Milan () – “Hassan Nasrallah reiterated that he will be the one to respond to the attacks and not Iran, marking a certain autonomy” and at the same time avoiding “dragging Iran into a confrontation with Israel, which would be one of the objectives of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.” Hezbollah has transformed Lebanon “into the front line of this confrontation” to “protect Iran and eliminate the threat to it,” he said. Jordanian professor and geopolitical analyst Amer Al Sabaileh, a specialist in Middle Eastern issues, international security and peace process policy in crisis zones. The scholar, born in Amman and a graduate in Modern Languages and Literatures, collaborates with various international media, including The Jordan Times.
As a specialist, Al Sabaileh has conducted numerous strategic studies, delving into various areas of war and terrorism, from North Africa to the Middle East. He is the director general of the Triageduepuntozero Geopolitical Risk Research Institute and is the president of the Centre for Studies – Security Languages - Council for counter terrorism studies, from whose observatory he analyses the various hotbeds of tension in the region. In this context, he highlights the role of the militias that Tehran has used, from Lebanon to Yemen, to fuel tension or pursue its own objectives, including the encirclement of Israel. On the domestic front, he believes that the victory of the reformist presidential candidate will not bring significant changes. Below is our interview with the Jordanian academic and expert:
Prof. Al Sabaileh, what is your assessment of the new Iranian government? Beyond the electoral victory of a “reformist” president, does the radical wing retain power in key positions?
It is thought that an Iran with a “reformist” face could lead to change and rapprochement with the West. This is what has happened in the last 20 years, since [Seyyed Mohammad] Khātami up to [Hassan] Rouhani, and the same can be said of the recent elections that brought Masoud Pezeshkian to the presidency. However, there are many doubts about his real ability to bring about serious changes in Iranian policy. Rather, it seems to be a “tactical” resource by Iran to move to a new phase: for example, now the pressure on Tehran is very high, Israel seeks at all costs a confrontation with Iran. That is why one cannot speak of change, especially if one analyses the presidency of his predecessor Ebrahim Raisi, under whom the country moved towards progressive radicalisation. No serious change is plausible, it would give the impression that he is trying to return to the previous phase – interrupted – of negotiations with the West, under Rouhani, to soften the impact of sanctions. But one cannot read this change without relating it to regional events, the confrontation with Israel and the change in US policy towards Iran, starting with the nuclear issue. Tehran is forced to make this tactical gesture in order not to give Israel the opportunity to portray Iran as a constant threat to the West and responsible for a possible confrontation on a global scale.
There are some figures within the government with a different profile than in the recent past, for example Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who is already an authoritative figure in the nuclear negotiations. What role can they play?
The change should also come from the team accompanying the president to show that reformists have leading roles in the government. In fact, a key reformist figure like [Mohammad Javad] Zarif, who was the real architect of the nuclear agreements, was only there for a few days [y después renunció, ndr.] And this shows that the change in Iran is certainly not radical and does not affect the fundamentals. The personalities now being named may give the impression of having a link with the reformist world, but we must be very cautious and evaluate the real objectives of the government. The choice of the Foreign Minister is certainly symbolic, because he was the head of the delegation for the nuclear negotiations and therefore the message seems to be that of returning to the terrain of negotiation, of openness to try to have less pressure and sanctions. But after the experiences of the past it is difficult to consider it as a real change. At the same time we must evaluate the capacity to contain Iran’s aggressive policies in the region and the capacity to curb the control of the hawks and the Pasdaran, their influence on domestic and foreign policy. It remains an open scenario, although the past leaves little hope: it seems rather a temporary tactic to avoid the risks of a regional escalation and fears of a possible return of [Donald] Trump to the presidency of the United States. I think the goal is to use the last months of Joe Biden’s presidency to reach an agreement that would limit the United States’ ability to attack Iran in the next four years of a possible future Republican administration with more aggressive policies towards Iran.
Domestically, repression and the number of executions in Tehran have reached record levels. Foreign policy is marked by many regional tensions. In what areas will the new government be able to make changes?
The Iranian challenge today is very difficult because, first of all, it must get out of the rhetoric of symbolism. When he was Minister of Health, Pezeshkian made a significant gesture by refusing to sign the medical reports of activists who died from torture. And that forced him to resign. Reading it today as a signal about internal repression in Iran could represent a good starting signal, but I think that his ability to turn the symbolic act into concrete measures is the real challenge. And unfortunately, evaluating the situation of the last few years with Raisi and the rise of hawks in all key positions of the State, many doubts arise about his ability to change. The same goes for Zarif’s departure, which shows that the attempt to promote the moderate face has not worked, while extremists tend to become more and more radicalized.
