Liberate Limán, Kraminna and then launch on the Sievierodonetsk-Lisichansk complex or advance directly towards Lugansk capital. That seemed like the plan of the Ukrainian counteroffensive a couple of weeks ago and for a moment it seemed that everything could be a matter of days, if not hours. The Russian debacle on the Kharkov front was such that there was no way of knowing exactly where they were going to try to set up a holding line that could stop Zelensky’s army. After a few days, it is clear that this line has been established to the east of the Oskil River, the passage of which has delayed Ukrainian operations (it is not clear how many units have been able to cross the shore), and in the vicinity of the city of Limán, already in the Donetsk region, that is, in the heart of Donbas.
The Limán’s resistance has been important for Russia for different reasons: first, because it has slowed down the enemy counteroffensive; second, because Limán, itself, is a key strategic point in possible subsequent attacks towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk… and third, because it helps them buy time until the reinforcement troops arrive, which will gradually join the front without experience, without training and with little training. It will be weeks, even months, before that shapeless mass can be turned into an army, if it ever is. For now, yes, they will make a bulk.
On the Ukrainian side, Liman is a good measure of their chances. When we speak of his army, we also speak of a complex group of experts veterans of the Donbas war mixed with moral volunteers and forced recruits. If Russia has shown signs of surprising fragility, we cannot ask Ukraine for more than what it is doing, which in itself is sometimes miraculous. The capture of Limán was taken for granted -and a few of us sinned here- as if it were the easiest thing in the world. It was not. And it is showing.
Ukraine map.
ISW, Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom and own elaboration
While the pro-Russian bureaucracy is involved in referendums and annexations, the local army seeks to surround the piece from all sides. Harassed from the west and south, Limán will soon be attacked from the north as well, especially after the liberation of Maliivka, less than an hour’s drive away and about thirty kilometers as the crow flies. Everything indicates that, yes, Limán will fall, and, yes, it will be a new blow to Russian aspirations, but these two weeks will have served, it is assumed, to better protect the other positions inside Donbas.
Bakhmut’s mystery
Besides, there is the question of Bakhmut (Artemivsk). The Russian army has been slamming into the defense of the city for months, but it seems that for the first time in a long time, they may have penetrated the northern area. Everything that surrounds this offensive is strange and difficult to analyze: it is not understood that Russia continues to press on that side while neglecting other more important ones. For its part, sometimes it seems that Ukraine has not just mounted a counteroffensive there either because it is interested in having part of the enemy troops entertained in that objective.
[Pánico en un centro de reclutamiento de Rusia: un joven tirotea a un oficial para no ir a la guerra]
Artemivsk was a very important strategic enclave when it seemed that Sloviansk and Kramatorsk were within arm’s reach from the east. If Liman falls and the Russian line has to retreat to Kreminna, it is difficult to know exactly why Russia wants direct access from the south. It is true that the M03 is a very appetizing communication channel, but it does not give the impression that there is coordination in that attack or that it is even possible to attempt the subsequent offensive without controlling the northwest of Donetsk with guarantees.
As for the rest of the operations, they seem rather slowed down or, at least, slowed down. There are still pockets of Russian occupation in the north of Kharkov that are slowly being pushed out and there is no evidence that Ukraine is in a position to take a step forward in the south of the country. The advances are slow and do not indicate any type of cataclysm by the occupants. It is true that when Russia falls, it falls with a crash, but for now, it seems like a distant and costly destination.
Armored fighting vehicles abandoned by Russian soldiers during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Kharkov.
Reuters
The chaos of partial mobilization
The big question right now, as we said before, is to what extent partial mobilization will have an effect on the war. One tends to think that three hundred thousand soldiers, however poorly trained, should at least limit the Ukrainian initiative on all fronts. Now, the chaotic images that come to us from Russia itself, with an incomprehensible conscription process, replacements often drunk and completely out of shape, together with the continuous protests in the recruitment centers, especially in Dagestan and Siberia, they invite us to think of at least erratic behavior on the battlefield.
The fact that even on Russian state television this mobilization process is questioned -although, of course, those in charge of it are blamed and not those who ordered it- gives an idea of the discomfort it is causing among the Russian population. As Margarita Simonián herself, editor-in-chief of the Russia Today television channel and one of Vladimir Putin’s media hawks, pointed out, recruitment letters have even been addressed to men aged 62 or 63, an age not suitable for combat in these circumstances. .
[La desbandada del ejército ruso permite a Ucrania rebasar la frontera de la república títere de Putin]
The tendency, since at least the horrific experience of the Vietnam War, to completely professionalize the armies, has several explanations: one of them is to alleviate the discontent among civil society, except in those countries, logically, in which the civil society is an understatement. Another is to prevent inexperienced soldiers, unprepared and with low morale from spreading their discomfort to the rest of the troops with what that entails. If the people we are seeing in the images are going to be the ones in charge of defending the Limanes on duty or are going to have the responsibility of completing the conquest of Donbas, sincerely Russia has a huge problem.
