ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN A new geography of war is defined in the Caucasus

The European Union and Turkey enter the scene in the negotiations between Yerevan and Baku. Confidence in Russian mediation, weakened by the Ukrainian conflict, is diminishing. The Karabakh problem and the Azerbaijani “corridors” to Turkey and Iran.

Moscow () – One of the most important consequences of the Prague summit of the Political Community of Europe that took place on October 6 was the resumption of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the intervention of Turkey, to find a solution to the conflict. The results remain to be seen, but several observers have noted the qualitative leap in the relationship between Europe and the Caucasus region.

A meeting between the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, France and the EU Council was also held in the Czech capital. The parties reached reciprocal recognition of territorial integrity based on the 1991 borders, long claimed by the Armenians, and the agreement on the establishment in the border area on the Armenian side of a civil mission of European Union observers.

Shayn Gadzjev, editor of the Azerbaijani agency Turan, considers that a great step forward has been taken, but that the main causes of the conflict have not yet been overcome: “All actors try to solve some problems for their own benefit, both the two countries in conflict like Turkey and the collective West.” The journalist stresses that “a special unknown is Pašinyan’s subsequent trip to France, which was followed by other visits by Armenian representatives and by the Prime Minister of Yerevan himself to the United States.”

The general impression is that Armenia is trying to reduce Russia’s role in controlling the territories. Moscow would also have disappointed expectations due to the war in Ukraine, which is exhausting its capacity to intervene. The new pro-Western orientation of Yerevan aims to overcome the phase of “on paper” agreements, such as the one in August, which was followed by two weeks of violent clashes.

Even the reference to the status quo of 1991 does not have a definitive value, because it does not exhaust Karabakh’s claim to be considered an Armenian region with the name of Artsakh, a problem that has existed since the end of the Soviet era. The compromise for now leaves this definition in parentheses, which Pašinyan would like to close once and for all, but he cannot go against the wishes of his people – not only the political opposition – and above all of the inhabitants of the areas affected by the conflict. .

For his part, the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, seems to be quite well disposed, but in all his statements the tone hardens when the subject of communication channels, the “corridors” to Iran and Turkey, which are the real purpose of the Baku war, rather than the identity of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The real question concerns the Lačinsk corridor regime, parallel to the Azerbaijan-Nakhičevan highway, if Baku is allowed to set up its own customs checkpoints.

Everything is focused on the highway control regime and in recent meetings there has been open talk of “freedom of transport, commercial cargo and people.” However, the Armenians refer to a smaller section than the Azerbaijanis claim. The Armenians want control and free access for their citizens, which forces Baku to go through controls in that country, which it will never accept. In the negotiations it has been suggested that these controls could be managed by the Russians, or perhaps by the Europeans.

The balances oscillate towards both parties: Azerbaijan seems to trust Moscow more, while the Armenians look towards the West. The paths of Eurasia are a path to the future of all international balances, and what is at stake in the Caucasus is something much more important than the particular interests of two apparently peripheral countries on the international scene.