Europe

ICJ decision is “a small diplomatic victory for Armenia”

The United Nations judicial body ordered Azerbaijan on Wednesday to end the blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only highway linking the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave with Armenia, which has been going on since mid-December. What are the consequences of this order on the blockade, and more generally on the conflict? Here’s an analysis.

The International Court of Justice, the main judicial body of the United Nations, ordered Azerbaijan on Wednesday to end the blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only highway linking the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave with Armenia in this disputed region of the South Caucasus.

Since mid-December, the Azerbaijanis, posing as environmental militants mobilized against illegal mines, have blocked this vital corridor for the 120,000 inhabitants of the enclave, mostly Armenians, who are deprived of food and medical supplies.

While the Armenians accuse Baku of creating a humanitarian crisis, Azerbaijan denies ordering the blockade of this vital highway for the separatist enclave.

Azerbaijan “should take all measures within its power to ensure the unimpeded movement of people, vehicles and goods along the Lachin corridor in both directions,” said Joan Donoghue, presiding judge of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). There is an “urgent need” to end the blockade, which could cause “irreparable damage”, he added during a hearing.

This map shows the conflict zones.  In green, the area of ​​Nagorno Karabakh and the areas of influence of the Armenians.  In addition to the neighbours: Turkey, an ally of the Azerbaijanis and historically at odds with the Armenians, and Russia, which although not far from Azerbaijan, has a Defense pact with Armenia.
This map shows the conflict zones. In green, the area of ​​Nagorno Karabakh and the areas of influence of the Armenians. In addition to the neighbours: Turkey, an ally of the Azerbaijanis and historically at odds with the Armenians, and Russia, which although not far from Azerbaijan, has a Defense pact with Armenia. ©France24.

The two former Soviet republics had clashed in the early 1990s, during the collapse of the USSR, over control of Nagorno Karabakh, a mountainous territory populated mainly by Armenians.

This first conflict, which caused 30,000 deaths, resulted in an Armenian victory. But Azerbaijan, an ally of Turkey, took revenge by launching a second war in the fall of 2020. This offensive allowed Baku to take control of numerous territories, including Shusha (Shushi, in Armenian), a strategic city located 15 kilometers from the capital. separatist, Stepanakert.

In November, the signing of a ceasefire under the aegis of Russia ended six weeks of fighting that had left nearly 6,500 dead. Two days of new clashes on the border between the two countries, in September 2022 there were at least 170 deaths and forced hundreds of Armenian civilians living in the border area to flee.

Since then, the fragile peace negotiations have continued to bear no fruit. Baku and Yerevan have separately appealed to the ICJ to intervene in the dispute. ICJ judgments are final, but there is no coercive remedy to enforce them.

To understand what is at stake with the ICJ ruling and its consequences on the blockade, France 24 interviewed Taline Papazian, professor at Sciences-Po Aix and director of the NGO Armenian Peace Initiative.

France 24: How do you analyze the order of the International Court of Justice? Is it purely symbolic or is it a victory for the Armenians?

Taline Papazian: This decision is very important, it is far from being symbolic. It is very important in the sense that it recognizes that the Lachín corridor is blocked, contrary to what Baku claims, and warns of the consequences of maintaining it. Although the International Court of Justice has no means to impose anything on Azerbaijan, his order can be considered a small diplomatic victory for Armenia.

Because it is well known that these types of decisions by judicial bodies, due to their international exposure, have direct implications and influence the perception of various international actors. I say “small victory” because it should be considered on the scale of the challenges facing Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh, but it is undeniably an important step. Yerevan has been conducting international law diplomacy since 2021, which may allow it to highlight the growing undercurrent of anti-Armenian racial politics at all levels in Azerbaijan.

This is a whole area of ​​public diplomacy that he could have engaged in since at least 2004, that is, since the beheading of the Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan by an Azerbaijani soldier during a NATO training program in Hungary.

France 24: The situation is unsustainable for the population, which sees how the humanitarian crisis worsens day by day. What is the situation on the ground?

The population continues to resist, but the effects of the blockade are being felt harshly due to the growing number of deficiencies. There is a lack of medicines, food, fruits, vegetables and powdered milk for children. There is also a lack of hygiene products.

In recent weeks, Russian peacekeeping troops have started to provide some humanitarian aid from time to time. But in proportions that are not enough to cover the needs of all the inhabitants or to ward off the specter of a humanitarian crisis.

Another effect of the blockade is that patients treated in hospitals are in danger of dying because they cannot be transferred to Yerevan. For their part, children no longer have access to schools, which did not reopen after the end of the Christmas holidays in January due to lack of adequate heating in the classrooms due to gas rationing.

Basically, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are caught in a pincer movement between the Russian forces, which are armed, and the Azerbaijani armed forces, which are now demanding the establishment of checkpoints, which would mean making all entry and exit conditional on the goodwill of Baku. Although, in the eyes of the inhabitants, the presence of Russian soldiers in the area has so far been a bulwark against the Azerbaijani army.

France 24: It is difficult to imagine a quick end to the crisis, despite the ICJ order. What can we expect from Turkey, where the Armenian Foreign Minister recently visited after the double earthquake on February 6?

It is too early to tell whether the ICJ decision will directly support a swift lifting of the blockade. From a general point of view, the situation remains on the verge of a possible war, although the EU observer mission, deployed earlier this week on the border between the two countries, postponed it in the short term.

Although the Armenians held out for 44 days against vastly superior forces in the 2020 war, the power imbalance in favor of Azerbaijan is too great. This means that we are far from a dynamic of calm, constructive and peaceful negotiations between two parties that would see peace in the same way and would like to build a stable future in the region.

Can Turkey play a role? If I wanted to, I could. Since the double earthquake, Ankara has found itself in a situation that will inevitably reshuffle the cards in the coming months on a political and economic level. But also in its relations with Western partners and international donors, while the country is plunged into a serious economic crisis and will have to respond to the socioeconomic consequences of the earthquakes.

So perhaps in this great upheaval that is to come there will be opportunities to accelerate or direct in a positive direction the attempts to restore diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia and, in turn, influence the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. But certainly not in the short term.

France24: What about Russia, the traditional mediator in the conflict, which still wants to play the role of mediator?

This blockade nullifies a very important article of the ceasefire agreement of November 9, 2020, signed under the auspices of Moscow. Some might even argue that since Latchin’s corridor provision doesn’t work, the legitimacy of his forces’ presence is in question.

However, Russia, which is already experiencing great difficulties in the Ukraine, cannot afford to lose its footing in the South Caucasus any further. When the Kremlin can no longer play the role of policeman, a country like Azerbaijan, which has the means for sovereign diplomacy thanks to its hydrocarbons, takes advantage of the situation to further break its ties with Moscow.

And Armenia, which does not have the same means but tries as best it can to preserve its interests, increasingly questions its relations with the Russians. The risk for the Armenians is to be caught between the geopolitical conflicts of the West and Russia. In any case, the latter, interested as Turkey is in the establishment of the Meghri corridor in southern Armenia, required by Azerbaijan to unite its territory with Nakhchivan -an Azerbaijani enclave-, can no longer pose as Yerevan’s mediator and ally.

* Article adapted from its original in French

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