A change of Treaty for a European Defense Union

The Russian aggression against Ukraine marked a turning point for European security and led the European Union and its Member States to take important measures in the field of defense: the EU He decided use common funding to equip the Ukrainian government with arms and ammunition through the European Fund for Peace totaling 3.6 billion euros, Germany assigned an additional 100 billion euros to its defense budget, Denmark will joined to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), Finland I enter in NATO and Sweden is ready to follow soon. It seems that the time has come to make bold decisions in the field of European defense and to contemplate a reform of the existing provisions.

The objective of a credible defense for the Union

In order to define which changes to the Treaty are necessary, we need to clarify what is the objective that the Union and the Member States would like to achieve in the first place. According to indications of the Conference on the Future of Europe, it is necessary for Europe “to become more independent and more capable of fending for itself in vital areas”, including security and defence. In recent years, the objective of building a European Defense Union has been exposed both by the European Parliament as for the European Comissionbut what does it mean specifically? In this regard, the Franco-British Declaration of st malo (1998), which can be seen as the preliminary step towards making the CSDP operational after the failure of the EU in its response to the Balkan wars, is still relevant. In fact, it reads that “the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and the willingness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”

25 years later, the war has once again set foot on European soil. Therefore, it is crucial to assess where we are and what we are missing on our way to meet this goal, in order to plan the necessary actions for the future.

Provisions, limitations and possible reforms

He Treaty of the European Union (Articles 24 and 42 TUE) considers the collective security and defense policy, including the progressive configuration of a common defense, as an integral part of the foreign and security policy. Indeed, a future European Defense Union cannot be separated from an operational common foreign and security policy. This requires, at a minimum, reviewing existing provisions extending the powers of the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission and encouraging differentiated forms of coordination between Member States, with a view to allowing the EU to put into practice the political initiative of the common institutions. and of those countries that are willing and able to act on key foreign policy issues.

Until now, effective and timely action has also been hampered by Treaty provisions (arts. 31 and 42 TEU) that prescribe unanimity as the decision-making rule in the field of foreign, security and defense policy . Unfortunately, unanimity has too often led to late or suboptimal responses to crises and conflicts, from North Africa to the Balkans and beyond. For this reason, there is increasing pressure from the European Parliament and the European Commission, but also from some Member States, to extend the application of qualified majority voting (QVM) to key areas of foreign and security policy. such as sanctions and civilian missions. It may be too ambitious to propose the adoption of the VMC also for decisions with military or defense implications, given the interests at stake at the national level. However, it might be worth exploring forms of enhanced VMC or the possibility for a Member State to abstain without impeding the tpma of a decision.

In addition, if we want to build a European Defense Union, we must guarantee democratic accountability for decisions in the military and defense field. This cannot be done solely through parliamentary control over governments at the national level, but requires the reinforcement of the European Parliament’s powers of information and consultation, as provided for in art. 36 of the TUE. The most effective power of the European Parliament, that is, the budgetary power, should also be extended to military and defense issues.

This means including in the common budget the operating costs of military missions, which is currently prohibited by the Treaty (art. 41 TUE). Such a reform would also favor a fairer and more balanced sharing of the financing burdens between the Member States. Since the CSDP started operating in the early 2000s, we have learned that the impossibility of financing military and defense operations through the Community budget means that the most active Member States, those that participate in EU missions with assets and means, they are also the ones that pay the most, in accordance with the principle of “costs fall on whoever incurs them”. In addition, art. 41 constitutes a de facto obstacle for civil-military cooperation, since civil and military missions are financed according to different procedures.

The steps towards a new European defense architecture

The ultimate goal is for Brussels to be able to respond in a timely and effective manner to conflicts and crises, including on the European continent. Pending the creation of the so-called European army, whatever it may look like, this means streamlining the European defense architecture and relying on a clear chain of command to mobilize European national forces. What we need is a political authority, for example a European Council of Defense Ministers, a fully-fledged headquarters in Brussels for military operations, not just non-executive missions, and national military contingents at the disposal of the authorities. of the EU to be deployed. In this framework, the EU Military Committee is clearly qualified to function as if it were a Head of National Defense. It could make crucial strategic decisions, while counting on the support of the EU Military Staff. Also, the European Defense Agency should become a European armaments agency.

Streamlining the overall architecture would allow the EU to overcome its current ambiguities and inefficiencies regarding European defense R&D and procurement support. In fact, the European Commission’s defense investments are currently made following the logic of the market, in line with its role in unlocking the full potential of the EU’s single market. But the defense market is not, and never will be, a free market: defense R&D and procurement decisions are made with political and strategic considerations in mind, something the current institutional architecture finds difficult to do. A comprehensive reform establishing a European defense military and political chain of command, with a properly balanced role for the European Commission, Member States and the European Parliament, would finally allow the EU to invest strategically in defence.

Looking at the future

Changing the rules also by modifying the Treaties, especially in an area as sensitive as defense, is not an easy task. Last year, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which he asked the European Council to start the process of reviewing the EU Treaties, which would also include giving the Union more powers in defense matters. Since then, the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs has continued to work on possible changes. While some capitals such as Paris and Berlin would be in favor of a review of the current provisions, a group of 13 Member States have declared their opposition to a change in the Treaties.

However, such a reform is unavoidable if the European Member States are serious about building a European Defense Union and equipping the EU with the necessary military power to protect its citizens, offer its neighbors the guarantees of adequate security and exert a credible deterrence against potential adversaries. Russia’s war against Ukraine has made the debate more pressing. Over the last few months, the EU has realized how difficult it is to act in accordance with the current regulatory framework, for example if a country like Hungary decides to block decisions on sanctions, even though all other countries have agreed to them. With a view to next year’s European elections, all pro-European political forces should place the necessary reform of the Treaties at the center of their electoral campaign, with a view to making the most of the Conference on the Future of Europe and converting the next legislature in a true constituent phase for the EU.

Article originally published in English on the website of the IAI.