The agreed rules of the war in Ukraine

Despite the breakdown of political dialogue at the highest level, there is “certainly talk” among the military, admit various Western military sources. It is reminiscent of Clausewitz’s saying that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” Politics, according to the Prussian military thinker, is not interrupted, but continues during wars, and is what allows them to end. The “red lines” of both sides have been discussed, essentially between Washington and Moscow.

The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk, the first territory captured from Russia since World War II, has been a turning point. One of the rules was not to occupy territory belonging to the Russian Federation, accompanied by another complementary one: that Ukraine should not attack beyond the disputed areas. Crimea and its waters are disputed territory. It is difficult to imagine that the Ukrainians did so in Kursk without the knowledge or approval or support of the US (and the UK), given the number of military advisers from these powers in Ukraine.

Zelensky may be pursuing his own agenda, taking more risks than Washington would like. If he has done so without consulting his allies, bad. If he has done so with the support or approval of his allies, too. Despite the fine words, there is a certain distrust in Zelensky and his entourage, reinforced after the loss of the F-16 fighter.

The Ukrainian action may be an effort to position itself for negotiations that could end up involving territorial exchanges, especially if Donald Trump were to return to the White House. It remains to be seen whether the Kursk incursion, in addition to being politically, morally and perhaps diplomatically effective, makes military sense for the Ukrainians if it leaves Donetsk unguarded. Professor Stephen Biddle calls it a “false promise” This incursion into Russian territory will not change the balance of power.

In any case, the rules of the allies govern the limits and scope of the weapons supplied to Ukraine. The reluctance of the allies to make deep incursions into Russian territory should not be underestimated either. Paris and London are more in favour than Washington or Berlin, which fear that NATO will become increasingly involved. Is this rule gradually being dissolved and the conflict becoming even more “NATO-ised”?

In exchange for not occupying or attacking Russian territory, there is another rule, which has no military meaning but rather political: Russia does not attack the supply lines from Poland and other neighbouring countries of the weapons that the West supplies to Ukraine. Without these supplies, kyiv would not be able to wage this defensive war, which it is trying to transform into an offensive one. When Russian experts visiting Spain are asked why Russia does not attack these lines, the answers are always evasive.

These rules are framed in two situations. The first is that Russia is a nuclear power. In fact, Putin has publicly and privately raised the threat of using nuclear weapons tactically in the event that what he considers to be vital Russian interests are endangered. This nuclear condition has marked the decision of the Western allies, essentially NATO, to avoid a direct confrontation with Russian forces, which could lead to an escalation that is difficult to control. Although from a military point of view, the tactical use of nuclear weapons does not make much sense for Russia, the logic of nuclear strategy, of mutual deterrence in use, with its paradoxes and its current greater complexity, requires a update. For now, there is a new race, including the prospect of installing atomic-capable missiles in Germany in 2026.

The second situation is that Western arms have from the outset denied control of airspace to Russian air forces which, if they had been able to use their aircraft freely, would have had a marked superiority. Also in the opposite direction. It is drones, including so-called “killer drones” and unmanned missiles, which mark the airspace battles of this conflict, with the Ukrainians even reaching, more symbolically than anything else, Moscow.

All this does not mean that one of the objectives of both sides, especially the Russians, is, contrary to international law, the civilian population of the other. This is a trend that stems from the Second World War, from the German attacks on England, and the so-called “strategic bombings” of the Allies against Germany, which were of little use, as was later assessed. Attacks against civilian populations have gained in importance, as in the Hamas attack and the response against Gaza. As a result, modern wars, with new technologies, are proving to be very bloody, for combatants and non-combatants alike.

In the Russian case, there seems to be another objective: the destruction of Ukraine’s industrial fabric, which, in any case, will take time to recover. It is clear that this has been a constant Russian theme in this long war, an objective that has now been reinforced after the capture of part of the Kursk region by the Ukrainians.

In this war there is another element that is not touched, because it would mean a casus belli General: reconnaissance and communications satellites. The development of private satellite systems, such as Elon Musk’s Starlink, was vital for Ukrainian troops to have access to the Internet. Cyberwarfare and sabotage, although more free, also seem to have some limits. The case of the arrest in France of Pavel Durov, the CEO of Telegram, has an impact in this context since the messaging service is, or was, strategic for the Russians.

These rules keep the conflict controlled and limited. But if they are broken, the dynamics can change. In fact, unwritten but spoken rules can be very fluid and subject to change as the conflict evolves. What may be considered acceptable behavior at one point may become unacceptable later.

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