On the surface at least, it appears that China-India relations have recently entered a period of normalization and even flourishing on some levels.
For example, a historic agreement has just been reached to withdraw troops in the disputed Line of Current Control, the most important diplomatic advance since the serious border clashes of 2020. At the same time, a certain diplomatic harmony between China and India is observed on the scene global, both voting in a similar way in international organizations regarding the war in Ukraine. Likewise, bilateral trade is at record levels in recent years.
However, all this apparent rapprochement and positive signs hide what is really happening in the relationship, with unfavorable prospects for the future.
First of all, it should be noted that after the 2020 border clashes in the Galwan valley, the first with fatalities in decades, India’s approach towards China seems to have shifted towards a minimal position that seeks to ensure mere coexistence, trying to avoid new military clashes and possible territorial advances by China in the disputed areas.
For India, border stability is an essential condition for a normal relationship with China, something that is by no means guaranteed today, despite the recent bilateral commitment to withdraw troops. As a recent proof of that characteristic equidistant posture of India, where mutual mistrust continues to prevail, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not meet with his counterpart Xi Jinping during the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held last month in Uzbekistan, as had been speculated in the previous.
Interestingly, the perception of China as a threatening and unreliable actor is deeply entrenched in India’s political, military, and academic elites. However, economic relations have gone down other paths. The Modi government has moved from initially seeking greater economic ties with China to imposing additional restrictions and controls on a range of Chinese activities in India, in the face of strong domestic criticism.
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India is now seeking to reduce its levels of dependency in critical sectors, but it constantly faces the dilemma of having a strong economic complementarity and high competitiveness with China due to geographical proximity, which ends up imposing itself in fact. Modi’s opponents have argued that the record bilateral trade with China would be more a measure of the failure of his foreign policy than a tangible benefit for India. Precisely, this anti-China resistance has left standby India’s entry into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest free trade agreement in the world, promoted by China. Of course, a fact celebrated by the US.
India’s approach to China seems to have shifted towards a minimal position that seeks to ensure mere coexistence
India considers especially worrying the growing economic and military support that China continues to give to Pakistan, which has become the most faithful vassal of Beijing. In fact, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is essential in China’s regional economic and security strategy. In recent years, Pakistan has plunged into an endless internal political crisis and has accumulated an exorbitant debt to China. In doing so, it has further deepened its historical position of dependence on Beijing, which has always been New Delhi’s greatest concern.
As a result of all of the above, India has recently sought more alignment with countries that can help strengthen its position in relation to China in the fields of defense, security and access to critical technologies. Such partners include, first and foremost, the US and its two other allies within the QUAD, Japan and Australia). But also to France, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Indonesia.
In this sense, it can be said that India has been one of the great geopolitical beneficiaries of the new “Indo-Pacific” approach, initially promoted by Japan and later adopted by the US during the presidency of Donald Trump. This approach has resignified the strategic importance of India in the region, presenting new opportunities to cooperate more with the West and, at the same time, hinder China’s expansionist plans in the region.
India has long sought to maintain strategic autonomy in foreign policy, refusing to engage in grand alliances. However, he is now aligning himself with Western powers to address the growing threat posed by China. However, always maintaining an autonomous position. On the one hand, India celebrates the relaunch of the QUAD and the increased US presence in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, he has abstained from international organizations on Ukraine, while taking the opportunity to expand his energy and military cooperation with Russia. And this despite strong pressure from the US and its allies.
Likewise, while showing agreement with China on various issues within the framework of the BRICS, the SCO and other multilateral organizations not dominated by the US, India has increased its unilateral actions to annoy Beijing. Perhaps most significant was New Delhi’s criticism of the “militarization of the Taiwan Strait” and the consequent refusal to reiterate its recognition of the “One China” policy, despite diplomatic complaints from Beijing. This does not imply that India will go on to recognize Taiwan, but it does imply that we will see more demonstrations of this type.
It should be noted that while India has supported the growth of the BRICS and CSOs, New Delhi continues to view China as a greater threat to its regional and global interests than any other Western power. That perception is not new and has not changed. Furthermore, the more leadership China promotes within the BRICS and CSO framework, such anti-Western platforms will limit their value to India. This does not mean that India will leave these groupings, but it does mean that it will seek to advance its own diplomacy at the bilateral level. In fact, Argentina appears in the new strategic calculation of India.
It can be said that India has been one of the great geopolitical beneficiaries of the new “Indo-Pacific” approach, initially promoted by Japan and later adopted by the US during the presidency of Donald Trump.
On the other hand, India’s strong dependence on Russia in economic and military matters will also be a factor that will contain New Delhi within these anti-Washington groups. And it is most likely that India’s ambiguous positions on Ukraine will continue, despite the US.
In conclusion, although there are currently positive signs in diplomatic and economic terms, due to both historical and recent factors, the trend in relations between China and India is towards greater distancing. The circumstantial alignment that can be observed between the two powers in some global issues, such as the war in Ukraine, is no less important than the certain possibility of growing bilateral tension in the future, due to domestic and regional issues that continue to be defining for the relationship.
