However, it moves

Volodimir Zelensky did not go to Berlin (1,200 kilometers away from kyiv, about a two-hour flight) on his first trip abroad since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Neither did he go to Brussels (1,800 kilometers from kyiv, just under three hours) or to Paris (2,000 kilometers, three hours). The first departure of the Ukrainian president has been to Washington DC, almost 8,000 kilometers away and a ten-hour flight. In the post-American world, all the important roads seem to continue to lead to Rome, that is, to the United States.

As we explained in the Editor’s Notes at the end of November, a large part of Ukraine’s future is at stake in the US. That is the signal that both the Ukrainian and American presidents, Joe Biden, send to the world with their meeting in the Oval Office of the White House. The visit has been accompanied by a new military assistance package, worth $45 billion, which includes a battery of long-range Patriot missiles, an essential reinforcement for the Ukrainian air defense system (although the missiles will reach the theater of operations , at the earliest, in February). The Russian air offensive with (Iranian) drones and missiles against Ukrainian infrastructure will continue, for the time being, causing considerable human and material damage.

For a government like the Ukrainian one, in the fight for the survival of the people it represents, the relative speed with which US aid packages (amounting to more than 50,000 million) are being approved must necessarily contrast with the labyrinthine process policy of the European Union, where every important step hangs by 27 threads. See, for example, what happened with the 18,000 million euros in financial assistance approved last week. The fund proposed by the European Commission to alleviate the Ukrainian budget in 2023 required the unanimous approval of the Twenty-seven. Once again, the veto of the government of Víktor Orbán in Hungary complicated and delayed the agreement. That avoiding the bankruptcy of your country, at war against an implacable enemy, depends on collateral political battles (from the tug of war over structural funds, frozen due to violations of the rule of law in Hungary, to the approval of a minimum rate in corporate tax) has to exasperate even the most poised of leaders.

As for the military aid itself (one of the keys to the extraordinary performance of the Ukrainian troops), European assistance has paled in comparison to that of the United States. After years of cutting or freezing defense budgets, it costs many European countries blood, sweat and a few tears to keep their armed forces ready for combat (or to help third parties in a large-scale war like the one underway). in Ukraine). Here Germany stands out, whose army continues to show signs of precariousness. At the beginning of this month, during a shooting practice, the 18 Puma tanks involved in them had malfunctions, rendering them useless. The Bundeswehr is still naked.

Soon, the war in Ukraine will be one year old (or nine, if we count from 2014, as the Ukrainians do well, when Russia illegally annexed the Crimean peninsula). The end doesn’t seem near. Today the military initiative is in the hands of the Ukrainians, who continue to fight heroically to defend their homeland (and, incidentally, the values ​​of all). Vladimir Putin, however, does not seem prepared to give up. On the contrary, he is doubling down, and by 2023 it is to be expected that he will continue to test, on multiple fronts (political, energy, migratory), the resistance of what he considers to be the weak flank of the Western front: the European one.

You won’t have it easy. Despite the stagnation that seems to grip the Old Continent in each new existential crisis (and this is to a great degree), the EU resists, adapts, evolves. I mean, it moves.

With the perspective that the end of the year always brings, today we can look back and not feel entirely dissatisfied with the performance of the EU since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. European gas tanks are full. Liquefied natural gas terminals have been built in record time. And throughout the continent, measures have been taken to alleviate the pressures of inflation on national populations and industries. Winter is much less threatening today than it seemed just a few months ago.

Russia’s energy independence is within reach, something unthinkable a year ago. In 2020, the EU imported more than half (57.5%) of its energy, according to Eurostat, with around 27% of such imports coming from Russia. Today the Russian quota barely exceeds 15%, which has meant a drop of about 6,400 million dollars.

The sanctions against Russia are in their ninth round and already include restrictions on the financial industry and the Bank of Russia, on companies that export coal and oil, as well as general export controls. For now, the Russian economy is holding up better than expected, thanks in large part to the decisive action of its central bank and the high prices of hydrocarbons, which have allowed Putin to continue financing the war. However, as one Bruegel’s study, this may start to change soon. With the sanctions, the EU now has a powerful foreign policy tool.

In parallel, the defense of the continent has been significantly strengthened, above all through the European pillar of NATO. The entry of Finland and Sweden, as well as the firm will of the rest of the member countries to fulfill all their commitments, have breathed new life into the Alliance, which continues to be the backbone of European defence. French President Emmanuel Macron would no longer dream of talking about a “brain dead” organization.

Meanwhile, the construction of a genuine Europe of Defense is going slower, but it is going. For the first time in decades, as explained Sophia Besch in Carnegie, European defense is no longer limited to trying to achieve more with less. Today Europeans are spending more money on defense to urgently fill capacity gaps in their armies, presenting a unique opportunity to modernize their armies, ensure the interoperability of their equipment and build a stronger common industrial base. To do this, it will be necessary to bet decisively on the joint acquisition of defense material. So far, as Besch points out, only 18% of all defense investment by Member States is done in cooperation with other EU countries. The room for improvement is enormous.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the EU’s main foreign policy tool has been reactivated. The debate on enlargement has returned to the forefront, enriched by proposals such as the European Political Community. Zelensky may have flown to Washington on his first trip abroad since the Russian invasion, but his country is traveling non-stop to the EU. In June, European leaders granted Ukraine accession candidate country status. Many would like to see him join as soon as possible, but it might be worth getting it right. It took 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to enter the EU, and a decade if we count since the commitment to include them was taken seriously. In the case of Ukraine, the process could go faster, given the firm will of both parties. The goal is clear and shared: a free, prosperous and European Ukraine; a Ukraine at peace.

In short, not all important roads lead to Rome. Some flow into the EU.