EU policy towards Palestine: coming to grips with reality on the ground

The violence that rocked Israel and Palestine in April and May 2021 tested Europe’s approach to the conflict, from its relations with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Islamist movement Hamas to its handling of the dire situation in Gaza and the annexation de facto of the West Bank by Israel. The European Union and its Member States have a declared interest in achieving a two-state solution. The events of 2021 made it clear that his policies stand in the way of that goal, rather than serving it. Many officials acknowledge the discrepancy but say the price of taking new positions is too high for those in charge of European capitals. Even so, Europe has levers of influence that it is not using. It could abandon its permissive approach to the PA leadership and demand conditions that allow for democratic political renewal in Palestine. It could also take a firmer line toward Israel, considering at least the use of trade and cooperation policy to deter violations of Palestinian rights and advance a sustainable resolution of the conflict.

The events of 2021 have highlighted the need to renew European policy. First was PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s cancellation in April of what would have been the first Palestinian general election in 15 years, thus ending any immediate hope of rejuvenating the Palestinian leadership. Days later came the war, the fourth between Hamas and Israel in the last 16 years. The violence revealed, on the one hand, the credit, albeit short-lived, that Hamas garnered among the Palestinians for standing up to Israel; and, on the other hand, the anger of the Palestinians towards the PA for not doing the same, in addition to its authoritarian practices and its incompetence. The annulment of the elections and the war capped years of dramatic changes, in which we have witnessed the fragmentation of the Palestinian political system and territory as successive Israeli governments explicitly rejected a negotiated two-state solution. However, European politics continues to maintain its modus operandi: Attempt to bolster the faltering PA against Hamas, while shying away from any serious effort to foment a change in Israeli policy.

As for the PA, while some European officials want to do more to hold leaders to account for their repression, Europe’s inertia reflects fear of seeing the entire PA collapse (and with it the two-state solution). ) if they do it. In fact, Europe, like the United States, considers that Abbas and those around him are the only group that can guarantee a minimum of stability in the occupied territories and, by extension, the security of Israel. Thus, the EU does not want to condition its support for the PA on its taking steps towards democratic politics and better governance, much less on elections that could bring Hamas to power. Consequently, PA leaders believe they can take European aid for granted.

“European Diplomats Stationed In Jerusalem And Ramallah Have Long Considered The European Policy Of No Contact With Hamas To Be A Dead End”

As for Hamas, aversion to the Islamist movement has long prevented a more constructive European approach. Since the last vote, in 2006, which Hamas won, the EU and its member states have maintained a policy of no contact with the group. They made commitment to the group (and, therefore, their inclusion in a unity government led by Abbas) conditional on compliance with the Quartet principles, then formulated by the UN, the US, Russia and the EU: commitment to non-violence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of the previous agreements of the Palestinians. European diplomats stationed in Jerusalem and Ramallah have long viewed this policy as a dead end, eroding Europe’s diplomatic clout, obstructing its stated goal of a viable, democratic and contiguous Palestinian state, and hampering efforts to put end the 16-year siege of Gaza. Hamas itself rejects the Quartet’s conditions. But its leaders affirm that they have revised their statutes to respond to European concerns, and that in order to take further steps it is necessary to dialogue with the Europeans.

Many European diplomats on the ground want a change of approach, involving more political engagement and more pressure on Israel, but Brussels and most European capitals reject any idea of ​​even thinking about how, for example, cooperation and Europe’s trade could be used to encourage a change in Israeli policy towards the occupied territories. Instead, European officials are trying to make up for the political disconnect by continuing to provide humanitarian and development aid to the Palestinians, even though the volume of that aid has fallen steadily since 2015. At the very least, they say, leaving the spigot open keeps Palestinians alive. the PA and the hope of a Palestinian state. Behind closed doors, however, many European officials admit that this hope is wishful thinking. Aid alone will never be enough to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. In reality, Europe has moved from efforts to build a Palestinian state to attempts to manage a status quo worse and worse to the one who clings, above all, because he does not see any alternative.

