Russia breaks the defensive line of the Azom steelworks in which Zelensky won medals

This event, celebrated by Russian propaganda as a kind of mockery of the Ukrainian president, has several interpretations: on the one hand, the message is obvious, a kind of “We are here, what happened to your soldiers?”. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Zelensky was there three months ago and already at that time there was talk of the “imminent” fall of Bakhmut. In other words, Russia, championed in this case by the Wagner Group, has taken neither more nor less than three months, at a rate of thousands of deaths per month, to meet only part of its objective.

Beyond the aforementioned symbolism, the relevance of the occupation of the industrial complex remains to be determined. Honestly, the information coming from Bakhmut is so confusing that It’s hard to separate the wheat from the chaff.. Both sides have already given so many versions about their actions that we don’t really know if the objective is to take the city from the east of the Bakhmutka river or if they want to create a pincer between Khromove and Ivanivske to cut the T0504, isolate Bakhmut from Chasiv Yar and surround to the ten thousand Ukrainian soldiers who are still supposed to defend the city. Nor do we know if that decision is going to be taken exclusively by Prigozhin or if it is part of some higher plan devised by Gerasimov, Shoigu or Putin himself.

On the Ukrainian side, three quarters of the same. Zelensky insists on the importance of keeping the Russians at bay and it affects the extra effort that is being made in troops and weapons, but there are also those who point to a diversionary maneuver and who believe that in reality the best men have already left the city and only those mobilized at the last minute remain. In the same way, there are those who are convinced that losing Bakhmut would mean a free path to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and who believe that it is best to get out of there as soon as possible and defend from other positions.

“Sink” or tactical withdrawal?

Certainties are few. This Tuesday, the Washington Post published an article in which they insisted on the lack of men and ammunition in the Ukrainian army to face what is coming their way in Donbas. On Monday, there were several media outlets that published the opposite: that, based on snipers and special units, they were causing an appreciable number of casualties among the Russian troops. Uncertainty is constant and there is no choice but to appeal to the confidence in the high command that devised the recovery of Kharkov and Kherson when both regions seemed lost.

The German weekly journalist BILD, Julian Röpcke, interpreted the capture of Vostokmash as the collapse of the defense of the western side of the Bakhmutka. “From now on, Wagner will advance street by street until he takes control of that entire side of the river.” Röpcke tends to exaggerate and this may be a good example. If Ukraine is really committed to defending the city, such a “street by street” advance could be a nightmare. In fact, other informants on the ground speak of fighting within the Azom compound itself, such as once in Azovstal, Mariupol.

The most optimistic among the pro-Ukrainian experts speak of a possible troop concentration at Chasiv Yar, but we are not talking about verified information either, at least not from official sources. Whether these troops are there to launch the defense of Ivanivske and Khromove or whether they are preparing a counter-offensive when Wagner’s exhausted troops finally take Bakhmut is something that is not entirely clear either. Both possibilities are compatible.

[El Grupo Wagner admite la “difícil situación” en Bakhmut: Ucrania envía cada vez más reservas]

The symbol in front of the lure

Nor should we rule out the aforementioned lure theory. After all, if Bakhmut has become the epicenter of the war, it is because Prigozhin has decided to do so with his determination to send tens of thousands of convicts to the area to gradually erode the Ukrainian defenses. Why there and not in Kreminna, Siversk, Vuhledar, Svatove or Makiivka? Because it was supposed to be where he could most easily achieve a victory that would ingratiate himself with the Kremlin elites. A victory that is already eight months late.

Maybe after all Zelensky is playing to deceive the Russians and is not sending his elite troops to Bakhmut, but is reserving them for other more important areas. Losing Siversk or losing Vuhledar would be dramatic for the Ukrainians. Losing Bakhmut may not be so bad. It is true that three roads lead from the city to Liman, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, but all three are seriously damaged and the transport of men, ammunition and supplies would not be easy in any case.

We all expected a second Russian offensive that reminds us in some way of the firstbut there has been nothing like it. It is true that the recent graduates of the following levy have been incorporated, as it could not be otherwise, but their presence is barely making itself felt due to the desire to role of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group. The fact that we are only talking about Bakhmut is significant: there is no breakthrough on the rest of the front. Ukraine will have the logical problems of men and weapons that more than a year of war implies and some 120,000 dead or wounded in combat… but it resists and resists well.

As long as all Russian efforts are concentrated on Bakhmut, they will not be concentrated elsewhere, and the second Russian offensive will come to nothing. Then, when the NATO weapons arrive, there may be a counter-offensive, or there may simply be ground stabilization. However, it is not the same that this stabilization arrives with Sloviansk and Kramatorsk in Russian hands than it does with the Vostokmash plant and some surrounding towns. Wagner’s commitment to the symbol, the message, the propaganda… cannot hide his inability to take a city of 73,000 inhabitants. As long as this continues, there will be no photo that worries Zelenski no matter how much it is retweeted from account to account.

[Rusia ordena duplicar la producción de misiles de alta precisión ante la alerta de escasez de armas]