Indian war diplomacy vs. G20

Unlike the West, Delhi cannot afford the fall of Moscow because it would mean giving Beijing carte blanche in the region. This is the opinion of analyst Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who explained to : “If little is said about India’s role in this war, it is because that is what she wants”: Prime Minister Modi’s goal? Gather the world’s most important leaders at the same table.

Milan () – If there is little talk about India’s role in the war in Ukraine, compared to the space given to China, for example, it is because Delhi “does not want to talk about it: it prefers to keep a profile low and working diplomatically behind the scenes ahead of the G20 in September,” says Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, analyst in charge of the Central and South Asia defense, strategy and diplomacy research program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). ), based in London. And indeed, today, at the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in Bengaluru, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made no mention of the war and, according to a text from the Indian Finance Ministry, Delhi plans to oppose the sanctions debate. additional to Russia.

A year after the start of the conflict, India has not changed its position: “It spoke out against certain violations of human rights and certainly the war does not interest it, but at the same time it does not directly support Western efforts in Ukraine because it does not want to the defeat of Moscow”. In her opinion, this would mean letting China become the main player in the region, while Europe and the United States are not only far away, but are considered “declining powers.”

What many people don’t take into account,” the expert noted, “is that despite the friendly relations between Russia and China, the Russian weapons that India buys are aimed at Beijing. India tries to be self-sufficient, but for its own safety, without a credible alternative from the West, it cannot afford Moscow to fall. Consequently, India prefers a multipolar world with a relatively strong Russia,” to which it remains (and will remain) attached for three main reasons, Roy-Chaudhury argued.

In the first place, there is a historical-affective relationship: “When India needed support, it was always the Soviet Union that came to its aid, whether it was during the war against China in 1962, with the supply of weapons that the West had refused to send, or during the war against Pakistan in 1971, during which the USSR vetoed all UN Security Council resolutions against India that the West supported. There is a strong memory of these events in the Indian security establishment.”

Then there is the military plan itself: “Since the 1960s, Russia has been India’s main arms supplier, although since the 1980s – aware of the risks of such dependency – it has tried to diversify the origin of its weapons. Today, the dependency is related to maintenance, spare parts and technologically advanced weapons that the West is unwilling to concede to Delhi, which for its part sees as necessary to counter Beijing.”

And finally, there is the relationship on the energy front: “Last month, India, by not having imposed sanctions against Moscow, became the main buyer of Russian oil”, buying 1.4 million barrels per day in January alone , accounting for about 27% of all Indian imports. Delhi has defended itself against Western accusations by saying it buys oil from the highest bidder: in the past year, the price of Ural crude has fallen as much as $33 a barrel below the Brent world index.

This dependence on Russia is therefore why India has been on a knife-edge over the past year: “Delhi neither condemned nor condoned the invasion, a term Indian officials, by the way, have never used. “continued the expert. India has no intention of undermining Western sanctions, but at the same time it wants to defend its national interests,” explains Rahul Roy-Chaudhury. In other words, it is in the best of the worst positions. It does not support the West or weaken its position, because it doesn’t provide aid to Russia, as China and Iran are suspected of doing. And this allows it to keep the diplomatic channel open with Russia without anyone talking about it.” Just a few weeks ago, for example, the National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, was in Moscow to talk with his counterpart and promote bilateral cooperation.

In line with this view, yesterday, for the umpteenth time, India abstained from voting on a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion and calling for Russia’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. As a result, Western countries feel “a certain mistrust,” the analyst stressed, “which actually comes mainly from Western defense ministries, who feel that India is not on their side. But this mistrust is seen on their side. offset by the need for the West to have an ally against China in the region”.

And in fact, India continues to be part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as the Quad, the forum for strategic dialogue between the United States, Australia, Japan and India, in which only the latter shares borders with the Dragon and, of course, , you don’t want it to have global domain. At the same time, according to Chaudhury, “The West cannot afford to ignore India because by 2035 it will become the world’s third largest economy.”

A diplomatic balancing act that could bear fruit in September on the occasion of the G20, during which India hopes to host US President Joe Biden, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping: “An achievement that would have global resonance, but also important internal repercussions. Let us not forget that in India the next elections are scheduled for 2024. Everything could still happen, but for the BJP, the party in power, it would be a great success to bring together the most important leaders of the world at the same table. a country like India could do something like that right now.”