Europe’s inertia is based on the feeling in major capitals that the costs of a change of course are too high, the benefits too uncertain and the prospects of success too low. European leaders are loath to pay the price of a policy overhaul in their bilateral relationship with Israel, especially at a time when the US is barely engaging and influential Arab capitals are normalizing ties with Israel. Few European leaders believe that Europe can do much on its own. Even within Europe, it is difficult to reach a consensus on a new policy: the most advanced states, such as Belgium and Ireland, face strong resistance to any change, especially, but not only, from the Visegrad Group (Republic of Czech, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). For the powerful middle states (particularly France and Germany) the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pales in comparison to the war in Ukraine and the broader confrontation with Russia, which they and others see as existential issues for the security of the continent. Even compared to other crises in the Middle East, they consider it contained and not a priority.

This calculation is understandable but wrong. There are strong normative reasons for Europe not to ignore violations of the values ​​it claims to uphold and what leading human rights groups now equate with apartheid. Even setting this argument aside, the events of 2021, such as the early August exchange between Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad militant group, should serve as a warning that violence will break out again and that the conflict is not necessarily contained. As Israel intensifies its presence in the West Bank and the succession of the Palestinian leadership approaches, the points of friction multiply; Israel itself has witnessed internal disturbances; and Gaza will never be calm as long as it remains an open-air prison. If there is no change, future matchups will be more frequent and more difficult to finish. Furthermore, Europe is not powerless. Just two years ago, in the face of opposition from the Visegrad countries, European leaders helped dissuade former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from formally annexing parts of the West Bank. If Europe can overcome its inertia, it has tools that could positively alter the trajectory of the conflict.

«Europe could make the PA accountable for its repression, conditioning budget support to the ministries of Justice and Interior, for example, to benchmarks»

An alternative path would first involve the EU and its member states trying to help create the conditions for Palestinian political renewal in the occupied territories. Europe could hold the PA accountable for its repression, by conditioning budget support to justice and interior ministries, for example, on benchmarks. It could redirect some funds earmarked for the Interior Ministry to Palestinian civil society, especially human rights watchdogs. He could more strongly support Palestinian legislative elections, while seeking ways to interpret the Quartet’s conditions to allow Hamas to participate in some way in a possible Palestinian unity government. European leaders should also initiate a review of their policy of no contact with Hamas. The idea is not to empower the Islamist movement, much less make it the sole representative of the Palestinians. But the group’s exclusion from politics has achieved the opposite of what the Quartet intended: its enduring popularity, certainly in the West Bank, compared to the PA. Palestinian political renewal requires your participation.

At the same time, the EU and the member states that are willing to do so should set a tone in relations with Israel that is appropriate for a country whose leaders reject a central principle of European foreign policy. A first step would simply be to ask the Israeli government to clarify its vision for resolving the conflict and thus explain why Europe is funding a process that the Israeli leadership itself seems to have given up on. The Europeans could at least start talks on how to adapt the cooperation and trade policy with Israel in a way that supports its main political objective, that is, the peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as the protection of the rights of the Palestinians. They could also explore more mechanisms to protect Palestinian space and development in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that remains under Israeli administrative and military control.

Finally, European officials should initiate a debate (at the national level and in their own circles) about what most are already privately suggesting: that the two-state solution, at least in its Oslo format, is now out of reach. , it is almost impossible to imagine how the parties could get there, and the time has come to consider other options. They should do so discreetly, to prevent the debate from getting bogged down in the European divide. The idea would be to reflect soon on what the alternatives could mean for European politics. As a bottom line, European leaders would have to make it clear that they will not support any political solution to the conflict that does not guarantee full equality for all those residing in territory under Israeli control and jurisdiction.

This article is an excerpt from a report that you can view herepublished by Crisis Group.