Finland and Sweden are going through a turning point in their respective security policies. Like Berlin, Stockholm is catching up on defense, while Helsinki has long been held up as a model in its ‘comprehensive security’ strategy.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine provoked a swift and determined response in Northern Europe. Less than three months after the Russian invasion, Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO. The two Nordic countries have been close partners in the Atlantic Alliance for decades now, and their military capabilities make them welcome new members. However, this moment would mark the end of Sweden’s 200-year history of military non-alignment. Finland had also stayed out of NATO for a long time, although it did so more out of the pragmatism of maintaining good relations with its Russian neighbor than for ideological reasons.
At first glance, the entry of Finland and Sweden [una vez superado el obstáculo de la aprobación de su ingreso por parte de Turquía] in NATO seems to be one of the biggest unintended consequences of the war. Russian President Vladimir Putin should have been well aware that an unjustified attack on another neighbor would at least prompt Finland to opt for the “NATO option.” An important part of Finnish security policy was that Helsinki reserved the right to reconsider its non-alignment if its general security situation changed. This is precisely what happened with the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. The reaction within the country was unequivocal. Finnish public opinion changed almost overnight, with support for NATO membership jumping from around 25% to 53%. By May 2022, when Finland submitted its membership application, it had risen further to 76% in favor of membership.
Finnish political leaders had to move quickly to keep pace with determined public opinion. Before the war, only two political parties in Finland were in favor of NATO membership. No fewer than four of the five ruling parties had to quickly adapt their positions to the new situation.
Sweden, for its part, was surprised by the rapidity of Finland’s transformation. It was not easy for the Social Democratic government in Stockholm to break with the country’s old doctrine of non-alignment. But eventually, Sweden came to the conclusion that there was no other way but to join Finland in trying to join NATO. The decision was made after careful consideration of all options, including an even closer defense union between Finland and Sweden, which was initially seriously considered as an alternative.
new impulse
Finland and Sweden are indispensable partners, and the joint NATO accession process has brought them even closer. Although the two Nordic neighbors intended to become members “hand in hand”, the wish did not materialize. Turkey has persistently blocked the Swedish bid amid accusations that Stockholm supports Kurdish terrorists.
Although Finland ended up completing its accession process without Sweden, becoming the 31st member of the alliance on April 4, 2023, this has not caused a break in relations between Finns and Swedes. The respective NATO processes have been very closely coordinated on a daily basis and at all political levels. Finland’s entry into the alliance is seen as a positive development for Sweden’s regional security. On the contrary, Finland’s top priority now is for Sweden to join as soon as possible: Helsinki’s first official act as a NATO member, some 15 seconds after completing its own accession, was to ratify Sweden’s membership.
Beyond the bilateral relationship between Finland and Sweden, the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – have further consolidated as a group. This momentum has been stimulated by the accession process of Finland and Sweden to NATO and by the strong support for Ukraine from all the Nordic countries. In defense matters, the five countries had already been collaborating since 2009 within the framework of NORDEFCO (Nordic Defense Cooperation), but the prospect of Finland and Sweden joining NATO has opened up new opportunities. The recent declaration of intent by the four Nordic air forces (Iceland has no armed forces) to operationally integrate their fleets created a total force of some 250 combat aircraft. In the far north, the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian air forces have already been conducting joint training exercises almost weekly for about 15 years.
Nordic cooperation also plays an important role in supporting Ukraine. Finland and Sweden, for example, have used their close bilateral defense cooperation to support Ukraine militarily. In January 2023, the countries signed a declaration of intent allowing Finland to be quickly resupplied by Sweden, allowing Helsinki to continue supporting Ukraine without jeopardizing its own defense capability. In May, the Ukrainian president, Volodímir Zelenski, began a long trip to Europe in the Finnish capital, whose visit coincided with a Nordic summit. His visit underlined the fact that the Nordic countries are increasingly perceived as a coherent and closely coordinated group.
High level interoperability
Finland’s accession process took less than a year, the fastest in NATO’s history. Had it not been for the Turkish opposition, both Finland and Sweden could have become full members of NATO as early as October 2022. Other Alliance members ratified membership at record speed: at the end of September, only Turkey and Hungary had not. The speed of the process was aided by Finland’s and Sweden’s high level of compatibility with NATO’s political norms and military standards. According to the usual procedure, a “Membership Action Plan (MAP)” is drawn up for the candidate countries, which allows them to gradually adopt NATO rules. But Finland and Sweden had in fact already gone through a very similar process, thanks to decades of close cooperation with NATO, including the strong prioritization of interoperability in defense acquisitions. Before their integration bids, both countries already cooperated closely with the United States on a bilateral and trilateral basis: this was another factor that facilitated and accelerated integration.
