Taiwan and the South China Sea

In recent weeks we have seen an alarming increase in tensions in the Taiwan Strait, between China and the United States, under the pretext of the visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the island. Tensions that have taken a disturbing shape in some aggressive Chinese military maneuvers, presented as a test of a possible invasion or, at least, of China’s real capacity to establish an air and naval blockade of Taiwan, with the consequent and brutal impact on the trade flows. In particular, the essential Taiwanese role in the export of an essential component for world production such as microprocessors has once again been highlighted. His leadership in this field is overwhelming and substantially reinforces his geopolitical relevance. Whoever dominates the world chip market will have technological and also military supremacy. For the two great superpowers it is a matter of survival as such.

The People’s Republic of China claims, since its formation, its sovereignty over Taiwan, which it considers a “rebellious” province, based on the internationally accepted doctrine of “one China”. Something that was consolidated after Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing half a century ago. However, the international community, which largely recognizes this doctrine, has continued to maintain and intensify commercial and all kinds of relations with Taiwan, from the principle that any “reunification” cannot be based on the use of force and that It is something that has to be resolved through negotiation, respecting the characteristics of the island, especially its fully democratic nature and civil liberties, as well as its free market economy.

For this reason, the United States has followed the theory of “strategic ambiguity”, that is, assuming the idea of ​​a single China, but with the aforementioned premises and, therefore, leaving the possibility of defending Taiwan against aggression if those they were not fulfilled. There is today an intense debate in the US about whether it should continue along this line or go one step further and make its commitment to that defense explicit, including a military response.

Beyond this reality, Taiwan is the key to access from the East China Sea to the South China Sea, in addition to being part, with Okinawa and the Philippines, of the so-called first chain of islands that condition China’s exit to the Pacific , along with the second chain that goes from Japan to Guam and the Mariana Islands. For this reason, the US has land and naval bases in Japan and South Korea, and naval bases in the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Guam and Singapore, in addition to the Island of Diego García and Thailand, in the Indian Ocean.

«If China were to dominate Taiwan, it would imply tightening the siege of the South Sea, which in turn is key to the Strait of Malacca, whose free navigation is absolutely vital for Southeast Asia»

The corollary is that, if China were to dominate Taiwan, in addition to being very detrimental to Japan and South Korea in terms of the security of their trade flows, it would imply tightening the siege of the South Sea, which in turn is key to the Strait of Malacca, whose Free shipping is absolutely vital for Southeast Asia, for China itself and for Japan, Korea, the US or India, as well as for other major exporting powers such as Germany. It is true that the Sunda Strait, between Sumatra and Java, in Indonesia, could be an alternative. But it also depends on who controls the South Sea. It is no coincidence, in this context, that Japan deploys a much more assertive foreign and defense policy based on the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

For all these reasons, China is developing an aggressive policy in the Southern Sea, based on the so-called “nine-point line” that it claims as the limit of its territorial waters and that supposes control of practically all of it. This policy goes through territorial claims (particularly with the Paracel Islands and the Spratly archipelago), in conflict with five ASEAN countries (in addition to the dispute in the East Sea with Japan over the Sekaku/Daiou islands). In fact, the Philippines went to an Arbitration Court under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which ruled in its favor, without China having accepted the ruling.

But, in addition, China is deploying artificial islands for military use, “fishing” ships, coast guards and air-naval maneuvers that put pressure on neighboring countries, making it difficult to access their waters, in which, moreover, there are huge reserves of oil and gas, in addition to very important fishing resources.

“China is developing an A2/AD strategy whose objective is to avoid the possibility of any attack on its continental territory, but above all to prevent the US from its effective capacity to continue guaranteeing free maritime movement in the region”

Such a Chinese policy can be framed, in turn, in the development of an A2/AD strategy (Anti-Acces, of a defensive nature, and Acces Denial, of an offensive nature), with air-naval and missile deployment, whose objective is to avoid the possibility of any attack on its continental territory, but above all prevent the US from its effective capacity to continue guaranteeing free maritime movement through the region.

The US reaction is multidirectional. On the one hand, trying to strengthen its military ties with the Philippines or Singapore (Malaysia or Brunei have a foreign policy prone to the Asian giant) and, as far as possible, with Vietnam and Indonesia. And on the other hand, configuring alliances whose objective is to contain Chinese expansionism and show the will to have an adequate response capacity in the event of a crisis. The two most important are the QUAD (with Japan, Australia and India, an absolutely key country in this scenario) and the AUKUS, together with the United Kingdom, to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines in addition to other high-tech military capabilities, up to today closed to any foreign country. Without forgetting the American pressure so that NATO and the European allies also have a greater involvement in the region, as was specified in the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance approved at the Madrid Summit at the end of last June.

What is at stake is something as important as control of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. If China were to succeed, displacing the US, it would be a decisive step to consolidate itself as a global power, relegating the Americans to no longer being such. In short, nothing less than geopolitical hegemony in this century is at stake. Hence the Taiwan crisis cannot be isolated from a broader context. Once again in history, the great empires go through the domain of the seas and naval routes.