economy and politics

New Zealand approaches AUKUS

New Zealand approaches AUKUS

Despite increasingly strong warnings from Chinese officials, New Zealand’s coalition government, led by the National Party, continues to actively explore the possibility of acceding to Pillar II of AUKUS.

In September 2021, the governments of Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom announced the creation of AUKUS, an enhanced security alliance aimed at strengthening the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. Although the threat was not initially specified, it was clear that AUKUS was being formed to counter the perceived growth of Chinese influence in the region.

New Zealand’s anti-nuclear security policy rules out any participation in Pillar I of AUKUS, which would involve the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. But Pillar II provides for the exchange of cutting-edge defense technologies in areas such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles and cyber warfare. In March 2023, Joe Biden’s administration signaled that the door was open to talks about New Zealand joining Pillar II.

Since then, New Zealand’s former and current governments have held discussions with AUKUS members to “weigh the economic and security benefits and costs of any decision” on whether accession to Pillar II is in the national interest. Wellington’s approach appears to be based on the assumption that technology sharing is decoupled from AUKUS’ overall goal of deterring China, New Zealand’s largest trading partner.

While the previous Labor government was willing to explore this option, the current National Party-led coalition has enthusiastically linked participation in Pillar II to a broader goal of aligning itself more closely with “traditional partners”. Foreign Minister Winston Peters has said there are “strong reasons” for New Zealand to participate in security arrangements such as AUKUS “when all parties consider it appropriate”.

A New Zealand government briefing document, published under the Official Information Act, states that AUKUS Pillar II “presents significant capability opportunities as well as broader interoperability implications” for the country.

Discussions have focused on technologies such as artificial intelligence and space technology, a field in which New Zealand has emerged as a potentially significant player. Underlying this tilt towards peaceful alliance is Peters’ assessment that the international security situation is now “the worst that anyone working in politics or foreign affairs can remember”, implying that New Zealand now needs to seek refuge on its traditional allies.

The Chinese ambassador to New Zealand, Wang Xiaolong, recognizes that the bilateral relationship is at a “critical juncture”, but insists that “China is not a threat to New Zealand, but, as both the prime minister and the Prime Minister have pointed out, [Christopher Luxon] like the minister [de Comercio, Todd] McClay, China represents an opportunity and a mutually beneficial partner for New Zealand.”

China has serious doubts about New Zealand joining the second pillar of AUKUS. Among them, the conviction that AUKUS is a nuclear-based military alliance “blatantly” designed to maintain American hegemony and that the sole purpose of its second pillar is to serve and support nuclear-related military cooperation within the framework of the first. pillar.

While previous Labor-led governments since 2017 engaged with Beijing in a different way to New Zealand’s allies, they had few illusions about China’s authoritarian system and its growing assertiveness internationally. Jacinda Ardern’s government issued a strategic defense policy statement in 2018 identifying China as a threat to the rules-based international order, and passed a law in late 2019 banning all foreign donations over NZ$50. to domestic political actors, in a move to limit Chinese influence, and condemned the 2022 China-Solomon Islands security pact.

During Chris Hipkins’ brief tenure as Prime Minister, a series of national security and defense policy documents were made public confirming New Zealand’s hardening perception of the Chinese threat. Peters said that “China is a vital economic partner for New Zealand” but added that their “political systems diverge significantly and it is not surprising that this gives rise to differences of opinion.”

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and Trade Minister Todd McClay have publicly indicated that they would not expect a hostile reaction from Beijing if the National Party-led coalition government ended up adhering to Pillar II of AUKUS. Whether this confidence is justified remains to be seen, but New Zealand’s decision-making will also depend on whether it fully shares the view that China constitutes the main threat to the existing international order – although Australia may now be seeing a backlash against this perspective.

Many New Zealanders accept that the world has become more complex and challenging, but the current government may find it difficult to attribute this to China, and reach consensus on domestic policy. Aside from the potential economic consequences of this move, critics point out that China’s assertiveness is just one of many threats to the multilateral system on which New Zealand and many other small and medium-sized powers depend.

These threats include the dysfunction of the UN Security Council, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and US exceptionalism, as well as a growing range of problems including climate change, pandemics and transnational terrorism, which do not They respect borders and cannot be settled with security pacts like AUKUS.

There are alternatives to Pillar II to strengthen New Zealand’s national security. The National Party-led coalition government could end decades of underinvestment in defense by raising spending to at least 1.7% of GDP and instead focus on strengthening security ties with its closest ally , Australia.

Article translated from English from the website East Asia Forum.

Activity subsidized by the Ministry of Foreign and Global Affairs.

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