Isljam Tokhlu, director of the Crimean Tatar Cultural Centre, on the prayers for “special military operations fighters”: “They are an alien element of the Muslim tradition in the service of the occupying armies. And even the justification of defending traditional values against the West is hardly applicable to the Caucasian context.”
Moscow () – The question of the participation of Russian Muslims in the war in Ukraine requires a proper definition, to know whether it is really a jihad or risks appearing as a crime against Allah. To clarify this and other delicate questions, such as the condescension of the ministers of the Islamic faith to the interpretations of the Holy Scriptures for the Moscow regime, the Idel.Realii website interviewed Koran scholar Isljam Tokhlu, director of the Crimean Tatar cultural center.
In recent weeks, one of the most debated topics in Russia and Central Asian countries has been the role of women in Islam, and in particular the way they dress, with the wearing of the niqab banned in several regions. A video in which Imam Timur Kamaev from Kazan explains the correct way to “beat your wife” also caused a stir. Tokhlu starts from the principle that in the Islamic tradition, “as in any other religion based on scriptures”, one must first distinguish what is written in the sacred texts from the interpretations of theologians, often dependent “on their geographical location”.
The aforementioned precept of verse 34, a quote written on walls at recent Muslim protests in several Russian cities, expresses what is “generally accepted throughout Sunni Islam”, with a practical translation of moderate control in family life that must be transferred to all spheres of social life. Hence the fundamental dilemma of how decisive interpretations of the Koran are on the most burning issues, given that “times change”, the expert recalls. If the text says in the original “talk to her, and distance yourself”, translating it as “take the whip and beat her” could lead to even more radical domestic violence than that proposed by the imam from Tatarstan.
This ambiguity is also reflected in the tragic dimension of the war, when Muslim believers are invited to align themselves with the Orthodox, forming prayer meetings in favour of the “fighters of the special military operation”, as the President of Bashkortostan, Radij Khabirov, did. In this case, an element foreign to Islamic tradition is introduced, the collective moleben typical of the Byzantine-Slavic liturgy, above all “for the salvation of soldiers and victory in the war”.
As Tokhlu explains, “it is important not to introduce practices other than those of the Prophet Muhammad himself,” according to which one can pray individually for loved ones, but not gather for collective and contingent reasons. In this case, “one is actually praying for the occupying armies and for the people who impose colonial regimes, which is unacceptable for Islam.” The definition of Jihad for the Russian war in Ukraine is also, in his opinion, completely inappropriate, since “external Jihad, which is secondary to internal and spiritual effort, indicates the defense of one’s own life, one’s family and one’s people, or of the entire Muslim community, if necessary even by means of war.”
The Koran indicates that the Jihad war is aimed at defence, but here it is a question of “aggression and occupation”, and if the Russians want to justify it as “the defence of traditional values against the West”, this interpretation can hardly be applied to Russian-Caucasian Islam, which is “well rooted in its own traditions”. According to the academic, anyone who fights in such an army “must be considered an unbeliever”, who gives his life for purposes other than religion. If anything, remembering the Russian occupation of Tatar and Caucasian territories in past centuries, “a war against the occupying Russians would make sense”. It is therefore “a control of politics over religion”, forcing the correct interpretations of Islamic scriptures “and indeed of Christian ones as well”.
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