BRICS, Anti-Western or Non-Western?

The first BRICS+ summit after the group’s expansion in January 2024 allowed its host, Vladimir Putin, to present himself as a world leader who is still far from isolated. But the lack of substantial progress on other issues highlights the organization’s disparities, rather than its unity. While the BRICS should be taken seriously as an expanding economic organization encompassing numerous countries in the Global South, it would be wrong to interpret it as one pole of a two-way geopolitical competition between China and Russia and the West.

The Kazan summit, which took place from October 22 to 24, received much of the international attention. Putin presented her as one of the “largest foreign policy events ever celebrated” in Russia, with an impressive list of participants. In addition to eight of the nine full member states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and UAE) present (Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva participated online due to a recent head injury head), more than 20 countries were represented, many of them heads of state. Among the notable guests were Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.

As is customary at multilateral summits, several leaders also met bilaterally on the sidelines of the summit, and Putin had 17 bilateral meetings in your agenda. It is worth highlighting the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modion Wednesday, which was the first between the two leaders in five years, facilitated by an important agreement on the Sino-Indian border dispute, a day before the summit began.

Non-Western or Anti-Western BRICS?

Many Western observers view BRICS as an increasingly anti-Western organization, noting that the summit was held in Russia, while the group welcomed Iran as a full member in January 2024. Furthermore, its growth comes with the backdrop of China’s geopolitical contest with the US. It is true that the BRICS countries share the explicit ambition to diminish Western dominance in global governance and strengthen the international influence of the countries of the Global South. The establishment of a “more just and democratic world order” has been a central interest emphasized by all members, old and new. The BRICS as a group also criticizes the use of sanctions by Western countries and wants to increase the use of local currencies in member states’ financial transactions to decrease their dependence on the dollar.

But reading these measures as an organization-wide proclamation of anti-Western sentiment is an oversimplification. While this is true for some – notably Russia, Iran and, to a lesser extent, China – other member states do not wish to be seen as part of an anti-Western club. Indeed, members such as India, Brazil and the UAE continue to collaborate closely with Western partners, manifested, among other things, in India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue alongside Australia, Japan and the United States. These countries often oppose initiatives that are not in line with their own foreign policy agendas.

For example, earlier this month, Russia hosted a meeting of BRICS finance ministers at which Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov called for the creation of an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as a BRICS rating agency, a reinsurance company and a raw materials exchange. However, most BRICS finance ministers and central bank heads did not even bother to attend and sent only junior officials instead.

The summit declaration This week he also advocates reforming the Bretton Woods institutions, rather than creating full-fledged alternatives. Furthermore, Member States agreed to “discuss and study the feasibility of establishing an independent cross-border settlement and depository infrastructure, BRICS Clear, an initiative to complement the existing financial market infrastructure as well as the independent reinsurance capacity of the BRICS, including the BRICS (Re)Insurance Company, with participation on a voluntary basis” (emphasis added) –a somewhat lukewarm response to Russia’s initiatives. Even when it comes to reducing the primacy of the dollar in international trade – something that most member states generally favor– There are many differences over how to do this, and the expected rise of the Chinese renminbi as an alternative to the dollar does not sit well with member India and others.

Take member interests seriously

Indeed, the BRICS have experienced an increase in candidate states and have impressive economic figures. Its member countries represent the 29% of world GDP and 40% of crude oil production. But there is no reason to fear the development of a large anti-Western geopolitical bloc. For this, its interests are too diverse and include too many countries that value the organization only as a non-western and non-anti-western group.

Europe should focus on taking seriously the criticism that unites all BRICS+ countries, both “non-Western” and “anti-Western”, which includes the unfair dominance of Western states in major international institutions that no longer reflects contemporary realities. Considering the attractiveness of the BRICS as an alternative to Western-led institutions, there is a clear need for European countries to reevaluate their engagement strategies with countries in the Global South. Maintain and nourish relations with each of the BRICS countries –like the last ones from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on his visit to New Delhi to the 7th Germany-India Intergovernmental Consultations –It is essential to prevent the BRICS+ from becoming a true anti-Western pole.

Article translated from English from the website MERICS.

The BRICS entry, Anti-Western or non-Western? was first published in Foreign Policy.

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