The six scenarios that can prevent the Ukraine war from dragging on for another six months

If it were not for the indecisiveness of the Ukrainian intelligence and particularly of its president Volodymyr Zelensky In the days immediately before the conflict, Russia would probably have advanced only a few kilometers north of Crimea and a few kilometers east of Donetsk by now. The rapid conquest of Kherson, Melitopol and a good part of the province of Zaporizhia allowed the subsequent encirclement of Mariúpol and the corresponding control over practically all the ports of the Black Sea.

In practice, this is the only victory of Vladimir Putin’s Army in this war… and it ended three months ago (the definitive conquest of the Azovstal steel mill took place on May 17). The advances in the east are of little relevance and are limited to the province of Lugansk. Even the publicly declared fact of focusing only on the Donbas has not changed things much: the conquest of Sievierodonetsk and Lisichanska month and a half ago, has led to a complete stalemate in the situation.

[Sólo el nacionalismo ruso da credibilidad a las tesis del Kremlin sobre la asesina de Darya Dugina]

It is hard to imagine who benefits from this stalemate and the consequent prolongation of the war. Both countries are on the verge of economic collapse and have lost an estimated 50,000 young people in a conflict that, it must be insisted, measures its progress in tens of kilometers. Europe watches with terror the arrival of the cold and the constant increase in gas prices, while the rest of the world fears a famine derived from the blockade of grain in Ukrainian ports, despite the agreements between Turkey and Russia for its partial distribution.

On the other hand, it is also hard to imagine how this war is going to end in which both are at stake: international prestige, territorial integrity, guarantees for the future, desire for revenge… Even so, we wanted to draw these six possible scenarios in which the war would end sooner than later. None of them are likely, but they at least stick to the logic of the conflict:

back to 2014

There seems to be some consensus among experts that Russia has a troop problem. Probably, at least in the south, also from supply lines. The first scenario for the end of this war involves a major mobilization from Moscow, more or less masked, that allows the Russian Army and its allies to defend the southern front and at the same time continue the offensive in the east, something that has not been achieved in All summer.

If that were to be the case and Russia advanced towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, occupying the territory of the so-called Ukrainian JFOs (Joint Forces of Operation), it is possible that it would provoke a cataclysm in the rest of the Donetsk province. Once the objective of conquering Donbas, understood in a purely administrative way and not counting the Russophone areas of Kharkov, has been fulfilled; Russia could, in practice, end its offensiveorganize various annexation referendums and consider the “special military operation” over.

Of course, Ukraine was not going to accept something like that, so something similar to a guerrilla war would continue in the area. What we had been seeing since 2014, wow. If we didn’t call it “war” then, maybe Putin will trust us not to now.

Russian collapse and withdrawal

Let’s take the opposite scenario: Putin fails to mobilize enough soldiers or pay enough mercenaries. The southern and eastern fronts hold out for a while, but both economic sanctions and the arrival of weapons in Ukraine take their toll on a demoralized Russian army. Supply lines begin to fail calamitously as bridges are torn down and rail lines are bombed. Little by little, Ukraine is beginning to make real progress in the south, something that it has not achieved so far. It surrounds Kherson, approaches Melitopol and even begins to bombard Mariupol.

[Natalia Vovk, la supuesta espía ucraniana a la que Rusia acusa del asesinato de Darya Dugina]

The acts of sabotage are growing and Putin has to decide between sending more men from Donbas or leaving those who are to their fate. He chooses the latter and a retreat is precipitated. Besieged by Ukrainian troops, armed and trained for months by various NATO countries, the Russian battalions are withdrawing into Crimea. In Moscow, they are proposing an agreement whereby their troops withdraw from all of southern and eastern Ukraine in exchange for the recognition of Crimea as Russian territory and a referendum in Lugansk and Donetsk to decide its independence, its continuity in Ukraine or its integration into the Russian Federation. Pressured by the West, and despite the fact that it is not an ideal ending, Zelensky reluctantly agrees.

Ukraine strength tables

Until now, we had looked at Russia’s ability to mobilize more troops. Let us now turn to the Ukrainian situation. for now, national mobilization plus immense Western aid has enabled an exemplary defense. Now, counteroffensives in the south have failed one after another. What if, with a more trained Army and more effective (and better used) weapons, Ukraine were able to turn this into a “give and take”? What if Russia realized that she has as much to lose as to gain by prolonging the war?

As in the previous point, Putin probably offered a ceasefire and negotiations in a foreign country, perhaps Turkey, with the aim of redefining the borders. Again, he would ask for recognition of the Crimea, even if he had to cede all the occupied territory to the north of the peninsula. As for the east, he said it, either a referendum, or the acceptance of a commitment to demilitarize the area and share resources. It would be complicated, of course, but at some point an imperfect agreement will have to be reached for both parties.

End of Putin and the war

We take for granted that Putin is untouchable, but what if he isn’t? He has been in the Kremlin for 20 years., plus those who spent in the shadow of Yeltsin. He knows everyone’s weak points, but at the same time everyone knows his. He is a man supported by a financial elite that he has been decimating little by little. A dictator who disposes of his Army at will without anyone complaining. Let’s say that changes. Let’s say that the crazy discourse of Novarrosiya and pride above all collides with the resistance of the royalists, those who want to continue doing business with the West, those who refuse to see their men humiliated in a foreign land.

[Linas Linkevicius, ex canciller de Lituania: “Rusia debe ser derrotada, dolorosamente derrotada”]

Let’s say the coffins back home start to make the victory speech untenable to the point that Putin is forced out of power. Let’s call it a coup or let’s call it a smooth transition. That will depend on Putin. There will be someone with a lot of power who is seeing what is happening and is pulling their hair out. What matters is whether we are talking about one man or ten million. In the second case, perhaps, we can see the end of Putin… and with the end of the genocide, the door is open to an agreement with the neighboring country… as long as it commits in writing not to enter NATO and to respect Crimea.

Ukrainian collapse and withdrawal

We talk all the time about the Russian shortcomings as if the Ukrainian ones did not exist. We have already said before that his Army has shown a clear inability to take the initiative and has barely advanced in its announced counteroffensive in the south. Soon the cold will arrive and, with the cold, the doubts of the West about whether it is convenient to prolong this war or not. Since the West is key in supplying weapons and training troops, the slightest hesitation would immediately affect Ukrainian performance on the battlefield.

If that were to happen, if the West even partially abandoned its commitment, Ukraine would probably have no choice but to consolidate forces across the Dnieper, both in the south and in the east. Give up the city of Zaporizhia, perhaps Mikolaiv, probably Odessa… and give up Donbas in its entirety, both the administrative part (Donetsk and Lugansk regions) and the cultural part (including the Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk provinces). Definitely, the dream of Dugin and Putin would be fulfilled to form a “New Russia” from Belgorod to Moldova.

Extension of the conflict to other countries

It is by far the worst possible option. If in a bad calculation, a Russian missile ended up in Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania… the direct conflict with NATO would be served. In the same way, if in retaliation for its policy in the Asia Pacific, China decided to actively participate in the war, it would cease to be what it is… but to become something even worse. A World War III of unpredictable consequences.

Just what we feared on February 24, when all this started. What Antonio Guterres has been warning for monthsSecretary General of NATO, without being able to do anything to prevent it.