Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Turkish president signed his signature three times in a row in the document with which he appointed himself president of the Turkish sovereign fund. It was 2018 and the leader of the Islamist party AKP had just been sworn in as president after a constitutional reform that granted him broad executive powers. On that ink-stained paper, the culmination of a political project on which he had been working for more than a decade: the establishment of a “new Turkey” under the leadership of a single sultan.
Today, Erdogan remains at the head of what is officially known as Türkiye -name with which the Government renamed the country so that, among other things, there would be no confusion in its Anglo-Saxon form, which also means “turkey” (“turkey“)-. And barring unforeseen events, he will remain in charge for the next five years. But if Türkiye is no longer Türkiye, Erdogan is not what he was either.
In the two decades that he has been in power (11 years of them as prime minister), the Turkish leader has governed the country, first with a kid glove, then with an iron fist. Precisely, it was his authoritarian drift, which was exacerbated after an attempted coup against him in 2016 and the subsequent decree of a state of exception, that damaged trust of Türkiye with its Western allies.
However, if the relationship is still turbulent today it is not because of the increasingly blatant harassment of the opposition. Nor (or not only) because of the continuous cuts to LGTBI and women’s rights. But, above all, because of the changing and contradictory foreign policy of a country with a strategic geography and that is a member of NATO and the G20, as well as a perennial candidate for the EU.
That diplomacy with a personalist seal is the same that this Thursday led the Turkish leader to travel to Madrid to celebrate together with his Spanish counterpart, Pedro Sanchez, a High Level Meeting aimed at strengthening relations between both countries in the economic and business field. The objective of the summit is to achieve a volume of bilateral exchanges of 25,000 million euros (5,000 more than currently) and sign collaboration agreements in various areas. A deepening of the “comprehensive partnership” between both countries that comes at a delicate moment for Erdogan.
Still a ‘strong man’?
At 70 years old, the Turkish president has won 17 consecutive election days. A good streak (a priori unalterable) that came to an end in the municipal elections last March, when his party lost for the first time the country’s main cities and key provinces at the hands of a united opposition made up in part of exiles from their own Government.
There are those who see in this electoral disaster a vote of punishment due to the serious economic and cost of living crisis that is hitting citizens and that the movements promoted by Erdogan are unable to soften. And the Government has been insisting for some time on applying an unorthodox economic policy based on the drop in interest rates and the devaluation of the Turkish lira. A maneuver contrary to the dominant economic theory that has resulted in a constant increase in inflation – which has reached over 85% (currently it is close to 70%)-, and unemployment.
Erdogan’s defeat at the polls came just a year after Turkish voters re-elected him as president. At that time the economy had already been in free fall for some time and the country was immersed in a deep crisis. humanitarian crisis due to the disasters caused by the earthquake at the beginning of 2023. Thus, one of the most widespread readings of this victory is that voters thought less about economic aspects and more about their nationalist concerns. That is to say, many voted for the candidate who, in a tense international context, they perceived themselves as more capable of guaranteeing their safety.
Precisely, one of the great successes that can be attributed to Erdogan is that despite the ups and downs (he went from a policy of “zero problems” with neighbors to complaining with everyone around him), he has managed to strengthen Turkey’s geopolitical stature. . He has done it mostly through of strengthening the national military industry.
Day by day, It has the second largest army in NATO and its Armed Forces use a wide variety of sophisticated homemade weapons. Furthermore, the country has gained strong momentum in national projects such as the drones Bayraktar TB2, which have become the spearhead of Ukraine’s air resistance to the Russian invasion.
The difficult Turkish balance
Behind the ambition to achieve military autonomy is not only the need to respond to nationalist impulses of a good part of the population, but also to enhance the figure of Erdogan on the world stage. A strategy aimed, in turn, at projecting more power at home. Because for Erdogan it all comes down to “national interest.”
You only need to look at Türkiye’s position in the war in Ukraine. Since the conflict began, the Turkish president has refused to take a position on one side or the other. In theory, as a member of NATO, should be aligned with the Ukrainian government, similar to European values. Values that, on paper, Turkey has been trying to get closer to since 1999, when it was recognized as an official candidate for full membership in the European Union.
The truth is that Turkey has become a key arms supplier to kyiv and has mediated the talks that allowed resume Ukrainian grain exports. In January 2024, after a long period of negotiations, it approved Sweden’s application to join NATO. He previously gave the go-ahead to Finland after months of blockade. He did it, yes, in exchange for both countries extraditing people accused of terrorist activities in Turkey and the US selling him F-16 fighter planes.
However, while it has strengthened its commitment to the Alliance, Ankara has continued to strengthen its ties with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran, a country that the West openly accuses of promoting terrorism. The motives? Mainly commercial. For a decade Türkiye has been an important importer of Russian gas, which is why from the beginning it has refused to apply sanctions to Moscow, with whom it has continued to do business.
This double game by Erdogan leads to the question of where Türkiye really wants to be. And perhaps the simplest answer is nowhere but at home, where Erdogan he is still the most man powerful from Türkiye since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the republic 100 years ago.
Add Comment