Indian elections: the end of democratic backsliding?

On June 4, 2024, as the results of the Indian general election were being consolidated, a political earthquake shook the country. Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) failed to secure an absolute majority of seats (272), winning only 240, 63 fewer than in 2019. The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) barely crossed the majority threshold, securing 294 seats, far short of the 400 it had declared it would win. The BJP’s “victory,” put into the Indian political context, actually looked like a resounding defeat.

A few weeks after the electoral verdict – and based on the data from post-count polls – it is possible to analyse the reasons for this result and draw some conclusions for the future of Indian politics.

Is it the economy, or not?

Let us begin with two widely publicized reasons for the BJP’s disappointing results: economic difficulties and a backlash against rising authoritarianism. Overall, it is now clear that both reasons, while influencing the results, do not constitute a complete explanation for the election result. On the one hand, it is true that the country went to the polls in a context of economic uncertainty. In a pre-election survey, as many as 62% of respondents said they would vote in the polls. They mentioned unemployment, rising prices or falling incomes as the main reason why the BJP should not have another chance in government. Added to this is the fact that the agrarian situation – a persistent problem that has led to widespread and long-lasting protests – has marked much of Narendra Modi’s terms in office. Finally, inequality HE ha shot in recent years, accelerating a long-standing trend.

However, states with similar economic problems – such as much of the northern “Hindi belt” – responded very differently. In Uttar Pradesh, for example, the BJP suffered a significant decline in its vote share (-8.3 percentage points), while in neighbouring states the change was much more moderate (-3.1 percentage points in Bihar) or even positive (+1.3 percentage points in Madhya Pradesh). Overall, as the post-poll survey data show, the BJP was in a very bad position. kept The BJP’s advantage among poor voters was evident: as many as 37% of the poor voted for the BJP, slightly above the 36% who preferred the INDIA Alliance, a constellation of 26 parties that campaigned on a very progressive and markedly centre-left programme. Farmers’ distress appears to have weighed more heavily, with the BJP suffering heavy losses in states that have witnessed significant farmer protests (Rajasthan: -9.3 percentage points; Haryana: -11.9 percentage points). Moreover, Modi’s party lost ground among most farming castes across the country, except in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, where the party is virtually unchallenged.

Overall, the BJP’s national vote share declined marginally (from 37.4% to 36.6%). However, the regional breakdown of the vote share indicates that where the BJP was the dominant party – in most of the north and west of the country – its vote share declined quite sharply (-4.6 percentage points), while in areas where the party was the challenger of regional parties (in the south and east) it made substantial gains (+5.9 percentage points), thus offsetting losses in its core support areas. In other words, it appears that feelings of opposition to the traditional parties – caused at least in part by economic difficulties – were one of the reasons why the BJP did not sweep the polls.

Stopping the authoritarian drift

A similar observation could be made about the interpretation of the election results as a reaction against the growing authoritarianism. The consequences of the verdict should not be confused with its causes. There is very little evidence in the post-election survey data that voters strongly resented India’s democratic backsliding. If more than two-thirds of voters think the elected government should be controlled by other constitutional bodies, a similar proportion is of I agree with the statement that “we must have a strong leader who does not have to worry about elections.” These contradictory data indicate, at the very least, that there was no strong reaction in defence of democracy and India’s liberal values, even though the opposition parties made the defence of the Constitution one of their main pillars in the elections.

However, there is at least one sense in which voters did defend the constitutional provisions. Indeed, post-poll survey data show that there was a significant shift of Dalit voters – belonging to the so-called lower castes – away from the BJP. This is one of the few national trends that can be extrapolated from the data. The reasons point to anxiety among Dalit voters – inadvertently promoted by the BJP and fuelled by opposition parties – that the ruling party had used its majority to change the Constitution and get rid of provisions reserving seats for lower castes in Parliament and in public sector employment. It is probably in this sense – the fear of a reversal of affirmative action policies – that we should interpret voters’ intention to defend the Constitution, rather than a more general concern about the erosion of liberal democracy.

