As Russia’s private militias multiply, so do the Kremlin’s problems

They are called Convoy, Patriot, Moran Security Group, Shchit (‘Shield’)… On Friday, July 14, the Kremlin declared that it was considering legalizing private military companies, including the Wagner group, whose existence is not yet authorized by Russian legislation.

“Legally, the Wagner private military company does not exist and has never existed. This is a matter that needs to be further studied and examined,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters, adding that it was a “quite a question.” complex”.

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These statements follow a similar message from Vladimir Putin the day before in an interview with the Kommersant newspaper. “The group (Wagner) is there, but it does not exist legally! (…) That is another question related to (its) effective legalization. A question that must be raised in the Duma (lower house of Parliament), within the of the government,” declared the Russian president.

Although prohibited by law, private military companies (PMCs) have steadily gained ground in Russia in recent years, fueled by the windfalls created by the Ukraine war and the Kremlin’s desire to turn these shadow armies into an instrument of its foreign policy since the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The model Blackwater

Russia, weakened by sanctions and isolated on the international scene, sought to extend its geopolitical influence, especially in Syria and the African continent, through the private Wagner militia.

The 2014 creation of the paramilitary group led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, disgraced since its aborted rebellion in June, was directly inspired by Blackwatera mercenary group deployed in Iraq by the United States that has become a symbol of the privatization of war.

For the Russians, these private military companies offer a number of advantages, including lower running costs than regular troops and the fact that they have no legal existence, allowing Moscow to wage hybrid wars while denying involvement.

“At that time, Russian military doctrine emphasized asymmetric responses to more powerful adversaries such as NATO,” recalls Danilo Delle Fave, an intelligence specialist at the Verona-based International Team for the Study of Security (ITSS). “Mercenaries can be sent to do the dirty work or simply to carry out the most risky missions, the ones you don’t want to entrust to your special forces,” adds the researcher.

Around thirty active PMCs (private security companies)

Another advantage is that the deaths of these volunteer fighters, ex-special forces, ex-convicts or fervent nationalists, are not counted in official losses, reducing the political cost of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Kremlin.

Russia currently has 27 active PMCs (private security companies), more than 70% of which were launched after 2014, according to Molfar, a Ukrainian open source intelligence (Osint) site.

Among these new private military companies are those of the energy giant Gazprom, which has recently created two private armies, known as Fakel (“torch”) and Plamya (“flame”). These private armies are tasked with protecting the company’s assets abroad, but they also support Russian forces in Ukraine. Even the Russian Orthodox Church finances its own PMC, whose fighters participate in the Kremlin “special operation”.

“In the future, the number of private military companies could continue to grow, especially after the end of the war in Ukraine. For many Russians mobilized on the front lines, these private militias will offer job opportunities and allow them to continue using the skills they have learned on the ground,” predicts Marcel Plichta, a specialist in international relations at the University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom and a former US Defense Department analyst.

According to the study published by Molfar, about a quarter of Russian private military companies only operate in Ukraine, while a dozen are present in various countries around the world, especially in Africa. Its role is simple: defend the interests of its leaders and those of the Kremlin. In this sense, the Wagner model has been abundantly documented: hoarding natural resources in exchange for combat missions, military training and intelligence.

“What makes Wagner unique compared to other private military companies is that Prigozhin is not just a mercenary boss, he is a businessman. In Africa, he mines gold through his own companies, with his own employees, his own security service, and then organizes the transportation of the minerals out of the country. At the moment, I can’t think of any other militia with similar capabilities,” says Marcel Plichta.

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Not so private private militias

Far from acting autonomously, the Russian PMCs and their leaders maintain close subordinate ties to the Russian security apparatus and political powers. In particular, the Wagner group is reputed to be a haven for former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officers.

After denying the existence of Wagner, Vladimir Putin himself acknowledged at the end of June the links between the Russian state and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s men. “From May 2022 to May 2023, the State paid Wagner 86,000 million rubles (almost a billion euros) to maintain it,” explained the Russian president, following the aborted rebellion of the paramilitary group.

In June 2022, the US Treasury sanctioned the security company RSB-Group, one of the oldest and largest in Russia, “which provides services to various Russian companies in close collaboration with the FSB”, the Federal Security Service in charge of internal security.

The Ministry of Defense also controls and finances various shadow armies. The minister himself, Sergei Shoigu, is affiliated with the PMC Patriot. In Crimea, the politician Sergeï Axionov, who governs the annexed peninsula, has been playing the role of warlord since the end of 2022 with Convoy, a private militia that has carried out several operations in the Ukrainian region of Kherson.

divide and conquer

“The elites have realized that having a PMC can allow you to be recognized by the Kremlin. Because if you contribute to the war effort [en Ucrania]you will be rewarded,” says Anton Shekhovtsov, director of the Center for Democratic Integrity, interviewed by Euronews.

According to Danilo Delle Fave, this “almost feudal” system serves to consolidate the power of Vladimir Putin. “The multiplication of centers of power in competition with each other prevents them from creating alliances and turning against the leader. The same type of dynamic was observed in the Nazi regime,” the researcher analyzes.

However, the abortive rebellion of the Wagner group demonstrated the fragility of such a structure, which could ultimately be a factor of internal instability. “In Russia there has been a fragmentation of security missions: the Ministry of Defense, the PMC, the National Guard, which is almost Vladimir Putin’s personal guard. […]. All this has led to a weakening of the state,” says Marcel Plichta.

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The time has come to regain control of the nebula formed by these armed groups. Since July 1, private military companies are required to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense. Last month, Moscow released a video showing the Chechen Akhmat paramilitary group signing the agreement. A way for the Russian authorities to show that the paramilitary groups are folding.

As for Wagner, his star has not stopped fading since his rebellion against military command. On July 12, the Russian army announced that it had received from the militia more than 2,000 pieces of equipment, 2,500 tons of ammunition and 20,000 light weapons. In addition, according to the Pentagon, the paramilitary group’s mercenaries no longer participate “significantly” in combat operations in Ukraine.

*This article was adapted from its original French version