The Russian peace contingent cannot prevent clashes between Yerevan and Baku over the pro-Armenian separatist region. Moscow would like to replace Armenian Prime Minister Pašinyan with its own oligarch. The Kremlin seems to be getting weaker in the Caucasus, as a result of the war in Ukraine.
Moscow () – The recent protests in front of a Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, are a sign that another phase of the open conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Yerevan and Baku is approaching. What is at stake is the possibility of a “third war” – after the one of 1992-1994 and the one of 44 days in 2020 – as affirmed by many observers, both Armenian and Azerbaijani, and even neutral.
As Guseinbala Salimov states in Zerkalo.az, “it is already clear that the Russian peace contingent is incapable of fulfilling its mission.” In reality, the parties are not ready to face a military escalation while the conflict in Ukraine continues, and Russia considers Karabakh “as the eleventh finger of the hand.” Armenia “does not want to calm down”, observes the Azerbaijani political scientist, and “continues to organize provocations”, like the one in Gyumri. Yerevan would thus try to rebalance Russia’s policy with the influence of the West, especially the US and France.
The Armenian Prime Minister Pašinyan, moreover, is not a very welcome character in the Kremlin, which considers him “a stranger” and tolerates him only “to unload on him all the negative effects of Caucasian tensions.” According to most of the region’s political commentators, Moscow is preparing an alternative to Yerevan’s prime minister. There is talk of Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian billionaire oligarch with Armenian citizenship, minister of the breakaway republic of Artsakh, the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh. Vardanyan is a very popular figure in Armenia, not least because of the numerous humanitarian and relief initiatives inspired and organized by him.
Undoubtedly, in Azerbaijan the situation is not calm either, considering the ideological front opened with Iran for the recognition of the so-called “Southern Azerbaijan”, which should unite with the “Western” linked to the conflict with Armenia and control of the Zangezur corridor (Lachin for the Armenians). The intensification of the conflict with Armenia would mean not only a host of new victims on both sides, but could also bring Russia out of its apparent lethargy to make up for the disappointments in Ukraine in the Caucasus. So far Baku has managed to reassure Moscow, but “everything has a limit.”
And Russia, although it formally supports Armenia, has always agreed on the need to cede part of the disputed territory to Azerbaijan, in order to keep both countries in its sphere of influence. If Moscow’s weakness were to return the Caucasian landscape to what it was 30 years ago, it would affect the Russians’ ability to assert themselves across the ex-Soviet East and West space, already sorely tested by the tragic conflict in Ukraine.
Now Putin must decide whether to punish the Armenians for the increasingly frequent anti-Russian demonstrations, supporting the change in power and liquidating the “people’s revolutionary” Pašinyan, but trying at the same time not to antagonize the opinion of the majority of the population. from the country. The third Karabakh war could end up being inevitable when internal and external relations are already entrusted only to arms.
