economy and politics

Japan after Abe

Abe knew how to read the new geopolitical scenario with a great capacity for anticipation. Faced with the clash between China and the US, he proposed a reformulation of Japan’s foreign and security policy consistent with the democratic and liberal values ​​of Japanese society, first imposed and then fully assumed.

Japanese society and the international community have been strongly shaken by the assassination of their former prime minister Shinzo Abe, while participating in an election campaign event, apparently by a disturbed and vengeful “lone wolf”. The commotion has been increased by the great citizen security that has Japan and for its highly restricted legislation for the possession of weapons.

In any case, the impact has been especially significant due to the personality and political action carried out by Abe as Prime Minister in two stages. An initial, very short, and a much longer second, which have made his joint mandate the longest since the end of the Second World War. But beyond the duration, it is convenient to focus on the content and the specificity of its policies. Policies focused on two areas: foreign And Security Policy, on the one hand, and economic policy on the other.

As far as the latter is concerned, their recipes are known as Abenomics and they consist of three “arrows” or action fields. The first is a ultra-expansive monetary policy, with clear instructions to the Bank of Japan, which intended to get out of the spiral of deflation and economic stagnation that has afflicted the country since the 1990s, developing a policy on the entire interest rate curve aimed at increasing effective demand and maintaining interest rates zero or negative reals. The second, one “flexible” and counter-cyclical fiscal policy, with large stimuli through public spending (accompanied by a rise in indirect taxes) without increasing the debt, which is already enormously high. And the third, the structural reforms.

Concrete reforms, such as reinforcing Tokyo’s second international airport to attract tourists and businesses, changing the pension system, reinforcing the resilience of commodity trade in a highly dependent country, or in the labor market. In particular, facilitating the entry of foreign workers (in one of the most closed countries in the world and ethnically more homogeneous, as a result of its insularity and its history) and the incorporation of women into the labor market, which is very limited for cultural reasons.

“Japan remains a country with a very low female participation rate in the labor market. Legislation is not enough, a very profound cultural change is necessary that requires a lot of time»

The first two “arrows”, as demand policies, are relatively easy to implement, especially the first one. The third has had uneven results and, specifically, Japan continues to be a country with a very low rate of female participation in the labor market. Legislation is not enough. A very deep cultural change is necessary that requires a lot of time.

However, much more remarkable are its economic achievements in foreign relations and that are linked to a new foreign and security policy. There Abe’s imprint is much deeper and indelible.

The paradigmatic example is the drive to Transpacific Treaty (TPP, for its acronym in English) of free trade and investment between 12 countries on both shores, regardless of China and incorporating to USA. Unfortunately, donald trump he decided not to ratify it, but Abe persisted in carrying it forward with the other ten and leaving the door open for future US incorporation. To this must be added the Regional Comprehensive Economic Association or RCEP (another trade agreement, less ambitious, between Asian countries and that does include China and from which India dropped at the last moment). A commitment to economic and commercial openness, led by Japan and that connects with the great geopolitical contribution of Abe: the concept of the Indo-Pacific Free and Open, quickly endorsed by the US, and which seeks to defend open societies, economies and political practices, in the face of China’s increasingly aggressive expansionism. Abe was able to prematurely read the challenge posed by a China with the ambition of replacing the US as the great global superpower by the middle of this century. This led him to reconsider and reinforce the ATV (dialogue forum between the US, Japan, Australia and India) which, beyond a political forum, is the embryo of a deeper alliance that includes the military sphere (with joint air-naval maneuvers in the Indian Ocean) and which is made up of countries who feel threatened by the power of China (with which Japan has a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea).

«Abe complemented the struggle with Beijing with infrastructure financing initiatives, sustainable, transparent and non-coercive to counteract the Chinese New Silk Road»

At the same time, and with the same logic, it fostered an increasingly close relationship with India Y Australia as two essential poles to avoid an Indo-Pacific dominated by the great Asian power. A struggle that was complemented by infrastructure financing initiatives, sustainable, transparent and non-coercive, precisely to counteract the Chinese strategy of penetration in all continents and that we know as the Belt and the Road (the New Silk Road).

