Religious extremism and tribal norms dominate in Afghanistan. The nations of the area are watching with apprehension – and trying to limit – the influences of radical Islam. War and weapons dictate the times of politics and the economic crisis fuels tensions. Border controls and the reopening of the bridges on the border with Uzbekistan.
Moscow () – On August 15, 2021, the Taliban completed their reconquest of Kabul, after the hasty and convulsive withdrawal of US troops. At the time, there was chaos and stampedes at the airport, with mothers throwing their children into the arms of marines above the fences. A year later, the news from Afghanistan is getting thinner and darker, beyond the restoration of the cloak of religious extremism and tribal norms.
The neighboring countries of Central Asia, not far away – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but also Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – watch with apprehension the possible influence of radical Islamism. In them, everything possible is done to encourage a moderate practice of religion, compatible with political systems that are far from stable, entrusted to a once-Soviet ruling class and that have prospered for decades thanks to the relative stability of Russia, for one hand, and the Western armed forces on the other.
Now, these two defense walls have collapsed: war and weapons once again dictate the times of politics and social life, and the economic crisis causes many tensions in the territories, between the different social classes and ethnic groups. In addition to the positions of asymmetric neutrality regarding the Russian war in Ukraine, the relations that these countries manage to maintain with the Afghan powder keg are especially important.
Tajikistan is in the front line, not only for geographical reasons -its border with Afghanistan is the one most at risk of penetration- but also because of its ethnic composition. Although Tajiks are the largest minority on Afghan territory, they are not recognized by the Pashtun-dominated government. Uzbekistan, for its part, is trying to contain itself: it is the most populous country in the area (with 35 million Uzbeks, compared to 31 million Afghans), but it is also a strategically decisive territory for the transit of goods between China, India, Russia and Europe. For this reason, Tashkent tries to ease tensions with the Taliban as much as possible.
A good example of this more constructive attitude of the Uzbeks is the situation in Termez. For millions of Afghans, this small border town has become the “gateway to life”. Warehouses have been installed here for humanitarian aid shipments organized by the UN. From there, more than a thousand tons of aid have been transported to Afghanistan, and now part is sent to the most devastated areas of Ukraine. A landlocked country, with bordering states so far from the coast, thus becomes a channel through which the hope of refugees, displaced and abandoned flows.
In addition, Uzbekistan is the main supplier of energy to Afghanistan, which is concerned with paying the costs without leaving outstanding debts with Tashkent. In summer, Kabul disconnects from the Uzbek network and switches to Tajikistan.
The Uzbek and Afghan territories have been intertwined many times, as have the ethnic groups of the two countries, in the succession of dynasties of antiquity and modernity. In 1750, a historic “Agreement of Friendship” was signed between the Afghan Sheikh Akhmad Durrani and the Bukhara Sheikh Mohammad Murad Bek, fixing the border at the Amu Darya River. Later the Soviets built the 816-meter-long Friendship Bridge there, which remained inaccessible for a long time due to the vicissitudes of the war in the last 20 years. The Uzbek border remains one of the most heavily guarded in the area, but the bridges are slowly reopening.
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