The war in Ukraine has fueled Scholz’s ideas of broadening and deepening the EU. For Macron, however, he has meant bringing out his contradictions between Europeanism and Gaullism.
Two whole hours is how long the Emmanuel Macron’s speech at the meeting of French ambassadors at the Elysée on September 1. As one of the attendees joked, you can only afford to speak for so long if the audience works for you. Indeed, once the French president finished, the public stood up to applaud him. And that despite the fact that the speech was, at the very least, confusing.
For example, Macron first tells his diplomats that it is paramount to maintain the unity of the European Union in relation to Ukraine. 15 seconds later he accuses other unnamed EU members of being “warmongers”. The result: Central and Eastern European nations feel singled out by Macron’s statement and condemn Paris for sowing discord.
Another example is the president saying he wants to invest heavily in France’s social media capabilities to deal with, among other things, Moscow’s presentation of the war in Ukraine. But what can an army of French advisers do if Macron warns of Russia’s “humiliation” and says that France does not want to be Washington’s “vassal”? Thus, Macron himself delivers the quotes that allow Russian propaganda channels to argue that Ukraine is actually a war against the West.
That Macron’s foreign policy communication is worse than his actual policy is not new. But how observe Michel Duclos, from Montaigne InstituteWhat was surprising is that Macron’s speech was devoid of new ideas and initiatives, especially as regards Europe.
“Macron Himself Says The Quotes That Allow Russian Propaganda Channels To Argue That Ukraine Is Actually A War Against The West”
Indeed, in his speech, Macron spells out why Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is a “historic breaking point” for the world. But he then goes on to present the same vision of France in the world and the same European agenda as in previous years. The reason is clear: Ukraine is exposing long-standing contradictions in Macron’s EU policy.
the e-word
The poet Walt Whitman wrote once “Am I contradicting myself? Very good then… I am big, I contain multitudes”. Macron – like his country – does indeed contain multitudes. As far as Europe is concerned, there are at least two “Macrones”.
One is the voluntarist pro-European who wants the continent to integrate, so that Europeans regain the momentum to regulate global capitalism and defend their geopolitical interests. The other is the Gaullist Macron, who thinks that France cannot simply subsume itself in the European chorus, but has a special role as a global “balancing power” that needs to act unilaterally at times. It is that Macron who tells his ambassadors: “The main objective of our diplomacy must be to defend the strength, influence and independence of France.”
In his first term, Macron was quite effective at plugging the cracks. Promoting commercial defense against China and its warrior wolf diplomacy, investing in common European defense projects such as the Franco-German FCAS combat aircraft, and advancing fiscal integration in the pandemic were compatible with the European and Gaullist Macron.
“The issue of enlargement is once again in the foreground. And that is the only issue in EU politics on which the European and the Gaullist Macron cannot reconcile.”
But Russia’s attack on Ukraine changes the EU’s agenda, and the issue of enlargement is back in the foreground. And that is the only issue in EU politics on which the European and the Gaullist Macron cannot reconcile. And with his speech in Prague on August 29, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz hits Macron exactly in his weak spot and thus puts Paris on the defensive.
Bigger, deeper, more German
Scholz sees getting the six Western Balkan states, and later Ukraine and Moldova, to join the EU as a strategic imperative. It is what these countries want and it is the EU’s most effective means of stabilizing the continent, or so the chancellor thinks. Ukraine underlines the urgency and offers the opportunity to finally overcome enlargement fatigue.
And to ensure that this EU, which includes 32 or 36 member states, can make decisions, Scholz wants to redesign the EU institutions. Most importantly, the chancellor wants EU member states to give up their veto power on sanctions policy and fiscal matters.
Deepening is the price of widening. Scholz is willing to pay for it, because like his predecessor Angela Merkel, he does not want an EU of “clubs and boards” that will inevitably breed new divisions. On the contrary, he wants to keep everyone on board.
