Integrate Russia into a common European home

After three bloody wars –the one of 1870, and the two world wars– France and Germany reconciled and made war between them unthinkable. This is one of the lasting achievements of the subsequent European construction. It should not only be possible and desirable, but imperative, to do so with Russia and Ukraine when the armed conflict ends – and it is not yet known how. Furthermore, a long-term vision can contribute to short-term peace. At the moment, the only thing that arises is tension sine die.

In the interwar period, first, and in the midst of the Second World War, visionary people like Jean Monnet, José Ortega y Gasset or Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, they began to think about a future of reconciliation through integration. You have to start thinking about how to integrate Russia, not Vladimir Putin, into a pan-European integration scheme. History and geopolitics weigh heavily and large countries like France or Germany will want cooperation with the largest country in the world, with extremely important raw materials, with nuclear weapons, which should not be left at risk and dependent on China, even though the alliance between Moscow and Beijing has cemented itself. It is part of the new landscape in which we are. It is no longer a matter of going back to the past, to the status quo before the Russian invasion. A new pan-European socio-economic and security cooperation framework will be necessary. And global. With one premise: Ukraine will be able to enter the European Union, but not NATO. And a double condition: security guarantees for Ukraine and peace of mind for Russia. With Putin, with a Russia like the one he wants, re-imperial, it will not be possible. Nor can it be a starting point for Volodimir Zelensky. But you have to look up and look further.

At the moment, what is being attempted is a peace plan. China has presented a proposal, commonly called Chinese plan in 12 points, that Pedro Sánchez, as president of the government of Spain, the country that will hold the presidency of the Council of the EU next semester, has been able to discuss in Beijing. It is too general. For example, it defends the principle of territorial integrity (which China has always defended), but without specifying it (Crimea? What to do with Donbas?) In Western Europe, for the lowdown, despite many official statements, many consider it impossible get Crimea out of the Russian Federation (and they have doubts about Donbas). It is interesting that China calls for avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, and Xi Jinping’s trip to Moscow may have served to reduce this possibility, despite Putin’s announcement to deploy tactical vectors in Belarus. But it is not a plan, and Xi must know it, but a base on which, perhaps, he can build a plan. Neither is the so-called plan in 10 points that Zelenski presented in December, which Sánchez said he defended before Xi. They are principles.

In any case, the Chinese plan cannot be rejected outright, as has been done from Washington and various European capitals, without offering an alternative, except that of more war. Even Zelensky has understood that he has to talk to Xi. Sánchez did consider that in the Chinese approach there are “very relevant” points (such as the nuclear one). Despite official statements to the contrary –Sánchez spoke of a “clear and resounding” unity–, some European governments are convinced that Ukraine cannot win this war, and they would have privately communicated this to President Zelenski, according to information from February of The Wall Street Journal. Although China alone may not be the best mediator.

It is necessary to think of a more distant horizon, in itself and to facilitate that the nearest horizon is cleared, in a new European architecture that, if the conditions are given, includes Russia

It is necessary to think of a more distant horizon, in itself and to facilitate that the nearest horizon is cleared, in a new European architecture that, if the conditions are given, includes Russia. Judging by the new Russian foreign policy doctrine to deal with what it calls “existential threats” (including the United States), which describes Russia as a “distinctive civilization-state” with a “unique historical mission”, those conditions are not met. In order to reach new constructive horizons, the West, and Ukraine itself, must turn more to Russian public opinion, starting with the many Russians who have fled the country.

It must be understood that Russian citizens see NATO as a devil that has been getting closer to their borders. The US has just inaugurated its first permanent military base in Poland in Poznan, the first on the Alliance’s eastern flank, which will house the headquarters of the V Army Corps, and Poland is putting together the largest ground force in Europe to do against Russia. Even in 2005, after the expansions of the Alliance before the Russian annexation of Crimea and the current war – when NATO was little talked about in Russia – some polls, among them one of the organization itself, indicated that 57% of Russians had a negative view of the Alliance, which they considered to be acting under US orders, and only 27% positive. Today worse. Public opinion in the EU is also understandably much more suspicious of Russia, according to an October 2022 study by Eurobarometer.