What is Iran’s current role on the Middle East chessboard? Is war with Israel a real threat?
Iran is undoubtedly one of the main players in Middle East politics. It is the architect of chaos in the region. Tehran has always thought of extending its presence through militias, and this has worked very well in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and it continues to work in Syria. Iran’s concept is the construction of chaos: after all, war, instability in this region, is linked to the presence of all these militias. Those who sponsor and support them are “the architects of chaos”, and the strength of these militias in the various countries is essential to Iran’s long-term goal of subjecting Israel to the “threat triangle” that runs from Gaza to Lebanon and the West Bank. That is why it has decided to sponsor militias in the West Bank and turn Jordan into a smuggling hub for drugs and weapons… Tehran always finds its space and its function in this context of instability, and that is why we cannot consider Iran’s role marginal.
To what extent does the weakness of the international community influence the regional escalation? And what factor could be decisive in determining the return to the negotiating table?
The international community is weak and absent. For many years it turned a blind eye to the growth of these militias and the Iranian policies that fueled their strength. Today it finds itself in a critical situation, lacking the tools to confront the reality, indecisive and hesitant. This is particularly evident in Yemen, where the international community turned against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in their war against the Houthis, preventing the last battle in Hodeidah in 2016, and applying sanctions against Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. What happened must be reviewed by analysing the policies of former US President Barack Obama, which, in fact, allowed the growth of the militias in Yemen. Added to this is the Iranian policy which, while wearing the mask of reformism when speaking to the international community about the nuclear agreement, on the other hand supported General Qasem Soleimani to rebuild the militias, making them ever stronger. Today, after October 7, Israel is faced with a reality in which it must fight against these groups which represent, from an Iranian perspective, the concept of the last confrontation, the last battle against Israel. That is why today Israel itself feels the duty to attack individually the different fronts, from north to south, in order to protect itself from a new threat. The international community is observing the results of the growth in recent years of these militias with the arsenals of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, which are also capable of creating serious disruptions to maritime navigation and international trade. That is why it is essential to return to the negotiating table. But we must also take into account the presence of the militias, the weapons at their disposal, which pose a threat to stability at any time.
Can the new government in Tehran change the balance of power and relations with Hezbollah?
It is difficult for Tehran to change its relationship with Hezbollah, because it is the bastion of its presence in the Middle East. It is what is considered the operational arm of Iran, in which it has invested for many years and from which it cannot disassociate itself. In addition, it must be considered that Hezbollah is not only an armed militia but also a political party represented in Parliament, and therefore forms part of the Lebanese social fabric. This means that Iran has managed to enter Lebanon as a permanent protagonist and it is difficult for it to abandon Hezbollah, to distance itself from it, even if it cannot stop sending it weapons. However, it is also worth noting that in one of his last speeches Hassan Nasrallah recalled that it is he who will respond to the attacks and not Iran, marking a certain autonomy. And also in this way avoid dragging Iran into a confrontation with Israel, which is one of the objectives of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Hezbollah has made Lebanon the “front line” of this confrontation, in order to protect Iran and ward off the threat from it.
From a Jordanian perspective, how do you view the growing tensions in the Middle East and, in particular, what is the status of relations between Amman and Tehran?
Jordan fears that the escalation of this conflict could lead to a regional war, with risks and consequences for everyone. Unfortunately, from a geographical point of view, Jordan is in the middle, and this was also evident last April when Iran decided to respond to Israel by violating Jordanian airspace. Amman is part of the US central command; it had to respond but immediately understood that such a confrontation would end up having very serious consequences. In addition, there is the aggressive Iranian policy of attacking Jordan and establishing militia bases in southern Syria to feed internal smuggling of drugs and weapons. That is why the idea of the government in Amman now is to eliminate the conflict and not show any sign of hostility towards Tehran, but making it clear that its territory must be respected. In short, I think that the message has been clear and was received, even more so now, with the arrival of the reformists, making them understand that the country must be safeguarded. Although its location does not help Jordan and there is a risk that the situation will degenerate. For its own security, Jordan is prepared to do anything, including talking to Iran to avoid the scenario of a regional war.
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