The conflict between Serbia and Kosovo is the one with the greatest capacity for destabilization in the region. But he’s not the only one. While the Dayton agreements show signs of exhaustion as they are considered ‘discriminatory’ towards minorities, the EU’s reluctance to enlarge in the region may serve as an incentive for destabilization.
Before the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, the Balkans were considered the most flammable region in Europe. This was the scene of the bloodiest wars in the Old Continent since the end of World War II, whose wounds have not yet healed. In fact, there are numerous latent conflicts, and some of them have not escalated thanks to the presence of foreign troops deployed on the ground in international peacekeeping missions. Over the last few months, tensions have risen and this could be another hot autumn in the Balkans.
Undoubtedly, the conflict with the greatest capacity for destabilization over the last decade is the one between Serbia and the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. The former Serbian province declared its independence in 2008, and since then it has been recognized by more than a hundred countries, that is, the majority of the international community, including Western heavyweights. On the other hand, this is not the case of Russia and China, which as members of the Security Council, veto their entry as a full member of the United Nations.
For Serbia, recognizing the independence of Kosovo represents a complete taboo, as well as political suicide for any Serbian president, whatever his ideology. International mediation has been attempting a less ambitious goal for years: the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. That is, to agree on rules of coexistence with the status quo that distance the scenario of a return to war. The absence of this normalization means that even symbolic disagreements can escalate and end up causing disturbances.
«The main stumbling block for normalization is the status of the community of Serbian municipalities, which brings together the ten municipalities with a Serb majority in Kosovo»
That is exactly what happened last summer in the face of a lack of mutual recognition of national identity documents or car plates issued by the other party. In mid-August, mediation by Brussels at a tripartite summit reached an agreement on national identity documents, but not on license plates. On October 31, the interim agreement that governs this matter expires, so there is a risk of new altercations at the border, especially if the Kosovar police forcibly prevent citizens of the Kosovo Serb minority from circulating with state license plates Serbian.
The main obstacle to normalization is the status of the community of Serb municipalities, which brings together the ten municipalities with a Serb majority in Kosovo. Belgrade maintains that the 2013 Brussels agreements provided for the creation of this institution, something that has not yet happened. However, Pristina opposes Belgrade’s ambition to create a Serbian autonomous region, arguing that the so-called “Brussels process” did not address this point. Pristina wants the community of municipalities to have only political coordination powers, but not to become an executive power.
In conversations with political representatives and Kosovar citizens, fear of the creation of “another Republika Srpska”, the autonomous entity within Bosnia Herzegovina created in the Dayton peace accords, is often expressed. The recurrent invocation among Kosovars of the precedent of the Republika Srpska as a bogeyman is not accidental. After years of toying with the idea of secession and then joining Serbia, the main Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, announced at the end of last year the launch of a secession process that was to begin with the withdrawal of some national institutions. Among his plans, the creation of his own army, something that set off all the alarms in the international community.
According to Bosnian analyst Jasmin Mujanovic, Dodik’s moves are marked by his close relations with the Kremlin, and therefore his calculations are influenced by the situation in Ukraine. “Dodik was informed of the invasion of Ukraine in advance, and if Putin’s plans had gone well, he would probably have declared independence. Only the forcefulness of the European response, and above all the sanctions, made him stop,” says Mujanovic.
“The Bosnian Serb Defiance Reveals A Deeper Problem: More Than A Quarter Of A Century After Their Signing, The Dayton Peace Accords Show Signs Of Exhaustion”
In addition to the EU and the US, which have imposed sanctions on him, Dodik has had another problem. The opposition in the Republika Srpska has denounced that the close victory of the Bosnian Serb leader in the elections on October 2 was due to a rigging and he took to the streets. The Central Electoral Commission has chosen to do a recount, opening the door to a repeat of the elections. This situation may be an obstacle for Dodik, but it does not solve the problem, since even the opposition defends the entity’s secession, it only criticizes the acceleration of the process due to the costs it will represent.
The Bosnian Serb defiance highlights a deeper problem: more than a quarter of a century after their signing, the Dayton peace accords show signs of exhaustion. On the one hand, the Croatian nationalists want adjustments in the Dayton political system, which is based on the distribution of political positions based on sectarian quotas, since they consider that it marginalizes them. On the other hand, there are several rulings, both from the European Court of Human Rights and from the Bosnian Constitutional Court itself, that consider the political system to be “discriminatory” for minorities without access to some positions because they do not belong to any of the three majority ethnic groups —Serbs , Bosniacs and Croats—, or by residing in a certain region. It is estimated that up to 400,000 people, 12% of the population, are affected by this discrimination.
Next to these problems, conflicts such as the one between Bulgaria and North Macedonia over Macedonian national identity and the origin of its language, and which blocks Skopje’s accession process to the European Union, seem secondary. However, in all of them, EU policy can play an essential role. After the wars of the 1990s, it was believed that the enlargement of the EU to all the Balkans could solve these national problems. However, the reticence towards enlargement by a large part of the 27 has pushed the prospect of accession so far away that it may incite irresponsible behavior by some political leaders, and therefore, the danger of destabilizing the Balkans. One more time.