It is not yet a matter here of outlining all the details of this new pan-European architecture, but of asking governments to get to work on it. Some are already doing so German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently spoke of Russia having to “come back into the fold” after the Ukraine war and resume normal trade relations with the West. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has been saying, at the same time, that he wants the defeat of Moscow, but that a new security architecture that establishes “guarantees for Russia” must be thought of, which is not well received by some of his partners, nor, of course, for Kiev. “We will need a framework that gives transparency and predictability to events” in Europe, according to Macron, who wants to see “a structure for conflict resolution on the continent.” As indicated in November 2022 by an interesting analysis by Stefan Meister published in Carnegie Europe“Europe is interested in a certain level of financial and technological integration with Russia” to maintain a certain capacity for “influence and information.”

A new security architecture will require, for Russia to accept it, that Ukraine not join NATO. The consolation prize for Ukraine would be, after in-depth internal reform, entering the EU and security guarantees.

A new security architecture will require, for Russia to accept it, that Ukraine not join NATO. The consolation prize for Ukraine would be, after in-depth internal reform, to enter the EU, even with prior political participation and security guarantees. The Union has, like NATO (art.5) a mutual security or solidarity clause in art. 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union. This clause establishes that, if a Member State is the object of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States have the obligation to provide aid and assistance by all means at their disposal, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. But unlike NATO, it lacks the punch, the effective organization to carry it out. Therefore, kyiv will want a bilateral agreement with Washington.

On this horizon, measures have been created to generate confidence, guarantee limits on military deployments, agree on denuclearizations. It could be argued that Russia, another Russia, would cooperate. Even creating a large market from Lisbon to Vladivostok, without falling back into energy dependence, gas and oil, which also goes against Europe’s green plans. From the UN rostrum in 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev called for building a “common European home.” A new pan-European common space would require, at the very least, a few pillars and a roof.

In the past, many agreements have worked, from the Helsinki final act, the “zero-zero” agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), or the Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council , among others. It is not a question of resuscitating this group, but of weaving a new network of shared interests that generate stability. In order, but with perspectives. First peace – Korean, Austrian or surely with a new formula – but something more, much more. As Henry Kissinger points out, “In the end, a place for Ukraine and a place for Russia must be found, if we do not want Russia to become an outpost of China in Europe.”

Clearing these futures would require five conditions:

The first is whatever Ukraine wants, as repeated by one Western leader after another. The resistant attitude of Zelenski and the Ukrainian citizens is being fundamental. But make no mistake, who really decides are the Westerners, and among them, the US in the first place, and the Washington-London-Poland-Baltics axis.

Then there are the Russians. For peace, the question of lifting economic sanctions will be essential for Russia. As well as how to finance reparations for the deaths and destruction caused to Ukraine. For the longer term horizon, too. Both countries – Ukraine and Russia – will have to be drawn, unequally, towards a Europe and a world that will not be perfect for them, but better than the current horror and live, all of them, forever, under fear, under a new fear.

Third, to convince the US, which is conducting a policy to leave Russia weakened. New arms control agreements, not just nuclear ones, could be of interest to Washington. Nor is the US a monolith regarding the war in Ukraine. A part of the Republican Party (Donald Trump, Ron DeSantis) is against Joe Biden’s policy towards this war.

The axis directed by Poland and that still European power that is the US is directing European politics more than Paris and Berlin. What affects Spain.

Fourth condition will be to achieve a joint position by a deeply divided EU, despite appearances. The aforementioned axis directed by Poland and that still European power that is the US is directing European politics more than Paris and Berlin. What affects Spain. Catalyzing this common vision must be one of the political objectives of the next Spanish presidency of the Council of the EU.

This includes the policy towards China, fifth condition, a more reasonable and autonomous policy than the one Washington has proposed (and in this there is an internal consensus in the US). The war has fostered a dependency of Russia on China that the US has always tried to avoid. However, the European order will depend a lot on the new world order that is being created, which will have to accommodate some legitimate Chinese interests (a central theme that we will develop on another occasion) and manage the competition between the two superpowers, which is a reality. Although historically, mistrust has been mutual, that of Russia and China has become “the most important undeclared alliance in the world”, as defined by Graham Allisonthe author of Thucydides’ trap (in which the US and China can fall). The West, and especially Europe, should not seek to directly break this alliance, but rather make itself more attractive to Russia, and reach understandings with that China that is at the same time “a partner, competitor and systemic rival”.

Difficult. Naive? maybe. As the great German sociologist Max Weber pointed out, “you have to try the impossible to achieve the possible”. The alternative is a much worse and dangerous world.