Iraq, on its way to becoming a client state of Iran?

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), backed and supported by Iran, seek to expel the United States from Iraq and the region as the war in the Gaza Strip rages on. Since regional tensions escalated after October 7, Iranian-backed militias have attacked US forces in Iraq and Syria at least 160 times, including an attack in Jordan by Kataib Hezbollah a predominant group within the PMF (and its sister group, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq) in which three Americans died. The US embassy in Baghdad and a base in Erbil have been the target of repeated attacks, as has the Kurdistan region.

In the last two years, the PMF has expanded its influence at the national level. However, the group could instrumentalize the war in Gaza as soon as 2024, raising the prospect of new attacks against US forces and the Kurdistan region, which impose limits on its influence and are essential to the campaign against the Islamic State (IS). ). To protect U.S. interests, contain Iran's influence, and prevent a resurgence of IS, Washington is now considering military measures to preempt escalating attacks by militias and their supporters in Iran.

Growing political and institutional power

The PMF was created in 2014 after the Islamic State (IS) seized Mosul and Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani issued a fatwa in which he asked Iraqis to fight to defend their country. Sistani later denounced the PMF for taking advantage of his religious decree to swell its ranks, as Sistani had called on Iraqis to join Iraq's armed forces. In 2014, the PMF was an army of militias; four years later, integrated into the State as auxiliaries to the armed forces, which guaranteed its combatants salaries and benefits equal to those of regular military personnel.

In 2018, they participated in the Iraqi parliamentary elections as a single bloc, leaving second in his electoral debut. This impressive result was attributed to low voter turnout and electoral apathy following the uprising against the Baghdad government, led by the Tishreen movement, which was also protesting against the PMF and Iran. In response, the militias brutally repressed the protesters.

Besides, in March 2020, pro-Sistani factions withdrew from the PMF due to their ties to Iran. This breakup was a symbolic blow, as they had gained religious legitimacy from Sistani's fatwa. Iran-aligned groups also have strong internal rivalries. In August 2022, the clashes between Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters and the PMF brought Iraq to the brink of civil war. Together, these factors, coupled with the US assassination of its founder, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in 2020, indicated that the PMF would struggle to maintain its rise.

However, the PMF's victory in the December 2023 Iraqi provincial elections highlights its remarkable resilience. They won 101 of the 285 provincial council seats, which has several implications for Baghdad. The result of the provincial elections allows the parties to exercise a certain degree of clientelism and influence in the electoral landscape. The most dominant political actors in provincial councils have broad mandates and resources, including control of budgets, employment of officials, contracts and local security.

In addition to its formidable presence in the Iraqi parliament, the PMF indirectly controls several ministries and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has exerted influence over the country's elections, government formation rules and Kurdish oil exports to suppress political rivals. Within the security forces, the Badr Brigade controls the Ministry of the Interior, and the PMF maintains a symbiotic relationship with some parts of the Iraqi security forces, including the army, where its officers have inordinate authority.

Expansion of economic power

The electoral victory and dominance of the PMF have important strategic implications. The status as a hybrid paramilitary group – with one foot inside and one foot outside the State – has been normalized. Therefore, it is unlikely that the PMF will accept integration into the armed forces or be supervised by civilians. The PMF can continue to claim all the benefits of being a formal member of the armed forces without submitting to the State. This includes access to the state budget, constitutional legitimacy, and legal protections that limit their exposure to punitive measures, such as sanctions and banning designations.

As a hybrid actor, they can direct the state and its resources to challenge their rivals. At the national level, the normalization of the PMF allows them to maintain and expand their influence over the state, while strengthening their ability to sideline their rivals, such as the Sadrists. This is especially important in the Iraqi economy, where PMFs compete with rivals for state contracts, diverted customs revenues that generate 10 billion dollars annuallythe control of illegal taxes that produce $300,000 a day and tens of millions of dollars in the scrap metal trade.

The PMF also has a vast real estate empire and a growing economic network. In November 2022, formed General Muhandis Company and was awarded land half the size of Lebanon along the border with Saudi Arabia. It has an initial operating budget of nearly $70 million, which complements the $2.6 billion budget it receives from the State, and follows the model of Jatam al Anbia, of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a holding company giant valued at billions of dollars. This has frustrated the PMF's rivals within the Shia community, who continue to work within the framework of the state and refuse to submit to its influence.

In the past, the PMF have attempted to torpedo investment projects that the State awarded to foreign companies, as demonstrated by their attempts to thwart a contract that the then Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi had awarded to the South Korean Daewoo in favor of a Chinese company. (In November 2021, the PMF they tried to murder Kadhimi, but they failed.) Now, however, the PMF has the ability to prevent investment projects that are not favorable to its objectives, which has implications for the billions of dollars that Qatar and Saudi Arabia hope to invest in Iraq. This agreement seriously undermines Iraq's ability to balance its ties between Iran and the Arab world.

Infiltrate Kurdistan

The PMF is also expanding its influence in Kurdistan. In addition to Kurdistan being a vital ally of the United States in the fight against terrorism, the Erbil base serves as a special operations center for hundreds of American troops, logistics and a staging point for operations in Iraq and Syria. Kurdistan is a strategic node due to its proximity to Western actors and the conflict in Syria, its ties with Turkey and its growing relationship with the Arab States of the Gulf.

Iran and Iraqi militias are determined to expel US forces from both Kurdistan and Iraq in general, as the US presence imposes limits on their influence. More recently, Iran came to launch a ballistic missile attack against Erbil on January 15, 2024, which allegedly targeted an Israeli base – the Baghdad government dismissed this accusationwhich has proven to be a baseless justification for an attack in which prominent businessman died and his 11-month-old daughter.

The PMF's control over the judiciary contributed to consolidate sentences who have declared independent Kurdish oil exports through Türkiye illegal. As a result, Kurdish oil exports have been disrupted, crippling Kurdistan's economy. This is intended to force the Kurdistan Region to pivot towards Tehran, which would allow the Iranian regime to expand its influence to the only part of Iraq that remains outside its orbit.

Implications for American policy

The Biden administration may be reluctant to a more aggressive military campaign against Iran and the PMF, even though it is necessary to deter their attacks against the US and its allies. However, there are other steps Washington can take. Among them, the deployment in Kurdistan of Patriot systems capable of destroying incoming missiles, which would have a material impact aimed at protecting the last remaining bastion of American influence in Iraq. Such a move would constitute a necessary show of strength and leadership by the Biden administration.

The Biden administration may be contemplating withdrawal of US forces in Iraq, but this would be disastrous for the campaign against the Islamic State. ISIS has been degraded in Iraq, but the terrorist group retains the capacity and infrastructure to mount a comeback, as it did in 2014, three years after the Obama administration withdrew its US forces from Iraq. The United States could consider withdrawing its forces from Arab Iraq, accepting that the political order in Baghdad and the dominance of the PMF make its presence unsustainable, but only if this is part of a withdrawal to Erbil, where Washington can continue its anti-terrorist campaign.

The Popular Defense Forces and Iran must not achieve all their ambitions: for the United States to withdraw its forces and pave the way for Iran's expansion in Kurdistan. Likewise, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani must not make concessions to Iran that would result in his and Iraq's government capitulating to Tehran and its allies. By withdrawing US forces to Erbil, the United States is taking advantage of the capabilities of an ally and a safe haven that has protected groups and officials who have fallen prey to the PMF's terrorist campaign. Preventing Iran's expansion into Kurdistan will empower moderate Iraqi actors in Baghdad who wish to maintain balanced ties with the West and the broader region, rather than see Iraq become a client state of Iran.

Article translated from English from the website Brookings.