There was a time when Eugeni Prigozhin he felt like something more than a Russian state plumber. After years of doing dirty work for his friend Vladimir Putin In Syria, in Africa, and wherever the defense ministry did not want to dirty its hands, Prigozhin dreamed of glory: for starters, with the legalization of his paramilitary army (ironically, the Wagner Group is illegal in Russia); then with a real post influence in the Kremlin and finally with a greater personal enrichmentThanks, for example, to the appropriation of the Soledar salt mines.
His ambition reached such a point that Prigozhin spent Christmas uploading first-person videos of his mercenaries from the Wagner Group in the vicinity of Bakhmut, protesting against Sergei Shoigu and against Valery Gerasimov for his little involvement in the battle and demanding more money and more weapons to conquer a city against which his private army had been crashing for five months. All this while his men hacked deserters to death and they published it on the networks without any qualms. Taking pride, rather.
Cruelty and propaganda. This has been the basis of the Wagner Group’s action in Ukraine throughout all this time. During the harsh autumn months, it seemed that the only army that was really participating in the “special military operation” was Prigozhin’s. His name covered all the covers and all the media were interested in him. The fanfare hid his failures: the mobilization of prisoners had served no purpose, only to increase insubordination, disorder and desertions. In turn, his elite troops continued to prove incapable of completely encircling Bakhmut, selling the seizure of part of Soledar, a town of ten thousand people, as an epic victory.
[Un excomandante del Grupo Wagner huye de Rusia: así fue su fuga entre disparos y perros de presa]
“Games Over”
Of course, all this has served the Kremlin wonderfully. His army was exhausted and where they have squeezed him he has had to run out and start digging trenches as if we were in 1916. The fact that there was a figure like Prigozhin assuming responsibilities, feeding the press and keeping alive the hope of a counteroffensive that never came, but which continued to be the focus of attention in a practically stagnant war, served Putin and Shoigu to cover up their miseries. . Now, at no time did they doubt who was in charge and who was obeying. It did not cross his mind to grant Prigozhin that status that he so desired.
Unlike. Gerasimov’s dismissal of Surovikin was a clear warning: now, in the face of the winter-spring offensive, we are in charge. Surovikin and Prigozhin had shown an undeniable affinity. Maybe excessive. Surovikin, a ruthless man, but with little experience in command – his duties had so far been limited to control of the air forces and, in fact, the only thing he did during his months at the head of the Russian army in Ukraine was bomb civilian infrastructure– he allowed himself to eat the land and the story by Prigozhin.
Soldiers from the Wagner Group next to an executed Ukrainian soldier.
Instead of claiming the few advances as his own, he let the Wagner Group as an organization do the bragging rights. Surovikin arrived in September as “General Armageddon”, promising victories and laying waste to capital, and left through the back door, overnight, replaced by one of the top members of the Kremlin structure. Neither more nor less than the chief of staff. A way of saying: “Games are over, now the seriousness begins.”
In fact, this idea has been repeated on several occasions throughout the war, starting with the effort not to use the forbidden word. The expression “we haven’t even started yet” has been heard on television sets, in press conferences and even in televised messages from President Putin himself. If Moscow has allowed a group of mercenaries, convicts and hustlers to represent its army for months, it has been because wanted to avoid military and propaganda attrition. Now, they trust, another phase in the war begins.
[Zelenski logró los Javelin y los Patriot, ya tiene los Leopard y ahora necesita misiles de largo alcance]
Rethink the objectives
The difficult thing for the Kremlin is going to be setting objectives. What does Putin want to achieve this spring? The attack from Belarus was taken for granted in December and early January, but will you continue with the same idea after seeing how Ukraine is preparing for that particular maneuver? Will you prefer to continue attacking from the east to gain complete control of Donbas? Will he choose to sell as a success the mere fact of resisting and not giving in in the occupied territories in the face of the strength of NATO? What image does Russia want to give of itself and its army?
From the outset, it should be an image of order and organization. The Ukrainian high command itself has acknowledged that Russia no longer falls into the strategic excesses of the first months of conflict. Thinking of an invasion of Ukraine like the one planned in February 2022 is somewhat utopian right now, but in Moscow it is still thought that if they manage to gather another 200,000 soldiers between volunteers and fresh out of military service, they will have an advantage in the Donbas that cannot be discussed with tanks or anti-aircraft defenses.
Russian President Vladimir Putin with General Valery Gerasimov in Moscow last December.
Reuters
However, there Prigozhin does not paint anything. Or, if you like, he paints the same thing he has always painted: the delivery paper. His men will be the first to enter the cities and the first to leave in coffins. They will take the risks that Gerasimov’s army does not dare to take and commit the atrocities that international conventions prevent Russia from committing. Nothing about a position in the Kremlin, nothing about legalizing the Wagner Group, nothing about winning battles that had already been lost.
Sergei Shoigu, a bad enemy
His direct confrontation with Shoigu has been sterile in every way, basically because Shoigu, together with Medvedev, has been the most faithful man to Putin on earth and Putin is not going to take him out of the way in favor of an upstart. Shoigu was minister of emergency situations with Yeltsin, with Putin and with Medvedev. I know involved in the fight against terrorismwas complicit in the repression against oligarchs and opponents, created the United Russia party to be led by its boss and, in return, received the post of defense minister in 2012.
[Rusia ataca a Ucrania con 30 misiles tras conseguir los Leopard: explosiones en Kiev y sin luz en Odesa]
In short, Shoigu is not defeated with TikTok videos or with bloody decks or attacks in the press. Prigozhin has misjudged his forces and his ability to influence and now you will pay for it with anonymity. All the successes from now on will be those of Gerasimov, Shoigu and Putin. Those of the Kremlin. Enough of taifa wrens. The failures? They will be disguised, made up and attributed to saboteurs, traitors and evil Nazis who came out from under the stones. Prigozhin better keep his salt mine or in the end he’s going to come out of this conflict worse than he went into it. And, clearly, it was not the idea.