The data on whether voters approved of Modi’s majoritarian turn in Indian politics is also mixed. On the one hand, an overwhelming majority of voters believe that India does not belong to Hindus alone. Moreover, the share of voters who “strongly agree” with the statement that “in a democracy, the will of the majority community should prevail” fell from 1.5% to 1.8%. 23% to the 19% between 2019 and 2024, though it is still much higher than before Modi became Prime Minister. Moreover, most respondents agree that minorities should adopt the ways of the majority. In other words, Indian voters cannot be said to have rejected outright the majoritarian logic that has underpinned much of Modi’s politics over the past decade. However, the BJP’s overall decline in popularity – especially in northern India, where the most blatant displays of majoritarianism have been seen – does indicate that voters were not prepared to back India’s transformation into a Hindu nation. de jure.

Opposition unity, cracks in Modi’s bloc

Two other factors, though not widely reported in the media, played a key role in the election results, with important implications for the functioning of the Indian political system. First, it is clear that the opposition parties proved to be much more aligned and willing to reach consensus than most observers had predicted. The opposition’s unity, coordination and ability to agree on seat allocation were crucial in key states, especially Uttar Pradesh. Looking ahead, it is plausible to expect that the confidence-building mechanisms established during the election campaign will strengthen the opposition, which in turn could act as a moderating force on government action.

Secondly, there is evidence that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, the BJP’s parent organisation) may have supported the BJP less enthusiastically than in the last two elections. The RSS, to which Modi belonged from a young age, is India’s largest Hindu nationalist organisation, with millions of volunteers across the country, who have been the BJP’s “foot soldiers” in the past. It is a paramilitary organisation, modelled on the Balilla The RSS is a party to the Italian government, whose ultimate goal is to transform India into a Hindu state. However, the RSS has historically been suspicious of political leaders who acted too independently of it. Shortly after the results were announced, RSS leaders blamed the BJP’s arrogance for the poor election results, a message interpreted as criticism of the Prime Minister. These comments are important because they could signal the opening of some breathing space for those who oppose the Prime Minister. inside within the ecosystem of Hindu nationalism, including the BJP. Indeed, it is hardly a secret that many in the party resent the excessive centralisation of power, as well as the marginalisation of senior party leaders over the past decade. This could also act as a restraining force on the government’s action.

These two coercive forces could expand the room for manoeuvre of other state institutions, as well as the media, a change that has become evident in the weeks since the elections. Combined with the pressures of running a coalition government alongside parties (such as the Rashtriya Janata Dal or the Telugu Desam Party, the BJP’s closest allies within the NDA) that enjoy the support of religious minorities, this new situation could fulfil the expectation that the elections have halted or at least slowed India’s democratic backsliding.

Looking to the future

However, a U-turn should not be expected. Especially in the states where the BJP is in power, majoritarianism will continue to be the order of the day.

In the weeks since the election results were announced, demolitions of Muslim homes have continued, cow vigilantes have attacked minorities, and opponents continue to be targeted by police action, including Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal (who remains in jail) and Booker Prize-winning author Arundhati Roy, who is currently being prosecuted under the anti-terrorism law for comments made 14 years ago about Kashmir. In addition, a potentially draconian new penal code (passed by the previous Parliament) has just come into force.

One way to gauge the direction the country is taking is to look at the bills the government will bring to Parliament. For example, if the government were to decide to bring forward a Uniform Civil Code bill – a highly controversial issue that would replace religion-based personal laws with standardised rules on issues such as marriage, divorce and inheritance and is therefore seen by religious minorities as an encroachment on their rights – it would be a clear signal that the BJP is willing to test the limits of coalition politics to realise its ideological project. On the other hand, the government could decide to focus on economic issues and employment. This would indicate a more measured approach by the BJP, possibly postponing more controversial issues until the party gets a clearer mandate during one of the many state-level elections in the coming months (the first being Maharashtra in October).

In other words, for the moment, India’s fate as a democracy remains somewhat of a question mark.

Article translated from the website of Affari International Institute (IAI)

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