“Deepening is the price of widening. Scholz is willing to pay for it, because like his predecessor Angela Merkel, he does not want an EU of ‘clubs and boards’ »
Because the main objective of European integration is to maintain peace among Europeans, as Scholz says. But also when it comes to “projecting peace”, a bigger and deeper EU will one day be more effective on the geopolitical stage. Indeed, it is fair to ask whether the surprising unity of the 27 EU member states over Ukraine would have been possible in a more fragmented EU.
Finally, Berlin is also comfortable with widening and deepening the EU, as it is used to operating in a system with multiple centers of power and thinks of politics primarily as a means to an end. Furthermore, Germany would remain the key member in that EU. “The center of Europe is moving east,” says Scholz. “Germany, as a country in the center of the continent, will do everything possible to unite East, West, North and South Europe.”
Smaller, more flexible, more French
Macron’s speech to his diplomats, delivered three days after Scholz’s speech in Prague, reveals how wide the gap is between Paris and Berlin on this issue. Like his predecessors, Macron wants a small EU and remains reluctant to hand over national sovereignty.
It is true that Macron has agreed to give Ukraine EU candidate status and has spent part of the French EU presidency in the first half of this year negotiating a solution with Bulgaria that would allow the opening of Albanian accession talks. and North Macedonia. He says that his project for a European Political Community (EPC) is not a substitute for joining the EU.
“What is Macron’s position on enlargement and what is CPE really about? Neither their diplomats nor their EU partners know this.”
But he goes on to say that EU membership is a long way off for Ukraine. And in his speech to the ambassadors, he does not develop a positive narrative of EU enlargement. He doesn’t even mention Albania and North Macedonia. On the contrary, Macron tells his ambassadors that the CPE could help “stop this logic of the endless expansion of the EU… which rather has to be stronger, more sovereign and autonomous.”
So what is Macron’s position on enlargement and what is CPE really about? Neither his diplomats nor his EU partners know this.
Strategic ambiguity or strategic discomfort?
And what about qualified majority voting in foreign policy, the second proposal that Scholz extensively developed in Prague? Macron does not mention the issue in his speech either.
Yes, Paris signed the majority vote on foreign policy in the Franco-German Meseberg declaration of 2018. But does France still credibly claim to be a “world balancing power” if it cannot decide on sanctions itself? When push comes to shove, few in Paris believe that Macron is willing to give up France’s veto. Especially in an enlarged EU, where France’s weight would be further diluted.
It seems that Macron does not want to think more about the institutional reform of the EU. That is why he did not even mention the Conference on the Future of Europe that he himself launched in his presidential speech.
Furthermore, on European defense matters, Scholz’s speech puts Macron on the defensive. The chancellor proposes the creation of a common European air defense system. This would give real meaning to the idea of a European pillar within NATO. It would also be a good first step towards one day Europeanizing France’s nuclear deterrence, an idea that is not politically acceptable today, neither for Berlin nor for Paris.
Again, Macron has not reacted to Scholz’s proposal. France favors defense integration, advocating an EU intervention force or joint weapons projects. But it seems that it does not really embrace this Europeanization of a defense infrastructure.
fetishism
But if it wants a “sovereign Europe”, France must at some point recognize that it has to be willing to give up some of its foreign and defense policy independence. She must also accept that the trend of enlargement cannot be reversed. Along with NATO, the EU is a victim of its own success. It’s just an overly attractive community.
“Ukraine offers an opportunity for Macron to confront his country’s own ‘fetishisms’ and taboos, namely opposition to EU enlargement and unbridled exaltation of national sovereignty”
Germany was willing to break or at least soften the “fetishisms” of debt reduction and the taboo of fiscal union. In the pandemic, German policymakers and analysts realized that Berlin did not have many options and that it was an imperative if the geopolitical weakening of Europe caused by the eurozone crisis was to be avoided from repeating itself.
Ukraine offers an opportunity for Macron to confront his country’s own “fetishisms” and taboos, namely opposition to EU enlargement and unbridled exaltation of national sovereignty. The war would be the time to change the narrative on these issues at home. So far, Macron has not been up to the challenge. Scholz should keep pressing.
Article originally published in English in the Web of Internationale Politik Quarterly.
