European Germany or German Europe

The construction of Europe has a starting point: the Franco-German reconciliation, after three wars in 70 years. A possible reconciliation due to the “humility” displayed by Konrad Adenauer and France’s desire to gain European “strategic autonomy” from the United States.

The first milestone was the CECA Treaty (European Coal and Steel Community) in the Paris Treaty of 1951. Then came the integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955 and the Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic Community, in 1957 The culmination is the Elysée Treaty, in 1963, signed between Charles De Gaulle and Adenauer. Without forgetting that shocking photo of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, hand in hand, paying joint tribute in 1984 to the French victims of the Battle of Verdun, during the First World War.

Integration in the European construction from the beginning implied the full incorporation of Germany into the ideal of a united Europe, based on peace and solidarity among the Member States, under conditions of equality. Entry into NATO meant her full commitment to the West and the reincorporation of defeated Germany as a sovereign and independent country in the face of the Soviet threat.

It may be illustrative to remember that the first Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, the British General Hastings Ismay, defined it as an organization to have the North Americans “in”, to the Soviets”out” and to the Germans “down”. The integration of Germany, then, intends to have it too “in”, from the point of view of the defense and collective security of the West, thus forgetting the ghosts of the recent past.

“Germany’s commitment to NATO and to European construction has been clear and undeniable, before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall”

Germany’s commitment to NATO and to European construction has thus been clear and undeniable, before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. After the end of the cold war, the Germans proposed reunification, integrating the former Democratic Republic, both to the European communities (in a de facto enlargement, considering the founder – the Federal Republic – as the matrix of the new Germany) and to NATO.

Such an objective, openly raised by Chancellor Kohl, generated evident misgivings in countries like France, with Mitterrand, or the United Kingdom, with Margaret Thatcher, who feared the rebirth of a “too” strong Germany. Kohl reassured them by assuring them that they were never going to propose a “German Europe”, but instead guarantee a “European Germany” forever. But reunification inevitably altered the balance established until then, whereby the political initiative corresponded to France (with the “permission” of the United Kingdom) while the economic hegemony of Germany was assumed (in Willy Brandt’s phrase, Germany had been a economic giant, but a political dwarf).

With reunification, the situation is unbalanced as Germany increases its economic weight even more, thus encouraging its desire for a greater political role, once its sovereignty is fully recovered. The launch, in the midst of the cold war, of the Ostpolitik to have its own foreign policy is the best example. The most practical realization of it was the ever-increasing energy dependency on the Soviet Union and, later, on Russia.

The culmination of this dependence comes with the controversial decision to launch the new NordStream 2 gas pipeline, questioned by the US and viewed with suspicion by other European countries. Such dependence was seen by Germany as “interdependence” with shared interests on both sides, thus lessening the possibility of conflict. Something similar to what the West thought with a greater interdependence with China and that is demonstrated by Western support for its integration into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the belief that this would promote the democratization of the emerging Asian giant.

In both cases, we now know that this has not been the case and it has been confirmed that both Russia and China put their geopolitical interests before strictly commercial and economic ones and both have a political model that does not coincide with our Western way of seeing the world. Their own story leads them on different paths.

«Interdependence, in reality, is vulnerability when the parties do not follow the same rules of the game»

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the use of energy as a strategic weapon have dramatically highlighted this. Interdependence, in reality, is vulnerability when the parties do not follow the same rules of the game. This finding has caused a historic change in Germany: the so-called Zeitenwende (change of era), for which security and defense policies are being completely reformulated and, not least, energy policy and foreign policy.

The greater assumption of collective responsibility by Germany will require overcoming the vulnerabilities of an economic model based on cheap Russian energy, massive entry into the Chinese market and a security model in the hands of the US, through NATO. And, of course, a greater proactivity in European construction, beyond the traditional Franco-German axis. And that’s where the problems start to arise.

Now, for example, Germany is irritating its European partners by taking advantage of its greater fiscal space to adopt measures, such as the aid plan of 200,000 million euros, which can alter the European internal market and break its unity and solidarity. Something similar, by the way, Europe rightly criticizes the US, considering that its policies to protect domestic production alter the principles of free trade.

In any case, the growing disagreements between Berlin and Paris have put their traditional relationship in crisis, even leading to the suspension of the joint meetings of both governments and the weakening of an axis that, until now, has been the clear engine of the political project European. Germany plays its own league.

“Germany cannot commit the ‘Russian mistake’ with China again, with its own policy regardless of the interests of the rest of its European partners or the US”

His ambiguity in the relationship with China has been the latest example, acting outside the European institutions, with the visit of Olaf Scholz to Beijing last week, accompanied by the large German companies present in the People’s Republic, in parallel to the sale of 24.9% of the port of Hamburg to the Chinese company Cosco, which contrasts, however, with the veto this week to the purchase by China of a German semiconductor company.

Criticism has been practically unanimous: the “Russian mistake” cannot be made again, with its own policy regardless of the interests of the rest of the European partners or the US. With these movements, Germany displays its strategic autonomy – to which it is entitled – but weakens the Western positions in the policy to be followed in the face of a China that is increasingly assertive and explicit in its objectives. The alarms have sounded again and the specter of a too strong and autonomous Germany has reappeared.

The alternative between a European Germany and a German Europe has returned to the stage. The demons of history are still there and Berlin must decide whether or not to feed them back.

It used to be said that France wants to lead Europe, but can’t, and Germany can, but doesn’t want to. Welcome be a greater German commitment and greater co-responsibility. But without forgetting that the construction of Europe is a political project based on the solidarity and sovereign equality of its Member States.

Germany must measure its steps well.