The continued influx of Afghans and Burmese has exposed what commentators call deliberate “strategic ambiguity.” India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. Help or rejection depends on geopolitical circumstances or internal politics.
Milan () – Immediately after the Taliban reconquest of Afghanistan, more than 1,000 Afghan refugees arrived in the Indian capital seeking asylum. When India introduced a new category of e-Visas, the number continued to grow in the following weeks and within days the Indian authorities received 60,000 applications. However, as of December last year, only 200 visas had been granted.
Delhi is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. In January this year there were 46,000 registered asylum seekers, but the true figure is estimated to be at least 213,000, of whom nearly half are women. and 36% minors.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are more than 15,000 Afghans. In most cases they are undocumented and it is the UNHCR that issues visas and identity documents, but the Indian authorities are not obliged to recognize them. In addition, the majority of Afghan refugees are Muslim, a condition that makes it more difficult to obtain citizenship. In 2019, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist party – modified the law with an amendment, allowing it to discriminate against refugees of the Islamic religion and favor Sikhs and Hindus. The same problem affects the Rohingya, the Muslim ethnic group originally from the Rakhine state in Myanmar. The Citizen Amendment Act offers protection against religious persecution to all religions except Islam. According to Human Rights Watchthere are 40,000 Rohingya in the country, of which only half are registered with the UN.
The wars in Afghanistan and Burma highlight India’s problem with refugees: the management of foreigners, including refugees, is regulated by the Foreigners Act of 1946, which does not guarantee help or protection against rejection and, by On the contrary, it prohibits associationism and limits freedom of movement. UNHCR intervenes in the gaps in Indian law, but its recognition remains unofficial.
Delhi has never given a clear explanation as to why it did not sign the 1951 Convention: some consider it to be a Eurocentric document, while others argue that an obligation to provide assistance would place an undue burden on state coffers.
Therefore, India prefers to proceed with ad hoc regulations according to the different populations seeking refuge and maintains what some call a deliberate “strategic ambiguity”. This allows arbitrary treatment, which in turn depends on the geopolitical circumstances of the region or internal politics. Case in point: Delhi welcomed Tamil refugees fleeing civil war in Sri Lanka with open arms, but Myanmar’s Muslims, also fleeing internal conflict, are portrayed as a threat to state security.
In some cases, judges have tried to fill legal gaps, but they have not always been successful. However, a regulation on refugees would not only facilitate the work of UN agencies but also reduce tensions in the region. India could also enjoy a better reputation internationally if it presented itself as a tolerant and secular nation. But at the moment the government is not interested: the electronic visas for Afghans – which at this point seem to have been granted as a propaganda measure – last for six months, after which it is not clear what will happen to the refugees, while security concerns have already justified the expulsion of hundreds of Rohingyas.
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