The Russian invasion of the Ukraine has brought to light important differences in European visions of security. If we let them fester, they will deepen the resentment between the European East and West.
How the war in Ukraine will end cannot be predicted. In its 11th month, Russia’s war against a neighbor of the European Union has left parts of Ukraine in shambles. Many civilians have died. Many cities, towns and villages have been destroyed. With the arrival of winter, much of the infrastructure has been deliberately attacked. Much of the population lacks water, heating, basic services, food, shelter and security. The news Coming from Mariupol, which Russia bombed and then occupied in June, they are shocking.
Russia’s war against Ukraine is not about preventing kyiv from joining NATO, an excuse used by Russian President Vladimir Putin to justify the invasion. Nor is it about fighting Nazism, another excuse. It is treated as recently wrote Gwendolyn Sasse, of “the destruction of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation.”
It is not entirely certain that all European countries have internalized Putin’s objective. If anything, his incessant warfare has opened several important breaches within the EU. How they are overcome could determine Europe’s future security architecture.
The first concerns the viability of EU soft power. The EU was created from the rubble of the Second World War. His ideology, for lack of a better word, remains a peace project. Economic strength aside, the EU is a soft power organization whose security is guaranteed by the United States. And it is a power where two ancient rivals – France and Germany, who went to war for centuries and managed to forge a rapprochement after 1945 – largely determined the EU’s relations with Russia.
Starting in the 1960s, successive German governments followed a special policy with the Soviet Union and continued to apply it with Russia after the end of the Cold War. Wandel durch Handel (exchange through trade) was not just a slogan. It was about weaving ties between Russia and Germany through gas pipelines.
Now it is clear, despite so many warnings ignored by the Central Europeans, that this dependency became an instrument used by the Kremlin to weaken and divide Europe. Europeans today pay a heavy price for Germany’s uncritical dependence on Russian gas. They have had to work to diversify their energy resources, which includes the purchase of liquefied natural gas from the United States, Qatar and other countries.
Some European political parties have accused US of taking advantage of Europe’s energy problems – which are its doing – instead of recognizing that these imports keep homes warm and industry running.
Despite the destruction that Russia is causing in Ukraine, both German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and sections of his Social Democratic Party and business lobbies yearn for the status quo ante.
Herein lies the second gap. It is related to the different historical experiences of the EU Member States and the consequent perception of threats. The EU, as a peace project, was refined over the years without the voice of Eastern or Central Europeans. They had to endure living under the dictatorship of the Soviet Union.
At present, Western Europe -especially France and Germany– a future European security architecture that involves Russia in some way is being considered. For Eastern Europeans, security is about defending against Russia. That is why the latter want Ukraine to win and Russia to be defeated. For them, the Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens the stability and security of Europe, a threat that would be exacerbated if Russia were to win.
That also explains why Eastern Europeans want the EU and NATO to defend Ukraine as much as possible. Their own historical and cultural experiences of living under the Soviet communist system play a key role in how they view Ukraine’s struggle for independence and sovereignty.
After 1945, Europe had a divided continent in which Western Europe enjoyed a peaceful project of freedom, democracy and stability. Eastern Europe lived under occupation and stability maintained by force. For Eastern and Central Europeans, when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the reunification of Europe meant membership of the EU and NATO. These two Euro-Atlantic organizations were the guarantors of their security and freedom. As Russia tries to destroy Ukraine, Central Europeans want the same prospects for Ukraine and other countries in the region. Unlike several Western European countries – notably Germany – they do not view the region through the prism of Russia.
These fractures will not separate the EU. But they will deepen and create resentment between Western and Eastern Europe unless both sides become aware of their different historical experiences and their perceptions of threats, security and Russia.
The war against Ukraine should be the catalyst for Europeans to understand why their different historical experiences matter and how they might shape the continent’s future security arrangements.
Article originally published in English in the Web from Carnegie Europe.