All this in a difficult balance, trying to maintain fluid relations with China itself, with South Korea (with the serious problem of the so-called “comfort women” during World War II, aggravated by their visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, in which military heroes considered war criminals by Seoul and the international community rest) or with Russia (with which it has the dispute over the Kuril Islands, occupied by the Soviet Union taking advantage of Japan’s surrender after Hiroshima and Nagasaki).

‘Japan returns’

But Abe’s great challenge was to profoundly transform foreign policy into his security and defense vector.

The great stumbling block was of a legal and political nature, given the pacifist constitution imposed by the US after the defeat in 1945, by which, in its article 9, it limits military capabilities to the so-called Self Defense Forces, without offensive capabilities and with the prohibition of having nuclear weapons in its territory despite the important US military bases therein, in application of the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, for which economic recovery was prioritized (Japan continues to be the third largest economy in the world and is a great technological power) and delegated its security to the US nuclear (and conventional) “umbrella”.

Abe proposed his reform, something highly complicated in a pacifist country still traumatized by the horror of the only two nuclear bombs used up to now, and which until now has not been possible, although the broad victory of the Liberal Democratic Party (and from Komeito) in the last elections could be an open door to such a modification. The path followed, pragmatically, was the “reinterpretation” of said article, expanding “self-defense” to the defense of its allies if they were threatened or attacked.

To do this, he launched the National Security Council which, under his authority, coordinated the three weapons and prepared to exceed the traditional 1% of GDP invested in defense, to match the parameters of the Atlantic Alliance, reaching the equivalent of 2%. This implied anti-missile defense capabilities, state-of-the-art fighter planes or long-range radar detection systems. Taboo topics until then.

«Increasing the GDP invested in defense up to 2%, to match the parameters of the Atlantic Alliance, implied anti-missile defense capabilities, state-of-the-art fighter planes or long-range radar detection systems, taboo subjects until then»

In short, Japan had to assume, for Abe, a much more proactive and leading role in its defense and security, in parallel with a reinforcement of the alliance with the US, through the QUAD or the deepening of bilateral agreements (which could reach include, where appropriate, the deterrent installation of nuclear weapons in its territory).

One of Abe’s favorite phrases was “Japan is back.” Japan returns. And it wants to stop being just a huge economic power, but rather a recognized political subject, hand in hand with the reinforcement of its military capabilities and a much more assertive foreign policy than in the past.

Surely, Abe knew how to read the new geopolitical scenario with a great capacity for anticipation. A world in which a new bipolar confrontation reappears (now between the US and China), which affects it very directly, and which requires a reformulation of the actors and the establishment of broad-spectrum alliances, from economic and commercial to military . A reformulation that Abe wanted consistent with the democratic and liberal values ​​of Japanese society, first imposed and then fully assumed. Japan’s clear alignment with the West in responses to Russia’s criminal and illegal aggression in Ukraine is a case in point. In addition, he sends a message to China, in the sense of committing, hand in hand with the United States, to the protection of Taiwan against a possible invasion by the People’s Republic.

«Abe sought a reformulation of geopolitical alliances consistent with the democratic and liberal values ​​of Japanese society, first imposed and then fully assumed»

Hence, also, its growing involvement with Europe, both with the European Union and with the United Kingdom so that it plays a role not only in the Atlantic area, but also in the new “Great Game” that is taking place in the Indo-Pacific. Abe’s two visits to Spain deserve special mention. The first, in 2014, to “pilgrim” to Santiago de Compostela, with President Mariano Rajoy, and the second, in 2018, to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and for the signing of a “Strategic Association” agreement. .

An implication not only, then, in the economic and commercial field, but also in that of collective security.

In short, Abe has been, without a doubt and in his own right, the most important Japanese politician since the end of World War II. Because of his desire for strategic reorientation, transformation and adaptation to a different future that he saw before anyone else.

Some consider him a Japanese nationalist politician. And he has been. Others, like a politician close to the ultra-right. He wasn’t. He was a man committed to the country and his time and who used power not to enjoy it, but to exercise it to change his country, thinking not only in the short term, but with a strategic and long-term mentality.

He deserves that recognition and may he rest in peace.

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