Cuba is intensifying its relationship with China – and also with Russia – which is increasingly worrying American policymakers. Located less than 150 kilometres from the US coast, the island is seen by China as an opportunity to counter the American presence in the South China Sea.
In early July 2024, the Center for Strategic and International Studies published a report suggesting that China was developing sophisticated v-positionssurveillance on the Caribbean island of CubaThe U.S. and Chinese governments quickly dismissed the news, as neither country wanted a major crisis in Cuba amid already strained relations.
China and Cuba are likely, however, to continue to grow closer for geopolitical reasons. The United States plays a major role in China’s backyard – Taiwan and the South China Sea – and China is showing that it can do the same with Cuba. The deeper China’s involvement in Cuba, the more complicated the geopolitical landscape will become, reinforcing the view among policymakers in Beijing and Washington that the two powers are engaged in a new cold war in which Cuba could become a flashpoint.
China-Cuba relations have a long and complicated history. Although Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party and Fidel Castro’s Cuban Communist Party had a high degree of ideological compatibility, complemented by a strong antipathy toward the United States, economic interests predominated.
After taking power in Cuba in 1959, the Castro regime was burdened by a U.S. economic embargo, and many of the government’s economic initiatives ended in failure. Despite these problems, from 1959 to 1989 the economy grew at an average rate of around 4% annuallywith considerable assistance from the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union provided about $4 billion annually to keep an economically dysfunctional regime in power.
China had its own challenges: regime consolidation, continuing threats from the ousted Nationalist government in Taiwan, the Korean War, a weak economy and strained relations with its main patron, the Soviet Union.
As the Sino-Soviet split intensified in the 1960s and 1970s, Castro’s need for Soviet economic aid strained ties with Beijing. China-Cuba relations did not thaw until the 1990s. By that time, the Soviet Union had dissolved, Cuba’s economy had bottomed out due to the loss of aid, and China had become a rapidly rising economic power.
China’s activity in Cuba is striking. Both countries are left-wing authoritarian regimes, consider the United States their main security threat, and are governed by communist parties. Cuba also offers China something that is hard to match: its location, less than 150 kilometers from the US mainland. This proximity is why the idea of Chinese listening posts is such a sensitive issue in relations between the three countries. For American policymakers, China’s involvement in the Caribbean would be a a significant threat.
China’s actions in Cuba echo the U.S. approach to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan, less than 150 kilometers from mainland China, recently acknowledged that the United States has a small number of troops on its territory, primarily for training purposes. China’s potential presence in Cuba also potentially creates a strategic threat to the United States, jeopardizing supply chains, ports, and other critical facilities in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.
There is also a diplomatic appeal in the rapprochement with Cuba. China has benefited from Cuban support in international forums, such as the United Nations. In 2020, Cuba drafted the joint declaration on behalf of 45 countries “in support of China’s counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures in Xinjiang.”
Cuba benefits significantly from its connection with China. Although China has not made large investments in Cuba as in other Latin American countries, it remains a key trading partner and plays a role in the projects petrochemicals and infrastructure of the Caribbean countryIt also buys Cuban zinc and nickel, essential materials for the global energy transition.
China has also consistently advocated for an end to the US economic embargo on Cuba and welcomed the Caribbean country into the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018. Senior officials from both countries meet frequently, and during the COVID-19 pandemic, the two countries actively cooperated on medical matters. In 2024, China sent food and medical equipment to the islandboth scarce.
Beijing has also helped Havana improve surveillance of the population. Chinese companies such as Huawei, TP-Link and ZTE built Cuba’s telecommunications network, which the Cuban government uses to control their populationIn 2021, as the island erupted in widespread protests sparked by dire economic conditions, the Cuban government used Chinese technology to shut down the internet in the country, hampering protesters’ ability to communicate.
Looking ahead, if US-China relations continue to deteriorate, China may be tempted to accelerate its engagement with Cuba, including through the provision of increased economic assistance and closer military cooperation.
The US presidential election in November 2024 will set the tone for US-Cuba relations. A victory by US Vice President Kamala Harris could mean a relaxation of tensions between Havana and Washington, leaving the door open for the Caribbean island to become less dependent on China. A second term for Donald Trump could lead to a tougher policy, bringing Havana closer to China, and perhaps Russia, which sent a small naval fleet to Cuba in June 2024.
China could also help drive economic reform in Cuba. Cuba is currently stuck in a development dead end, which will likely lead to further socio-economic turmoil. China’s own experience in enabling a large private sector to operate could serve as an example for the Caribbean country.
Ultimately, the China-Cuba relationship will reflect the situation between China and the United Stateswhich means that the Beijing-Havana-Washington triangle will have more weight in global geopolitical affairs unless it is handled carefully.
Article translated from English from the website of East Asia Forum.
Activity subsidized by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs
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