In military terms, accession will change little for Finland and Sweden. Even during the ratification process, the Finnish and Swedish armed forces have continued to carry out exercises with NATO countries, with a view to enhancing interoperability. After submitting its application on May 18, Finland added a total of 27 new or modified military exercises for the remainder of 2023. In April 2023, Sweden held its largest international exercise in 30 years. The objective of this exercise was for Sweden to rehearse the reception of forces from its future allies, who in turn practiced the defense of Sweden.
However, for both Finland and Sweden, the move from national to collective defense requires a major change in mindset. Considering national defense within the framework of NATO’s collective defense is standard procedure for the German armed forces, but for Finland it is a real revolution in military thinking. The Finns were prepared for a possible attack by Russia even after the end of the cold war, and they maintained a strong defensive capability. Even in the initially optimistic early 2000s, Finnish government reporting on foreign policy, security and defense never completely ruled out the possibility of a Russian attack.
After 80 years of focusing on one’s own national defense, starting to think about national security within the framework of the alliance is a significant change. As for Sweden, which greatly reduced its defense forces after the Cold War, increasing the number of troops poses a challenge in the medium term.
the return of history
Finland’s defense spending is already in line with NATO’s 2% spending target. Sweden has some catching up to do: its goal is to reach the 2% mark by 2026. In many respects, Sweden and Germany went through a comparable evolution in defense policy. Both interpreted the end of the cold war as the “end of history”, consequently reducing their defense capabilities.
For Sweden, the wake-up call came in 2013, when Russian warplanes rehearsed an attack on Swedish territory. The Russian aircraft had to be intercepted by the Danish air force, which was on duty at the time during NATO’s Baltic air surveillance, as all the Swedish pilots were on Easter vacation. NATO’s investigation into the incident later determined that it had been a simulated nuclear attack. The following year, Russia’s annexation of Crimea helped the Swedes realize that military capabilities had not become obsolete after all. In response, Sweden redeployed its Gotland Regiment to the Baltic island of the same name, which had been demilitarized after the Cold War.
Stockholm also reintroduced partial conscription, which had been abolished in 2010. Finland continues to maintain full conscription for male citizens, giving it a wartime strength of 280,000, with a full reserve force. of 870,000.
Sweden faces similar challenges to Germany, but has a nearly 10-year lead in terms of its own ‘historic turning point’. Swedish political parties agree that they all got their security policy wrong, reducing recriminations and solidifying consensus around the need to rebuild the military. Like Germany, Swedish foreign policy has traditionally emphasized peacebuilding as a policy objective. However, the need for greater military capacity is well understood. In many respects, Sweden is an ideal partner for Germany as it navigates similar issues. Finland’s whole-of-society approach to national security (“comprehensive security”) could serve as a model for Germany to implement its own comprehensive security approach, introduced in the new National Security Strategy.
Learn from mistakes
Russia’s brutal war of aggression represents a clear rejection of the post-Cold War European security order. The Finnish and Swedish candidacies for NATO – in response to Moscow’s aggression – show that the era of gray areas is over. Russia is forcing its neighbors to choose sides.
At the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, Ukraine – along with Georgia – was offered the possibility of joining NATO but without a concrete “Membership Action Plan”. The reason was that some Western European member states, led by Germany and France, did not consider that both countries were ready for accession and did not want to upset relations with Moscow. The Russian invasion of Georgia less than six months later, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 show that those concessions were in vain.
Ukraine’s NATO membership will once again be on the agenda of the Alliance’s annual summit, which is being held this year in Vilnius. There are two reasons why Ukraine should be given a concrete path to membership this time. First, because of Russia’s nuclear threats, Ukraine will need nuclear-backed security guarantees. It seems unlikely that the United States or the European nuclear powers would want to offer such guarantees on a bilateral basis. Second, NATO membership is the standard security guarantee in Europe. As long as Ukraine is not part of that framework, it sends a political signal to the Kremlin that Ukraine is a special case, with different rules.
By now it is abundantly clear that Russia will interpret this as a green light to assert its self-proclaimed sphere of interest.
Article translated from English from the website of International Political Quarterly (IPQ).
