely been a major issue in post-1945 German politics. As the nerve center of the Cold War, the Federal Republic had little room for maneuver in foreign affairs. Instead, Bonn focused on building what would later become the EU and making its citizens rich and with it their East German brothers and sisters jealous. By the time 1989 passed, Germans became accustomed to the benefits of a prudent Swiss-style foreign policy focused on multilateralism and business.

The Kosovo war of 1998-99 forced a reunited Germany out of this comfort zone for the first time. Should Germany give up its military containment? The decision to support the NATO operation marked a major turning point in the country, which for a long time equated the maxim of Nie wieder Krieg (no more wars) with non-military intervention. But the debate was brief. The NATO operation lasted less than two months. Very soon, German politics returned to focus on internal issues, such as the fight against unemployment or the exit from nuclear energy promoted by the Greens.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is different. Germany is having its biggest foreign policy debate in decades as the war continues and Putin’s calculation has called into question fundamental principles of German foreign and economic policy. And because, unlike Kosovo in 1999, the debate is not just moral. The decisions that Scholz must make regarding Ukraine involve risks and compromises that affect key German interests.

In this political debate, the chancellor is subjected to constant criticism. The weekly talk shows on German television relentlessly discuss the war and Germany’s role in it. Should sanctions be tightened and more – and heavier – weapons sent to kyiv? Should Scholz launch an initiative to negotiate an armistice? Is former Chancellor Angela Merkel guilty of the war?

Not only in social gatherings, but also in the Bundestag, Scholz is constantly questioned about Ukraine. By the opposition, of course, but also by deputies from the parties of his own coalition government. Some MPs from that coalition – Social Democrats from the ranks of Scholz, Greens and the pro-business Free Democrats – even joined the opposition in passing a resolution forcing the government to hand over “heavy weapons” to Ukraine. And the debate goes beyond Ukraine. How to deal with China, Germany’s largest trading partner, which is increasingly authoritarian and which has become the center of an open dispute within the government coalition?

Undoubtedly, at Zeitenwende he still has a long way to go. The movement is showing itself to be walking and the promised rethinking of German foreign policy by Scholz has not quite started. Overcoming established thought patterns is excruciatingly difficult, as any behavior therapist knows. But there is no doubt that German politics and civil society are fighting against the war and fighting for what should be the guiding principles of future German foreign policy.

‘Domaine reserved’

By contrast, in France, Ukraine is almost absent from the political debate. None of Macron’s allies, not even the opposition, believe it is politically necessary or timely to review Macron’s failed Russia policy or to put pressure on the Elysée over his current Ukraine policy. Why?

In the first place, one of the contradictions in France is that in the country that is being debated as a way of life, substantive discussion of foreign policy remains limited. There are countless radio shows where politicians and pundits discuss general questions like: “What is France’s place in the world?” or “Has Macron made France more influential?” Macron’s speeches are also dissected and criticized ad nauseam by journalists and experts. But that’s as far as we get.

kyiv wants French Leclerc tanks, but neither the opposition nor the media nor the think tank they launch a huge campaign to pressure Macron to lift his veto. The lawmakers are not passing resolutions constraining Macron or demanding to see the list of French arms deliveries to Ukraine, which are being kept secret.

That Macron can do what he wants in foreign policy, the so-called domaine reserved (reserved area) of the president, is not limited to his presidency. Whether Nicolas Sarkozy decided to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, or François Hollande wanted to bomb Syria over the use of chemical weapons in 2013, or send thousands of troops into the Sahel to fight Islamists, the president’s party, the opposition and the The media more or less accept the fait accomplis (fait accompli).

Furthermore, the war in Ukraine is still a long way off for many French people. More than one million of Ukrainians have arrived in Germany since February 24, 2022. Friends welcome refugees. Cars with Ukrainian license plates park in front of the local supermarket. Meanwhile, only 120,000 Ukrainians have chosen to go to France. There is also much less identification with Ukraine, a country the French know little about. There is no French equivalent to Vitali Klitschko, a former boxing champion and celebrity in Germany who draws the nation’s attention when he pleads in German on television for more weapons.

The French news cycle is much faster. German public space is governed by a series of quiet weekly debates on public television. In France, 24-hour private news channels, with guests on bar stools desperately trying to get their joke out before the moderator cuts them off, set the tone in this hyper-nervous democracy.

‘Are Zeitenwende? No N!’

Finally, the war in Russia was a shock minor for the political and economic system of France. France has a nuclear bomb. It need not fear Russia, with which it has never traded much. France’s dependence on China remains manageable compared to Germany’s, and Paris has always been much more wary of Beijing getting hold of key infrastructure like 5G.

In short, France has fewer mistakes to correct. Of course, France should ask itself whether basing 75% of its electricity supply on a single technology that is difficult to master is as risky as importing 55% of its gas from an authoritarian country with criminal rulers. But if Putin dared to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and hoped for limited EU sanctions, it was not because half of France’s nuclear reactors are out of commission or because Macron said NATO was “in death.” cerebral”, but because he thought he had Germany in his pocket. After all, Berlin doubled down on Russian energy after the Kremlin annexed Crimea in 2014.

«The war in Russia was a minor ‘shock’ for the political and economic system of France. France has a nuclear bomb. She should not fear Russia, with which she has never traded much »

This could also explain why kyiv is not trying to push a debate on Ukraine in France. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky invited Merkel, but not former President François Hollande, to visit Bucha. The tweets of Zelensky after the calls with Scholz are hermetic, but praises to his “friend” Macron for his “unwavering support”. The kyiv envoy in Paris works behind the scenes and does not criticize the French political class, as the kyiv man did in Berlin until the fall, even though the French political class has much of the same Russophile streak as the German one.

If there was any proof that Ukraine deserves to join the EU, there it is. kyiv perfectly knows how to play European politics. Public pressure works to some extent in Germany, where foreign policy is negotiated between coalition partners and the debate is public. In proud France, where ultimately one person decides, such a strategy would be completely counterproductive. Therefore, it is better to seduce your interlocutor. Scholz and Macron have a few things to learn from Zelensky.

Article originally published in English in the Web from Internationale Politik Quarterly.